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Abstract  
There is an undeniable connection between nationalism and dead bodies. According to 
Katherine Verdery (1999) dead bodies have enjoyed political life since far back in time. Based on 
nearly seven months of fieldwork among Tibetans in Dharamsala, India, this thesis concerns the 
political life of dead bodies in an exile context. It describes and analyzes how self‐immolations 
(the act of setting oneself ablaze), a new form of protest, in Tibet, are understood and made 
meaningful among exiled Tibetans in Dharamsala. Although potentially immoral as a form of 
violence and suicide within a Buddhist framework, this thesis shows that the self‐immolations 
are understood as a form of sacrifice and non‐violence, and that the self‐immolators have the 
uncontested status of heroes. Building on Michael Lambek’s (2007) theory of sacrifice as a kind 
of beginning, I propose that the self‐immolations can best be understood as an attempt at 
substantiating a beginning of exile politics, which again carries the potential for changing the 
present political situation in Tibet.  
 Moreover, I analyze this special kind of sacrifice within the anthropological framework of 
“good” and “bad death”, where the self‐immolations clearly are made to be a “good” form of 
death. My central argument is that the perceptions of the self‐immolations and the connected 
practices of commemoration are best analyzed in relation to the nationalist project in exile, 
which is conditioned by faith in certain values and goals. As a “good death”, the self‐immolations 
can be seen to reinforce the nationalist project in exile, and to ensure a continuity of the Tibetan 
freedom struggle and certain values.      
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structures and sentiments. Our commitments are to making sense of the frustrations, the 
possibilities, the unknowns. 
                      Carole McGranahan, Savage Minds, April 30, 2015 
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       “To whom do the dead belong?” 
                                                                  Heonik Kwon (2006, p. xi). 
Introduction   
 
This was just any other day. I began the early morning walk from my Tibetan Ama-la’s (mother’s) 
house to the Boudhanath Stupa,1 before beginning my day at the Tibetan language school. The sky 
was blue and the air felt light. The summer mornings at Boudha were comfortable until the midday 
heat swept over the Kathmandu Valley. School children with square backpacks – too heavy for their 
tiny bodies – were on their way to school. As I was approaching the Stupa I ran into Pamela, an 
elderly Australian lady who was one of my schoolmates. She decided to join me for my daily 
morning kora.2 We began chatting about the beautiful morning weather. The Nepali and Tibetan 
ladies were, as usual, seated along the narrow street leading to the Stupa, selling butter lamps to be 
offered there. As I passed them I could feel the heat from the lamps trying to embrace me. Watching 
the little flames of the lamps was so peaceful that I, as always, could not turn my glance back to the 
street.   
 As we continued a few steps further, my entire body suddenly trembled from the sound of a 
loud and penetrating scream coming from the Stupa. I was not sure whether I wanted to continue, 
but my body still carried on. Pamela came running down, but then ran back up, terrified by 
whatever she might have witnessed. “I can’t watch this”, she said, her voice trembling as she threw 
me a quick glance and ran back up the street. I continued walking, quite alarmed, and the first 
thing that caught my glance on seeing the Stupa, was a Western woman, screaming from its top. 
Shifting my glance to the left, my mind turned completely still as, in the midst of the chaotic scene, I 
saw flames emerging from the Stupa. In a state of shock I slowly moved to the side, staring at the 
flames and what I understood was a self-immolation. A huge crowd was gathered in front of me 
and on the top of the Stupa. Some were taking photos. Not a single sound was to be heard from the 
person on fire. We who stood outside the Stupa were spared the sight of his body on fire. A few 
Tibetans continued with their kora. One of them, an elderly man, was shaking his head either in 
anger or disappointment.  
 Within a few minutes people managed to extinguish the flames and several took out their 
cell phones to take a photo. Others ran inside the Stupa and climbed to the top to see the person’s 
charred body. A few hours later, these photos were shared online.  
Soon the crowd began moving in different directions and so did I, to do kora and pray for yet 
another Tibetan who just had self-immolated and died. The kora, which at this hour of the day 
would usually be filled with throngs of people, was now quite empty. As I approached the spot 
                                                 
1
 Tibetans see the Stupa as the figuration of the Buddha’s body, speech and mind (Levenson and Hamani 2003, 
p. 28). Walking around a Stupa – known as kora – is practiced to purify negative karma and gain merit. The 
Boudhanath Stupa is one of the holiest places for Tibetan Buddhists in Nepal.  
2
 Ritual circumambulation.   
2 
 
where the last self-immolation had taken place in March, a group of armed Nepali policemen came 
running and seized the dead body, just as they had done at the last self-immolation in February 
2013.3 Soon they left, taking with them the self-immolator’s corpse. I continued my kora, and was 
soon joined by more Tibetans. Everything seemed to be back to normal, without the slightest trace 
of the terrible incident of 15 minutes ago. The world carried on as usual.    
                                                                                      
Figure 2: The Boudhanath Stupa. The self‐immolation took place inside the white wall, 
approximatly at the spot where the multi‐colored prayer flags can be seen on the  left.   
 The above scene describes the self‐immolation of Karma Ngedon Gyatso on August 6, 
2013. A self‐immolation is the act of setting oneself on fire, with the intention of dying. To self‐
immolate involves dousing one’s body with kerosene or petrol, in some cases swallowing the 
liquid, and then lighting a match and setting oneself on fire (McGranahan, 2013).4    
 Karma Ngedon Gyatso was a thirty‐year old monk. Before becoming the 127th Tibetan 
self‐immolator, he bought butter lamps, paying 1500 rupees (ICT).5 Unlike some of the other 
self‐immolators, he did not leave any message behind. In exile, the self‐immolations are 
generally understood as a political protest against the Chinese occupation. When this incident 
took place, I was in Kathmandu to learn Tibetan to prepare for my fieldwork in Dharamsala on 
the perception of self‐immolations among exile Tibetans. After witnessing one, I became even 
more determined to carry out this project.  
 This thesis is about a special type of sacrifice and the Tibetan freedom struggle in exile. 
The self‐immolations are understood by exile Tibetans as a form of sacrifice, non‐violent in its 
nature, and the self‐immolators have the uncontested status of heroes. However, when the first 
self‐immolation took place in 1998 in New Delhi, and later when the wave of self‐immolations in 
Tibet started in 2011, the opinions were more diversified. A new form of protest, Tibetans did 
not know how to make sense of such drastic acts. The self‐immolations raised many questions, 
                                                 
3
 http://www.savetibet.org/dismay-over-hasty-secret-cremation-of-tibetan-monk-who-self-immolated-in-
nepal/ (acc.29.06.2015). The authorities cremated him at night the same day, without Buddhist rituals. His 
name was Drupchen Tsering and he self-immolated on February 13 – the third day of the Tibetan New Year 
(losar), also celebrated in exile for the first time as Tibetan Independence Day (chapter 5).  
4
 Taken from a talk on the self-immolations at Yale University in December 2013:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDLqEVMu7WY (acc.29.06.2015).  
5
 International Campaign for Tibet: http://www.savetibet.org/tibetan-monk-dies-after-self-immolation-in-
kathmandu-nepal/ (acc.30.06.2015).  
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one of the most often discussed issues, by both Tibetans and the international media, was 
whether the self‐immolations could be said to be an accepted form of protest within a Buddhist 
moral framework, where killing oneself is regarded as a great sin. This raised another related 
question; whether setting oneself ablaze was in accordance with the non‐violent approach of the 
Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama had earlier even been critical of hunger strike as a form of protest in 
the Tibetan freedom struggle, defining this as a form of violence.6 However, as the self‐
immolations have continued inside and outside Tibet’s borders, these questions are only seldom 
heard among exile Tibetans, and the self‐immolations are perceived and talked about as a form 
of non‐violent sacrifice.  
 Based on fieldwork among Tibetans living in exile in Dharamsala, north India, I explore 
why this has come to stand as the dominant understanding, and how the self‐immolations are 
made meaningful as a sacrifice. My central argument is that it is vital to contextualize these 
actions within the political project in exile. Applying Michael Lambek’s (2007) understanding of 
sacrifice ‘as a kind of beginning’, I suggest that the self‐immolations can be viewed by exile 
Tibetans as an attempt at substantiating a new kind of beginning. For exile Tibetans, this 
beginning, I hold, should be seen as a potential for changing the present political situation in 
Tibet.  Lambek further argues that self‐sacrifice stands in contrast to the classic gift (Mauss, 
2002; [1990]) because reciprocity is not possible in the former. It is a ‘first’ gift which can be 
neither cancelled nor returned. Thus, he holds, the only choice is to honor it (Lambek, 2007, p. 
29). This applies to the self‐immolations, too, and I argue that the relationship between the self‐
immolators (the dead) and those left behind (the living) is invested with morality. The memory 
of the self‐immolations as a sacrifice creates an active, moral relationship in which those alive 
are in debt to the former. I will show that in the exile context, the way the self‐immolations are 
remembered and the relation between the dead and the living, is deeply influenced by the 
nationalist discourses defined by central political actors: the Central Tibetan Administration 
(CTA) and the NGOs. These, I will argue, are engaged in a power struggle to define the aims of 
the self‐immolators. Hence, this thesis concerns the dominating narratives of the self‐
immolations as constructed by exile Tibetans, or, using Katherine Verdery’s expression, it is a 
thesis about “the political lives of dead bodies” (1999 [2004]).  
 Building upon Verdery’s perspective Charlene Makley (2012) has also explored the 
political lives of dead bodies of the self‐immolators, however, within the context of People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). She regards the self‐immolations as a form of “mass media”, called forth 
by severe state repression and dispossession on the one hand, and both PRC state and foreign 
media spectacles on the other. Makley considers the self‐immolations to be “primarily situated 
forms of communication”, telling us something about the “tragic intensification” of political lives 
                                                 
6
 The Dalai Lama’s statement on the Tibetan Youth Congress ‘Hunger strike unto Death’ in New Delhi, 1998: 
http://www.tibet.to/tyc1998/tyce.htm#09 (acc.07.08.2015).  
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of dead bodies in certain regions from 2009 when the first self‐immolation took place in Tibet. 7 
While Makley’s article concerns the political life of dead bodies of the self‐immolators post 2009, 
and of others who died as a result of the violent crackdowns in Tibet in 2008, as well as 
exploring what these deaths communicate, I turn my focus not so much towards what the self‐
immolations communicate, but rather their interpretations among Tibetans in Dharamsala, 
India.  
 
Clarification of the terms “Tibet” and “Tibetans” 
Robert Barnett introduces three dominating conceptions of Tibet (Tibetan: Pö): one recognized 
by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), referred to the as the “Tibetan Autonomous Region” 
(TAR), equivalent to the area ruled by the Dalai Lamas until 1950, a second referring to a vast 
area with a common cultural and historic heritage throughout the Tibetan plateau; and a third 
which implies one single political entity (Barnett, 2014, p. xix).8 The latter is composed of U‐
Tsang (TAR), Amdo (Qinghai, parts of Gansu and Sichuan) and Kham (parts of Sichuan and, a 
corner of Yunnan), and  is commonly known as “Pö Chö(l)kha Sum”, meaning three regions of 
Tibet (Shakya, 1993, p. 13). Today, Tibetans from these three regions are regarded as one ethnic 
group, on the basis of which national identity is asserted (Tibet.net). In exile, the term “Tibetans” 
(pöpa), as promoted by Central Tibetan Administration or NGOs, refers to one unified, 
homogenous group, which blurs local and regional identities (Korom, 1997; McGranahan, 2005, 
p. 573), and I also use the term in this way.9  I use “Tibet” to refer to the three regions.  
 
Nationalism and dead bodies 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is the connection between nationalism and dead bodies. 
I explore the Tibetan nationalist discourse in Dharamsala by focusing on the perceptions and 
practices surrounding the self‐immolations. Thomas Hylland Eriksen writes, “death is often 
important in nationalist symbolism: individuals who have died in war are depicted as martyrs 
who died in defense of their nation” (2010, pp. 129‐130). Giving up their lives is possible 
because nations inspire love, “and often profoundly self‐sacrificing love”, as Benedict Anderson 
(1983, p. 141) has argued. Further, Anderson points out that this love is clearly visible in 
nationalism’s cultural products, such as poetry, art or music, which it certainly is in the Tibetan 
case.10  
                                                 
7
 Makley has published a more elaborate article on the political lives of the self-immolators more recently 
(August 2015), but unfortunately due to time limitation I have not been able to incorporate it here.  
8
 A similar distinction is between “political” Tibet, which is the historical Tibet ruled by the Dalai Lama, 
equivalent to today’s TAR, and “ethnographic” Tibet, which includes also the Tibetan regions of Amdo and 
Kham (Goldstein & Kapstein, 1998). 
9
 However, despite this, regional identities continue to have a practical and symbolic importance (McGranahan, 
2010, p. 17), something I also found.    
10
 This is evident also in the Tibetan nationalism expressed in exile, for instance by poets and writers Lhasang 
Tsering (2012) or Bhuchong D. Sonam (2012), or by artists such as Karma Sichoe, Tashi Norbu or Tenzing Rigdol.  
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 In her book The Political Lives of Dead Bodies, Verdery (1999) has discussed the 
connection between nationalism and dead bodies in more detail, arguing that dead bodies have 
enjoyed “political lives” since the ancient past. She points to the connection between nationalism 
and dead bodies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where, following communism’s 
fall, dead bodies became central in the project of nation building. Choosing a specific number of 
dead was a way of creating collective identities, as well as rewriting history and shaping the 
future. Today, I will show, the Tibetan self‐immolators occupy a similar role in the exile 
community, i.e. as a national symbol of resistance and as a metaphor for the political situation 
inside Tibet, a situation often expressed as, “Burning Tibet”  (chapter 3).  
 In other words, there is an undeniable connection between nationalism and dead bodies, 
particularly visible in the Tibetan case since the wave of self‐immolations in recent years has 
resulted in many deaths, transformed into symbols of Tibetan nationalism. Following Benedict 
Anderson I understand nationalism as a “cultural artefact” (1983, p. 4). Nationalism, he argued, 
should be treated as if it belongs to “kinship” and “religion”, rather than political ideologies 
(1983, p. 5). Because nationalism is based on indicators of common origin or ethnicity such as 
appearance, color, language or religion (Horowitz, 1985, p. 17), it evokes intense emotions and 
sentiments, whereby “the nation is created as an object of devotion” (Kapferer, 1998, p. 1). By 
focusing upon nationalism as a form of kinship, we will also be better equipped to understand 
“the force and persistence of national identification and sentiment” (Eriksen’s reading of 
Anderson, in Eriksen, 2010, p. 120).  
 To provide a working definition of nationalism, I follow Verdery who, building on 
Anderson’s suggestion, understands nationalism as a kind of ancestor worship, “a system of 
patrilineal kinship, in which national heroes occupy the place of clan elders in defining a nation 
as a noble lineage” (1999, p. 41). Nationalist discourses are filled by kinship metaphors, she 
argues, such as “fatherland” or “motherland”. Thus, Tibet is commonly referred to as phayul 
(“fatherland”). For followers of nationalism, members of the same nation are also imagined as 
one’s brothers and sisters (Verdery 1999, p. 41).  The nun Sangay Dolma who self‐immolated on 
November 25, 2012 in Rebkong, Amdo, applied these kinship metaphors in her last message: 
“Look, my Tibetan brothers and sisters, look at the land of snow, our destiny is on the rise”. In 
the last lines of her message she refers to Tibetans as “children of the snow lion”, another name 
for Tibet.11  
 Tibetan nationalism has above all grown and flourished in exile (Sharling, 2013; Anand 
2000). Houston and Wright (2003, p. 219) point out that Tibetan nationalism stems from the 
Chinese occupation which caused exile. However, the present nationalist discourse in exile is, I 
argue, tightly interwoven not only with the Tibetan diaspora, but also with Tibetan Buddhism.  
 
                                                 
11
 TYC, "Tibet Burning: Profiles of Self-Immolators Inside Tibet. February 2009 to May 2013".  
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Buddhism: from proto-nationalism to nationalism  
Religion and politics are impossible to separate in the Tibetan case.12 I argue that the particular 
form that the Tibetan nationalist discourse has taken today is conditioned by Buddhism with the 
Dalai Lama in the forefront, and with compassion and non‐violence as its core values. The Dalai 
Lama is the reincarnation of Tibet’s protector deity, Avalokiteshvara (the Bodhisattva of 
compassion, called Chenrezig in Tibetan), and is thus the highest spiritual leader of the Tibetan 
people and the central symbol of the Tibetan nation (Kolås, 1996, p. 64). Buddhism is thus 
regarded by most Tibetans as the basis on which national identity is asserted in both exile and 
inside Tibet. Although the majority of exile Tibetans are not devoted Buddhists, the Dalai Lama’s 
faith in values grounded in Buddhist ethics, despite being contested, dominates the exile 
community.13  
 Nevertheless, I do not regard the emphasis on Tibet as a Buddhist land as a modern 
creation only. Prior to the Chinese invasion, Buddhism was the main reason for Tibetans 
identifying themselves with the “pure land surrounded by snow mountains” (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 
39; 1994), at a time when the full‐blown Tibetan national identity, taking shape from the late 
1950s, had not yet emerged. As mentioned the “Land of Snows” invoked a larger, cultural Tibet, 
and not a politico‐national entity (Barnett, 2014, p. xli).  
 George Dreyfus (1994; 2002), argues that there has been, a form of proto‐nationalism, at 
least in Central Tibet, since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, involving a perception of 
belonging to a distinct country. This proto‐nationalism was based on the idea of Tibet as a 
barbarian land that was civilized into a Buddhist country, a transformation in which 
Avalokiteshvara occupied a central role through the manifestations as kings who introduced 
Buddhism, and for that reason, the emphasis on Buddhism in today’s nationalist discourse 
cannot be dismissed as a modern creation only. Tsering Shakya lends support to Dreyfus’ 
argument when writing that when opposing Chinese rule, even at a time when the idea of an 
independent Tibet was non‐existent, Tibetans mobilized in the name of faith (1993, p. 10). 
Dreyfus’ argument also points the central role of the current Dalai Lama in the development of a 
full‐blown nationalism taking shape from the late 1950s.  
 Despite the continuity of the Buddhist tradition, that does not, however, mean that it 
remains unchanged, or that Buddhist ethics are not reinterpreted in accordance with the present 
social and political context.14 Compassion and non‐violence, the two core values in today’s 
nationalist discourse, became prominent after the coming into existence of a Tibetan exile 
                                                 
12
 Here I will not engage in the discussion about “religious” and “secular” nationalism. My aim is primarily to 
shed some light on the Dalai Lama’s central role in the development of a Tibetan national identity.  
13
 Not only in exile, but also inside Tibet, as shown by certain religious teachers' emphasis on vegetarianism in 
Kham and Amdo (Buffetrille, 2014).  
14
 The 5
th
 and the 13
th
 Dalai Lama, who took up military force against intruders, exemplify that non-violence has 
not always been a dominant value in Buddhism as practiced in Tibet (Sperling, 2001) and that Buddhist ethics 
are open for interpretations.   
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community, and were reinforced after the Dalai Lama received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 
(Houston and Wright, 2003, p. 1), for his “consistent resistance to the use of violence in his 
people’s struggle to regain their liberty” (Nobelprize.org).15 
 This thesis will explore how Tibetan nationalism finds expression in the local context of 
the exile community in Dharamsala (McLeod Ganj) by focusing on diaspora, values, 
commemorative practices, and the political lives of dead bodies. The understanding and 
meanings of the self‐immolations, as well as commemorative practices for the self‐immolators 
bring to fore certain values and, can tell us something about nationalism among exile Tibetans. A 
focus on dead bodies will also show that nationalism, although having homogeneity as one of its 
aims (Wade, 2001, p. 853), is not one single thing, but rather something which is contested. 
 To explore the connection between nationalism and dead bodies, I intend to analyze the 
self‐immolations within the framework of anthropology of “good” and “bad death”. In order to 
understand why the self‐immolations have become a part of the nationalist discourse in exile, 
we need to look at why and how the self‐immolations are made into a culturally meaningful 
death, and further how this affects relations between the living and the dead. I take the concept 
of “good” and “bad death” as another way of studying Tibetan nationalism, because the ideas of 
“good” and “bad death” are never given, but are negotiated and guided by the ideology and 
concerns of the living. Framing the self‐immolations in the context of “good” and “bad death” will 
also help us to understand the self‐immolations from a larger perspective, where nationalism is 
not only about politics, but is also a source of meaning and hope. Verdery argues that our 
understanding of the political dimension has become too narrow and flat, as a result of having 
been too exclusively guided by rational theory. She insists on “enchanting” our understanding of 
politics, meaning enlivening or enriching it. Inspired by Verdery’s (broad) understanding of 
politics (1999, p. 26‐27), I suggest that in the exile Tibetan case the politics of dead bodies is not 
only about rational political strategies, it is also about the wider existential concerns of healing 
and creating hope. 
 
Anthropology of death: “good” and “bad death” 
The anthropology of death is not a vast field. Among the first studies addressing the topic of 
death were those carried out by E.B. Tylor and James Frazer who approached the issue primarily 
in relation to the origin of religion and the continuous unfolding of culture (Palgi and 
Abramovitch, 1984, p. 387). Durkheim challenged their evolutionary perspectives with his study 
of suicide, where, he argued that beliefs and ideas of death are far more complicated, showing 
how “collective representations” unite and simultaneously specify the separate identities of 
individuals (Metcalf and Huntington, 1992, p. 29). Durkheim made a lasting contribution to the 
anthropology of death by pointing out that grief experienced at the death of a fellow human 
                                                 
15
 http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1989/presentation-speech.html (acc.16.07.2015).  
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being is expressed “collectively in culturally prescribed ways of mourning” (Robben, 2004, p. 7). 
Later, Robert Hertz, a student of Durkheim, carried out the first elaborate anthropological study 
of death rituals (Hertz, 1905, translated in 1960 by Rodney and Claudia Needham), drawing his 
material largely from Indonesia and focusing upon secondary death rituals.  
 Like Durkheim, Hertz studied the social ramifications of death, in which he paid specific 
attention to the moral obligations of the living towards the body of the deceased. For Hertz, 
“death has a specific meaning for social consciousness; it is the object of a collective 
representation” (1960, p. 28). Further, Hertz suggested that death cannot merely be viewed as 
an ending of an individual’s life, but rather is a “social event and the beginning of a ceremonial 
process by which the dead person becomes an ancestor” (Kaufman and Morgan, 2005, p. 323); 
death is thus understood as a transition (Abramovich, n.d.).16  
 Hertz’ study became highly influential, being, as Metcalf and Huntington argue, “a 
forerunner of the modern tradition of social anthropology” (1992, p. 34). Hertz showed that the 
meaning of facts lies in their interrelation, and not separately in themselves, and as Evans‐
Pritchard pointed out, it is revealing these interrelations that is the art of anthropology (1960, p. 
15). Hertz made the double disposal of the dead meaningful by showing its relation to beliefs 
about ghosts and to the rules of mourning.17 As I will also attempt to show throughout this 
thesis, the understanding of self‐immolations and the way these actions are made meaningful 
has to be comprehended in relation to a range of past and present social and political factors in 
Tibet and in exile.  
 An important contribution, influenced by Hertz’ work, was made by the volume edited by 
Maurice Bloch and Jonathan Parry, Death and the Regeneration of Life (1982a). The book 
discusses many prominent themes in the anthropology of death, the most important one for me 
in the present context being that of “good” and “bad death”.  
 The idea of “good” as well as “bad death” is present all over the world, even though these 
categories can only become meaningful with reference to the ideological orientation of a society. 
Hence, the categories of “good” and “bad” change in accordance with the ideological orientations 
or concerns of the living, something that, according to Bloch and Parry (1982b), is due to death’s 
ambiguity. Similarly, Verdery (1999) holds that the prerequisite for incorporating the dead into 
society is that they are ambiguous, i.e. they do not have one single meaning, but are open to 
various interpretations. Verdery’s insight plays a crucial role in this thesis.  
                                                 
16
 http://henry-a.com/death/anthropology-of-death (acc.10.05.2015).  
17
 Despite the strengths of Hertz’ analysis, it is also flawed in several ways, as pointed out by Metcalf and 
Huntington (1991), for example by his attempt to try to cover many human activities, such as the symbolic, the 
social, the pragmatic and the emotional (1991, p. 36), with “limited and secondhand data” (1991, p. 37). Still, 
Hertz’ study stands as one of the most original analyses on death from the 20
th
 century, and his remarks on 
how our attitudes towards death are socially determined, continue to be the cornerstone of ethnographic 
analyses (Palgi and Abramovitch, 1984, p. 389). 
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 Bloch and Parry define “good death” as a type of death which “suggests some degree of 
mastery over the arbitrariness of the biological occurrence…”(1982b, p. 15), while a “bad death” 
involves a lack of control, such as suicide, homicide, or sudden or unexpected death (Bloch and 
Parry, 1982b, pp. 15‐17; see also Abramovitch, n.d.). In the literature on the anthropology of 
death, sacrifice is everywhere classified as a “good death”, sometimes as the best of deaths 
(Parry, 1994, 1982 [2004];  Malik, 1999). Sacrifice is described as a death from which the living 
(and the dead) have the potential for accumulating resources, blessings, prosperity for the 
community etc.  
 What constitutes a “good death” for a Hindu (Parry, 2004) is not the same for the 
Chukchi in Siberia (Willerslev, 2009) or the Wari in the Brazilian rain forest (Conklin, 2004). 
Further, Bloch and Parry suggest that a “good death” is a death that ensures the regeneration of 
life; it’s a life‐giving death (1982b). In his study of the devastating consequences of the Vietnam 
War, Heonik Kwon, makes a similar point, arguing that a “good death” ensures the regeneration 
of life by reinforcing corporate solidarity and revitalizing historical continuity (2006, p. 14), in 
others words, bringing “a renewal of the world of the living” (Bloch and Parry, 1982b, p. 16).  I 
will explore how Tibetans in exile have attempted to ensure this. While a “good death” can be 
understood as a beginning, in the sense of a regeneration of life (Schömbucher, 1999 ; Simpson, 
2001; Willerslev, 2009) through which the dead person becomes an ancestor (Palgi and 
Abramovitch, 1984, p. 388 [Hertz 1960]), a “bad death” in most cases implies an ending, leaving 
the survivors in despair and hopelessness. Death rituals or commemorations play an important 
part in “transforming death into fertility” (Bloch and Parry, 1982b), and helping the living with 
handling death and creating meaning. Such practices are also very important in the aftermath of 
a self‐immolation, which will be dealt with in chapter 4.  
 With his work from two Vietnamese communities where the Vietnam War resulted in 
“bad deaths” on a grand scale, bringing disturbance in the traditional Vietnamese cosmology, 
Kwon also makes visible the mutable connection between the living and the dead, and the 
differing implications “good” and “bad deaths” have on this connection.  He also exemplifies that 
the meaning of “good” and “bad death” is guided by the (present) ideological orientations, 
controlled by the Vietnamese state. In Kwon’s study, dead bodies are an important vehicle for 
rewriting the past and shaping the future. In Verdery’s work, the dead have the same 
significance, the raising and tearing down of statues and holding political reburials of selected 
dead bodies being a means to rewrite history and shape the future. Both Kwon’s and Verdery’s 
ethnographic work bring to fore the relevance of dead bodies in the creation of social history, 
collective identities, and national consciousness.  
 In this thesis I attempt to explore how these insights can be applied to the Tibetan self‐
immolators. Both works are of particular importance for my thesis as they illustrate how beliefs 
around death are not only about “culture” or religion, but are also conditioned by political and 
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economic factors.18 In addition, they exemplify how local traditions interact with a wider global 
context. I shall attempt to move in this direction, and away from the traditional anthropological 
approaches to death, where the universal phenomenon of death was analyzed holistically only in 
relation to the religious beliefs of the local community. This approach was criticized by Johannes 
Fabian (1972) as the anthropological study of “how others die” and an exoticization of death, as 
well as a process of parochialization, contributing to the anthropological discipline losing its 
potential for exploring the universal phenomenon of death. In the same way, Robben (2004) 
writes that this (parochialization) is a result of anthropologists’ hesitation to make 
generalizations or all‐encompassing theories. According to Palgi and Abramovitch (1984, p. 385) 
this has left the discipline bereft of a theoretical dimension. They, too, called for anthropological 
approaches which move beyond the “local”, and attempt to understand the phenomenon of 
death from a larger perspective than that of isolated “cultural” beliefs. This thesis is an attempt 
at following their advice. Understanding a highly political subject such as the self‐immolations in 
relation to religious or cultural beliefs only, is a narrow view. These acts have to be explored in 
relation to the current social and political situation in exile as well as in Tibet. In addition, 
understanding the notion of sacrificing one’s life for the nation in the local context of 
Dharamsala has to be understood in the perspective of how the “local” context interacts with the 
“global”.19 The theoretical framework of nationalism and dead bodies is an attempt at bringing 
this to the fore.  
 
Methodological considerations  
This thesis is primarily based on fieldwork among Tibetans in McLeod Ganj, Dharamsala, as well 
as short visits to other places in India along with my interlocutors, and a couple of final weeks in 
Choklamsar in Ladakh. I arrived in McLeod Ganj on January 3, 2014 and stayed here until June 
25, 2014. On June 25 I left for Ladakh together with Gu‐chu‐sum, an organization I had spent 
much time with. My purpose was to work with them during the Kalachakra festival, a huge 
Buddhist festival, presided over by the Dalai Lama. We arrived in Choklamsar, Ladakh, on 28 
June, and I left Ladakh for Norway on July 19.  
 For me the anthropological fieldwork was not merely a methodology for collecting data, 
but also a personal journey, during which I expanded my understanding of what it means to be a 
human. This understanding grew through daily interaction with many different kinds of people. 
Engaging in their daily life and listening to their stories as well as sharing my own, I was able to 
take part in their “life‐worlds” (Wikan, 2012), as well as understand the social and political life 
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 Other recent studies on death and life apply a similar approach, see Lock (2002), Lee and Vaughan (2008) 
and; Simpson (2001).  
19
 I am aware that ideas of the “local” and the “global”, especially during the time of globalization which 
renders our traditional concept of boundaries and scales problematic, have been a much discussed topic in 
anthropology, for example by Ferguson and Gupta (1997).  
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in McLeod Ganj. Because of a dialectic engagement between myself and the people with whom I 
spent my time, I refer to them as “interlocutors”, rather than “informants”, to emphasize their 
active part in our relationship. In the following I will outline how I slowly became part of the 
McLeod Ganj landscape, and describe how I engaged in people’s lives and they in mine.   
 During the entire fieldwork I lived by myself, in a series of rented room. Though many 
anthropologists recommended living with a family during fieldwork, I do not regard having lived 
by myself as a disadvantage. As I will show, I spent the greater part of my day in the company of 
many different people. For this reason, I consider having lived on my own as a good thing since I 
had greater freedom to make appointments with others or just join someone for dinner if I 
wished. 
 
Volunteering with NGOs  
As a fresh fieldworker, I found it hard to know when my fieldwork actually began. Getting 
started meant forming acquaintances with different kinds of people.20 I planned to do this by 
volunteering to work with different NGOs, involved in political, social and educational work. 
Since NGOs are numerous in McLeod Ganj, volunteering presented a great opportunity for 
meeting Tibetans from various backgrounds. One of the NGOs I contacted was Lha, which 
provides language courses to Tibetan refugees, the majority of the students having been born 
inside Tibet. At Lha, I began as an “English‐conversationist” as well as teaching basic English to 
two monks in their early 30s, both born inside Tibet, for two hours daily from January to April. 
Working with them, I gained monks’ perspectives on the self‐immolations. Prior to my 
fieldwork, I had assumed that monastics held different opinions on the subject in contrast to lay 
people, but I rather found out that their opinions converged to a large degree. Spending time 
with these two monks, I also acquired knowledge on their early life in Tibet (Kham), and their 
experiences of living in India versus Tibet, among other things.   
 Another NGO I spent time with, was Students for a Free Tibet (SFT), a politically active 
NGO, where the majority of the professional activists are young men and women born in India. 
At the SFT office I could spend time with professional21 activists, which gave me access to 
participate in the various social and political campaigns and activities they organized. The most 
important of these were the candle light vigils which SFT organized in collaboration with other 
NGOs after a self‐immolation. I also had contact with some professional activists from Tibetan 
Youth Congress (TYC), the most politically controversial NGO, with whom I also conducted 
interviews.    
                                                 
20
 Such as “political activists", “monastics”, “laypeople”, “politicians (members of the CTA)” – all of them 
including both Tibetans born inside Tibet and Tibetans born in exile. These categories are not rigid and were 
merely intended to help me sort out the great social complexity in McLeod Ganj.  
21
 Meaning having activism as a full-time job.  
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 A third NGO I had contact with, was, Gu‐chu‐sum, an association for former political 
prisoners and their families. Here I was offered the task of having English conversations two 
hours daily, from mid‐January until I left Dharamsala, with a group of seven students: three girls 
and four boys, who were all born in Tibet, and had lived in India for four to six years. They all 
lived in the Gu‐chu‐sum building.  This came to be the NGO I would stay with during my entire 
fieldwork and the one where I would form the closest friendships, among the students as well as 
the staff. Through Gu‐chu‐sum, I became acquainted with Tibetans from many different 
backgrounds, both born in India and Tibet, people who had lived in India for a long time, and 
short time. Some were politically active, others were not. The most valuable of my experiences 
from Gu‐chu‐sum was that of getting to know the students and some of the staff members 
personally, spending much time with them, also “backstage”.  
 By mid‐January, I had three main arenas in which to interact with people of various 
backgrounds, ranging from the age of 19 to about 45 and representing a mix of people born in 
Tibet as well as in exile. As Geertz (1976) established, ethnographic understanding is situated, 
thus subjectivity is unavoidable. For that reason, staying in contact with people from different 
backgrounds was for me an important technique for working towards achieving “objectivity” 
(Stewart, 1998, pp. 31‐47), in order to obtain views on different subjects through multiple 
perspectives and thus, “transcend” both mine own, as well as my individual interlocutor’s 
orientation. For Stewart, “objectivity” is about being alert, keeping an open mind, being 
receptive to the view of others or showing empathy. To work towards the goal of objectivity, one 
has to strive to transcend not only one’s own perspectives, but also of one’s “informants” (1998, 
p. 16), an advice I attempted to practice.  
 
Engagement (participant observation) 
Having settled into a daily schedule, I let the surroundings and people take charge. I learned 
from my early encounters that the issue of self‐immolation is considered sensitive, hence it was 
important for me never to impose this topic on people. In fact, often the topic was met with 
silence. The act itself is so drastic that most people do not know what to say. Moreover, I 
regarded it as vital to get to know my interlocutors’ personal stories and understand their daily 
and more general concerns, and let them be in charge of how the issue of  the self‐immolations 
was raised. Finally, taking part in people’s daily activities and listening to whatever they talked 
about, was a way of engaging in their lives and have good participative relations (Stewart, 1998, 
p. 22) with my interlocutors.   
 Engaging with various people involved different activities. With the students from Gu‐
chu‐sum for example, it involved letting them choose what they wanted to talk about during 
language classes, which could be anything from the Tibetan yak to development and education. 
It also involved going on walks with some of them, usually to the circumambulation path 
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(korlam) and the Tsuglagkhang complex, or playing badminton, or occasionally preparing 
thukpa (Tibetan noodle soup) in the Gu‐chu‐sum kitchen on Sundays. Engagement with SFT 
mainly involved spending time at their office, watching the activists work and converse with 
them, or helping with simple practical preparations for various campaigns and participating in 
them, such as the candle light vigils.   
 Besides my daily engagement in various NGOs, I also began interviewing members of 
CTA toward the end of February. Conducting formal interviews was the only possible way of 
getting their perspective on the self‐immolations and other subjects.  
 After having been in Dharamsala for about a month, I had become acquainted with many 
Tibetans, spending time in their company and some gradually becoming good friends.    
 I came to know many Tibetans through the snowball method, and then made an effort to 
stay in touch with some of them over time. Most of them were male, born inside Tibet, while a 
few were born and raised in exile, in India, ranging from the age of 26 to 35. As a female, it was 
easy for me to get in touch with men and some of them became good friends. In addition, I also 
kept in touch with some tourists over some months, and a few local Indians in the last month of 
my fieldwork.   
 It was important for me to stay in touch with people who were not involved with NGOs, 
the CTA or any kind of organized political work, in order to gain a different perspective on 
various topics, though many of them certainly had strong political opinions. This also enabled 
me to check and possibly correct my own observations of social life and politics in McLeod Ganj. 
Thus, one could also call this “respondent validation” (Stewart, 1998, p. 37; Moen and 
Middelthon, 2015) to work towards the goal of objectivity, although in my case it did not involve 
written feedback, but rather oral response through open conversations and interviews. It was 
also crucial to test the veracity or “truthfulness” of my findings because as a researcher one does 
make errors of interpretation or things can pass by unnoticed (Stewart, 1998, p. 19).  
 Hanging out in cafés, conversing and spending time with my neighbors, and doing kora 
on a daily basis, were ways I interacted with people, as well as simply observing them, both 
Tibetans and tourists.  
 
Techniques of data collection 
I applied specific fieldwork techniques such as the use of interviews, collecting short life 
histories (Mintz, 1979) of a few people, observing different events which took place in the 
community, and reading online blogs, newspapers and webpages of CTA and various NGOs to 
follow their activities, and also gathered other types of relevant documentation. Following 
Stewart’s (1998) advice, I chose to apply multiple modes of data collection to ensure veracity, as 
well as to have a comprehensive data account, in order to work towards objectivity. Both 
veracity and objectivity are necessary to achieve the goal of perspicacity, i.e. generating insights 
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that might be applicable to other times and places (Stewart, 1998, p. 47; Moen and Middelthon 
2015).  
 
Interviews 
I asked to conduct interviews with everyone I knew, including tourists and the local Indians in 
addition to the Tibetans. Many of these interviews, became either semi‐structured or informal 
conversations.22 I used interviews simply because it was a valuable method for collecting 
people’s opinions about the self‐immolations and other issues. I continued doing this from 
February until the end of my stay. I had developed an interview guide in advance which I 
followed with most people, but as I came to know of other issues in the community through 
conversations with people or by coming across them on news pages or blogs, I added new 
questions. I did not follow the interview guide strictly with everyone, apart from the CTA 
members. It was therefore possible to ask some uncomfortable questions or formulate them 
differently with people I was well acquainted with, and who felt they could trust me.  
 When I asked about the self‐immolations, I always began by asking the following open 
question, “How would you describe these acts?” Some interlocutors referred to the self‐
immolations as either a sacrifice or a non‐violent act, or both, in the first sentences of their 
answers, while others did not. I therefore asked the latter further questions about the sacrificial 
and non‐violent nature of the self‐immolations. The answer was usually an immediate “Yes” or 
“Definitely”, while some who were in doubt, contemplated for a moment before answering.  
 The interviews usually lasted from forty‐five minutes to one and a half hour. I recorded 
the interviews because of their long duration and also because I did not want to risk misquoting 
people on these very sensitive issues. The use of an audio recorder was, however, a disadvantage 
in some cases, for example with activists from SFT who were very careful about expressing their 
opinions about certain sensitive political issues. I discovered that one professional activist from 
TYC, though rather outspoken compared to the SFT members, told me many unexpected things 
when I turned off the audio recorder. Some laypeople, not engaged with the CTA or the NGOs, 
were not affected by the use of the recorder, while others were. The latter also talked about 
more sensitive issues once the audio recorder was turned off. I therefore began to let people 
continue talking after the interview if they wished, and took notes in my notebook.  
 Because they are living in an English‐speaking country, most Tibetans in India can speak 
good English, so I conducted most of the interviews in English. In the case of a few Tibetans who 
spoke very poor English, I had to use interpreters. The interpreters were a young woman and a 
man, both in their late 20s.  
 Throughout this thesis, I place direct quotes within quotation marks. In places where I 
have separated long quotes from the main text, I have always transcribed them from recordings. 
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 In total I conducted interviews with 30 Tibetans, four “Western” tourists (of which two were written 
feedback by email due to their time constraints), and finally, six local Indian residents.  
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My own position  
During my fieldwork, I did not form close relationships with everyone, such as the activists from 
SFT, while I had no difficulty in getting close to the Gu‐chu‐sum students as well as laypeople 
around town.  
 The Gu‐chu‐sum students and other Tibetans I knew did not regard me as a researcher, 
although from time to time they would ask about how my research was going, or I would share 
my findings with them. I interacted with them, in a casual way, like their other friends, nor did I 
impose questions on them, and after some time, especially with the Gu‐chu‐sum students, I 
became a part of their daily lives. We also interacted inside the Gu‐chu‐sum building, which was 
their “home” at that time. It was the place they ate, studied and slept.  
 Something I regard as an advantage in my engagement with Tibetans in McLeod Ganj is 
my Indian background. Though I was a foreigner, people did not regard me as an inji (a word 
used for referring to people from “Western” countries). Somehow, I stood closer to the Tibetans 
than the injis. The Tibetan world, with all its religious rituals and prayers, was neither strange 
nor unfamiliar to me since due to my Indian background, I have been brought up in a similar 
environment. The open and warm Tibetan hospitality was also very Indian‐like, so being with 
Tibetans was for me very similar to being in an Indian environment.  
 
Limitations and challenges  
The biggest challenge I faced was language, since I could not communicate with people well 
enough in Tibetan. Before I began my master’s degree in autumn 2013, I had studied Tibetan for 
two months in Kathmandu. However, in Dharamsala, most of the people I spent my time with 
could communicate in English, which they spoke from “well” to “good enough”.  
 Despite not being able to communicate with people in Tibetan, I do not believe that this 
hindered us in understanding each other’s concerns in life. However, I think that being able to 
speak and understand fluent Tibetan could have brought me many advantages, also enhancing 
the veracity of my data. After all, a language is impregnated with a specific cultural knowledge. 
In addition, language also provides better access. Due to my inability to speak or understand 
fluent Tibetan, it became difficult for me to go “backstage” with some political activists.  
 Another reason why I was not able to go “backstage” with them could be depended on 
the role they assigned to me. At SFT, I was perhaps regarded as just another foreign student or 
researcher. For that reason they assigned me the role of a researcher, to whom they had to 
present themselves in a specific way, and keep a professional and distanced relationship. Since I 
spent my time with many different kinds of people, a fact they were aware of, this could also be a 
reason for not sharing all kinds of sensitive information with me. When I faced difficulties on 
approaching them, I naturally also ended up with by distancing myself from them.   
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 Fortunately, I followed newspapers such as Phayul, Tibetan Politial Review, Tibet 
Telegraph, Tibet Sun, blogs, and other social media on a regular basis. This was an important way 
I followed the various topics and discussions unfolding in the community, something I continued 
to do after my fieldwork. Discussions online weighed up for my poor Tibetan skills, and also 
confirmed the political disagreements that existed beneath the surface in the Tibetan 
community, but which had not always been expressed to me openly.  
 Another challenge was that as I formed friendships with people, it became important to 
take into consideration their needs and interests, which resulted in it becoming very difficult to 
bring up a sensitive subject such as the self‐immolations. As conversations on death in most 
societies are avoided (Srivastava and Srivastava, 1997, p. 827), it became challenging for me to 
gather data on this topic. Hence interviews were an excellent method as they offered me a 
legitimate method to ask about everything on the topic, without feeling guilty for asking 
uncomfortable questions. Working with death does raise many moral dilemmas, as well as 
emotional challenges for the researcher. This has been pointed out by Palgi and Abramovitch 
(1984, [Abramovitch, ND]), who exemplify these dilemmas by citing Hortence Powdermaker’s 
reluctance to take field notes during a death ritual. Powdermaker writes, “How can you take 
notes in the midst of human sorrow? Have you no feelings for the mourners?” (Powdermaker, 
1933, pp. 84‐85 in Palgi and Abramovitch, 1984, p. 386). These are feelings I can relate to both 
with regard to trying to bring up the self‐immolations in conversations, and participating in the 
candle light vigils held in the aftermath of a self‐immolation.  
 
Ethics   
As an ethical consideration, I have anonymized most of the people involved in my project, except 
in a few cases where the identity has been impossible to hide23, or hiding it has not been 
necessary. I provided all my interlocutors with a consent form which included basic information 
about my project and the interviewee’s role. I conducted and recorded all interviews with their 
written consent.   
 Another other ethical dilemma I wish to write about is of a more personal nature, and 
was present during fieldwork, and even more strongly in the writing process. Because of the 
delicacy of the subject of the self‐immolations, and the sensitive nature of political 
disagreements in exile, I always felt a responsibility not to make the situation worse for 
Tibetans, or to put anybody in an unfortunate light. Rather, I always felt a responsibility to show 
solidarity with Tibetans, as well as to contribute something positive. It is worth mentioning that 
in the field of Tibetan studies many scholars have already felt the same “commitment to 
solidarity” that Per Kværne (2001, p. 62) writes about in his article on “Tibet images among 
researchers on Tibet”. This commitment or responsibility became especially prominent in the 
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 For example in chapter 3, regarding the two men who attempted to self-immolate.   
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writing process, which created many obstacles for me. I wanted to be loyal to my friends, loyal to 
the Tibetan cause and others who had taken me into their lives, so that at times I was unable to 
look at things critically. It took me a long time to drag myself out of McLeod Ganj, put the sense 
of responsibility I felt towards everyone to one side, begin taking responsibility for my 
anthropological subject also, and see things from a different perspective.  
 
Chapter layout 
Chapter 1 provides background information on the self‐immolations, a short overview of the 
Chinese response as well as the initial response in exile in the beginning, followed by a brief 
presentation of the literature on the self‐immolations. In chapter 2, I move on to the place of my 
fieldwork and present the social and political framework of the Tibetan diaspora in Dharamsala. 
In chapter 3, I present how the self‐immolations are understood, and in what ways these actions 
are made meaningful: focusing on the activation of Buddhist values and nationalist sentiments, 
which also contributes in invalidating the Chinese narrative of the self‐immolations. In chapter 
4, I explore commemoration practices for the self‐immolators and analyze how the self‐
immolations gain political force, and are transformed into a symbol in the nationalist project in 
exile. I argue that the commemoration practices for the dead also assist in reasserting exile 
Tibetans’ faith in particular values and goals, although the goals are interpreted differently by 
the main political actors in exile. In the final chapter, I argue that the understanding and 
handling of the self‐immolations has to be understood in relation to the continuous emphasis on 
unity, which is a central characteristic of all nationalist movements. I close this thesis by a short 
summary and some concluding thoughts regarding future research.  
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1  The self-immolations  
 
The first Tibetan self‐immolation took place on April 27, 1998, during a hunger strike in New 
Delhi. It was carried out by Thupten Ngodup, a 60‐year old ex‐monk and ex‐soldier.                                                            
                                                                                                            
 Figure 3: Thupten Ngodup (photo: Shadow Tibet, Jamyang Norbu’s blog).24                                                     
 Thupten Ngodup was born in 1938 in the village of Gyatso Shar in Tsang, and fled to 
India after the Lhasa uprising in 1959. He joined the Indian army in 1963, serving in the Special 
Frontier Force, a secret unit with many Tibetan ex‐guerilla fighters (Ardley, 2003, p. 49). After 
retiring from the Indian army, he moved to Dharamsala and began working as a cook for 
Tsechokling Monastery.  
 Thupten Ngodup actively participated in all kinds of demonstrations and meetings for 
Tibet. Before joining the Tibetan Youth Congress’s (TYC) “Hunger Strike Unto Death” in 1998, he 
had told his friend Tenzin that in case he died, Tenzin should sell all of his things and donate the 
money to TYC.   
 On April 23 1998, a few days prior to his self‐immolation, Thupten was interviewed by 
the Norwegian‐sponsored radio station Voice of Tibet. He began by saying, “I joined the Hunger 
Strike because I am a Tibetan and I have a duty to perform… No, there is no fear in my heart at all.” 
He ended the interview saying,  
I am giving up my life to bring about peace and fulfilment to my unhappy people… I have one 
hundred percent confidence that the people inside Tibet will not only continue the struggle but will 
intensify it. They will never sit back and not struggle (Norbu, 1998).  
 On April 27 – the 49th day of the hunger strike – when the Indian police attempted to 
intervene, Thupten Ngodup decided to self‐immolate (Buffetrille, 2015). He was immediately 
rushed to Ram Manohar Lohia hospital in New Delhi, where the doctors stated that he had 
nearly 100 percent burns, and thus no chance of surviving. On the evening of April 28, he 
received a visit from the Dalai Lama who told him not to nourish any feelings of hatred against 
                                                 
24
 http://www.jamyangnorbu.com/blog/2008/05/12/remembering-thupten-ngodup/ (acc.19.06.2015). The 
following references to Jamyang Norbu are from the same article.  
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the Chinese, and “that his act had created an unprecedented awareness of the Tibetan cause” 
(Norbu, 1998). He passed away on April 29, 1998 (Norbu, 1998; ICT).25  
 Thupten Ngodup’s self‐immolation left most Tibetans in a state of shock. It was a new 
form of protest, unknown to Tibetans. Still, some prominent activists like Jamyang Norbu 
immediately recognized and named it to be a sacrifice and regarded Thupten Ngodup as a “hero” 
(pawo). Thupten Ngodup’s self‐immolation was, however, an exceptional case, and several years 
passed before another Tibetan carried out this form of protest.   
 The next self‐immolation took place on November 23, 2006, in Mumbai, carried out by 
the regional TYC president of Bangalore, Lhakpa Tsering (24), during the Chinese president (at 
the time) Hu Jintao’s visit to India. Unlike Thupten Ngodup, Lhakpa Tsering survived. Four years 
later, the first self‐immolation took place inside Tibet, on February 27, 2009, carried out by 
Tapey, a monk in his mid‐twenties, from Kirti Monastery in Ngaba, Amdo (Sichuan), as a protest 
against the Chinese authorities’ prohibition of a prayer ceremony in his monastery. This came as 
a sequel to a brutal attack on the local community by the Chinese security forces in 2008, killing 
many people, followed by a crackdown on religion. The next self‐immolation, taking place on 
March 16, 2011, was also carried out by a monk, Phuntsok (20), also from Kirti Monastery. The 
day of his self‐immolation marked the day the Chinese security forces had attacked the local 
community in 2008 (ICT; McGranahan, 2014). Phuntsok’s self‐immolation, countered by further 
violent crackdowns in the Ngaba region (ICT, April 15, 2011;26 Buffetrille, 2015), initiated the 
wave of self‐immolations in recent years. 
 At the moment of writing (August 2015), 149 Tibetans have set themselves on fire, of 
whom 142 have done so in Tibet, and seven in exile – four in India and three in Nepal. Of the 142 
self‐immolators in Tibet, 20 are thought to have survived. The whereabouts of the majority of 
the survivors, however, remains unknown. In exile, three self‐immolators have survived (ICT, 
April 30, 2015).27 In spite of the large number of Tibetans who self‐immolated and continued to 
set themselves ablaze, they received little attention in the international media. In fact, in 2011, 
Time Magazine named the self‐immolations one of top ten underreported stories in the world 
(December 7, 2011),28 something that remains applicable today.  
 According to exile Tibetans, the main reason behind the self‐immolations is China’s 
illegal occupation of Tibet and more than 60 years destruction of Tibetan civilization. This is 
highlighted in the exhibition on the self‐immolations in the Tibetan Museum in Dharamsala, 
                                                 
25
 http://www.savetibet.org/resources/fact-sheets/self-immolations-by-tibetans/ (acc.08.08.2015).  
26
 http://www.savetibet.org/list-of-prisoners-and-disappeared-tibetans-in-ngaba-crackdown-situation-
provokes-us-government-concern/ (acc.22.06.2015).  
http://www.savetibet.org/two-elderly-tibetans-killed-as-hundreds-of-monks-detained-from-kirti-crackdown-
deepens/ (acc.22.06.2015).  
27
 A special report on the survivors: http://www.savetibet.org/newsroom/tibetan-survivors-of-self-immolation-
repression-and-disappearance/ (acc.22.06.2015).  
28
 http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2101344_2100858_2100859,00.html 
(acc.29.06.2015).  
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organized by CTA as part of its “Solidarity with Tibet” campaign. A statement issued by CTA on 
March 26, 2012, gave seven reasons why the Chinese authorities were responsible for the self‐
immolations (Tibet.net).29 The white paper, “Why Tibet is Burning?” was published by CTA  on 
January 28, 2013.30 A pamphlet on the repressive policies inside Tibet by the former cabinet 
minister Kirti Rinpoche was published in  February 2013, a series of five books (Tibetan Self-
Immolations 1998 to 2012: News, Views & Global Response, 2013) was published by Kirti 
Monastery in Dharamsala, and statements and reports were also published by NGOs such as TYC 
and an The International Campaign for Tibet.31 Furthermore, the self‐immolations have to be 
understood in the light of more recent political events in Tibet. Prior to the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics, several riots took place in Lhasa. This unleashed a wave of protests throughout the 
Tibetan plateau, eventually taking the form of self‐immolations. As a result of these protests, the 
Tibetan landscape was transformed through a strong military presence, and China’s political 
control over Tibet increased. Tapey’s self‐immolation was a result, among other factors,32 ‐of 
this tighter political control. Cities like Lhasa – as well as county centers such as Ngaba where 
there have been many self‐immolations – are today filled with Chinese military, and countless 
video cameras have been installed to monitor all activity in Tibetan urban areas. Many exile 
Tibetans, among them Lobsang Sangay, the exile Tibetan prime minister, regard the self‐
immolations as the only form of protest possible under China’s current regime (The Washington 
Post, July 13, 2012).33 
                                                 
29
 These are: “1.Continuing occupation of Tibet 2. Political repression 3. Patriotic re-education and 
demonization of H.H. the Dalai Lama 4. Shooting and killing of peaceful Tibetan protesters 5. Economic 
marginalization and making of Tibetans as second-class citizens in their homeland  6. Cultural assimilation and 
denial of Tibetan as a medium of instruction 7. Environmental destruction”. 
http://tibet.net/2012/03/at-least-seven-reasons-why-beijing-is-responsible-for-the-self-immolations-in-tibet/ 
(acc.29.06.2015).  
30
 http://tibet.net/2013/02/cta-releases-white-paper-on-self-immolations-in-tibet/ (acc.01.07.2015).  
31
 By TYC: "Tibet Burning: Profiles of Self-Immolators Inside Tibet. February 2009 to May 2013”, 2013. 
 TYC has also  compiled a list with detailed information on the self-immolations so far (August 2015) on their 
webpage, which is updated when another self-immolation takes place:  
 http://www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/category/tibet-burning/ (acc.22.06.2015).  
By ICT: Factsheet on the self-immolations: http://www.savetibet.org/resources/fact-sheets/self-immolations-
by-tibetans/ and a special rapport: http://www.savetibet.org/storm-in-the-grasslands-self-immolations-in-
tibet-and-chinese-policy/ (acc. 22.06.2015) 
32
 There are also other possible historical reasons, going back to the invasion of the Amdo region by the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the 1950s, which resulted in killings, imprisonment and torture on an 
immense scale, specifically in the Ngaba area where many self-immolations have taken place. The historical 
account of the Chinese occupation in Amdo region remains for the most part untold. Naktsang Nulo, My 
Tibetan Childhood  (2014), is one of the few accounts of this period in Amdo's history. Berounsky (2012) traces 
the large number of self-immolations carried out by monks from Kirti Monastery to its historical and political 
importance. Prior to the Chinese invasion, political power in Amdo rested with local kings or chiefs, and 
monasteries belonging to the Gelukpa school. Thus Ngaba, although ruled by local kings, was under the 
influence of Kirti Monastery (Shakya, (2012b, p. 35). Historical awareness among the Kirti monks remains 
strong, Berounsky (2012, p. 75) states, and he sees this as one of the reasons why it became the centre of 
protests, and later of the self-immolations.    
33
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/for-tibetans-no-other-way-to-
protest/2012/07/13/gJQA13wniW_story.html (acc.22.06.2015). This article was written by Lobsang Sangay 
himself, with the title “For Tibetans, no other way to protest”.  
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The wave of self-immolations from 2011 
A wave of self‐immolations began in earnest after Phuntsok sat himself ablaze in Ngaba on 
March 16, 2011, carried out by men and women, monks, nuns, students, nomads, and lay people 
from all walks of life. Of 142 self‐immolations in Tibet, 117 were carried out men and 25 by 
women, while the seven self‐immolations in exile were all carried out by men. The age of the 
self‐immolators has ranged from 15 to 60, but most of them were young, between the age of 17 
and 30 (ICT; Buffetrille, 2015). Most of the self‐immolators have been from Amdo, others have 
been from Kham. Two self‐immolations have taken place in Lhasa, carried out, however, by 
Tibetans from Amdo. In most cases, they have taken place close to a monastery or public 
building, showing the political and religious character of these actions (Buffetrille, 2015).   
 Up to February 19, 2012, self‐immolators inside Tibet were monks or ex‐monks, mainly 
belonging to Kirti Monastery or other monasteries of the Gelukpa school. In the course of 2011, 
12 Tibetans, including a nun, sat themselves on fire inside Tibet. In addition, two self‐
immolations took place in exile, in New Delhi and Kathmandu. The self‐immolation in New Delhi 
was carried out by an exile‐born Tibetan man, Sherab Tsedor, outside the Chinese embassy. In 
Kathmandu, it was carried out by a monk, Bhutuk from Kardze in Kham (Sichuan), who set 
himself on fire, having draped himself in a Tibetan flag. Hence, counting in the self‐immolations 
in exile, a total of 14 Tibetans self‐immolated in 2011.  In 2012, the frequency of self‐
immolations picked up speed, and already by February 19, 10 more people had self‐immolated, 
including the first layperson to do so inside Tibet. From then on, laypeople – students, nomads, 
housewives – also chose this form of protest.  
 2012 is the year when the greatest number of self‐immolations took place, sometimes 
several occurring on the same day. Thus, on November 7, 2012, five Tibetans self‐immolated – 
four in Amdo and one in the TAR. Three of the four self‐immolations in Amdo were carried out 
by monks from the Ngoshul monastery in Ngaba. Two of them were 16 years old, while the third 
was 15 years old, the youngest so far. The fourth was a woman who self‐immolated in Rebkong. 
A total of 85 Tibetans inside Tibet set themselves on fire in 2012. A Tibetan man, Jamphel Yeshi, 
self‐immolated on March 26 in New Delhi, making the total number of self‐immolations 86.   
 Self‐immolations continued in 2013. In May, however, the pace slowed down, with one in 
May and one in June and July. The next self‐immolation took place on September 28, followed by 
one in November and two in December. Altogether 27 Tibetans self‐immolated in Tibet in 2013; 
in addition two took place in exile, in Kathmandu on February 13 and August 6, the latter 
described in the opening of the thesis. A total of 29 Tibetans set themselves on fire in 2013.  
 In 2014, during my fieldwork in Dharamsala, the self‐immolations still continued, though 
with less frequency compared to the first four months of 2013. Six Tibetans set themselves on 
fire between February and April 2014. For some months it remained quiet, before two persons 
set fire to themselves on September 16 and 17. In December, in the space of less than ten days, 
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three Tibetans self‐immolated. In total, eleven Tibetans set themselves on fire in 2014. In 2015, 
the self‐immolations have continued, although intermittently. At the present moment (August 
2015), six Tibetans have self‐immolated in 2015, the last one being a monk, Sonam Topgyal (late 
twenties), on July 9, 2015, three days after the Dalai Lama’s 80th birthday, in the main square of 
Kyegudo, Amdo.  
 
The response of the Chinese authorities  
When the first self‐immolation took place on February 29, 2009, People’s Armed Police 
responded by firing at the self‐immolator, extinguishing the fire after he had fallen to the 
ground. This was followed by tight security control in the area, taken to new heights after 
Phuntsog’s self‐immolation two years later on March 16, 2011. This time, too, the police 
extinguished the flames, but then began beating Phuntsog severely. He passed away the next 
day, and it is difficult to know whether he died as a result of his burns or the violence inflicted by 
the police. The Ngaba area faced a massive crackdown in the aftermath, in the course of which 
Kirti Monastery was completely isolated, while the monks were forced to undergo a “patriotic 
education” campaign. Around three hundred monks were deported for the purpose of “legal 
education” (ICT – fact sheet on self‐immolations).34 The monastery was also raided by the police, 
two Tibetans being shot dead as they were holding a vigil outside Kirti to offer the monks 
protection.35 Hoping to stop the self‐immolations, the authorities implemented a new strategy 
which still stands today: they began arresting people who attempted to save the self‐immolator 
by giving the person medical treatment or offering any kind of assistance in the aftermath. Three 
monks who took Phuntsog back to Kirti after he had been beaten by the police and tried to give 
him medical treatment were detained, accused of “intentional homicide” by having plotted and 
assisted the self‐immolation, and given sentences from 10 to 13 years (ICT).36  
 The Chinese authorities have continued to follow this policy, further intensified from 
2012, by criminalizing the self‐immolations (ICT Special report; Amnesty International UK, 
February 10, 2013).37 This also involved sentencing people to prison who find themselves in the 
area of a self‐immolation, and as Buffetrille (2013) writes, the same goes for people who possess 
photos of the self‐immolators or attempt to help their families by offering small gifts (n.24 and 
25 in Buffetrille). Another common practice is to take away the dead body of the self‐immolator 
by force, either to the hospital or for cremation (n.23 in Buffetrille, 2013), thus preventing 
                                                 
34
 http://www.savetibet.org/resources/fact-sheets/self-immolations-by-tibetans/ - see Phuntsog’s self-
immolation.  
35
 http://www.savetibet.org/two-elderly-tibetans-killed-as-hundreds-of-monks-detained-from-kirti-crackdown-
deepens/ (acc.23.06.2015). 
36
 http://www.savetibet.org/monks-imprisoned-for-10-13-years-following-self-immolation-by-kirti-monk/ 
(acc.23.06.2015); http://en.people.cn/90882/7585023.html (acc.23.06.2015).  
37
 http://www.savetibet.org/acts-of-significant-evil/ (acc.24.06.2015). On January 31, 2013, eight Tibetans were 
sentenced to jail on the charges of “intentional homicide”, Amnesty International UK/blogs COUNTDOWN FOR 
CHINA, February 1-7, 2013 (Post from February 10, 2013, acc.24.06.2015).  
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traditional funeral practices. In a few cases, Tibetans have opposed the police and stopped them 
from taking the dead body, for example following Tsewang Kyab’s self‐immolation on October 
26, 2012 in Kanlho, Amdo (Gansu), when people honored his dead body with khata (silk scarf) 
offerings before carrying his body to his home.38 From 2012 onwards, the Chinese authorities 
have labeled self‐immolations “suicides” motivated by economic or personal and family issues. 
While exiles attempt to tie these actions to the political context, the Chinese authorities attempt 
to do the opposite. Furthermore, in Chinese media the self‐immolators have been depicted as 
mentally disturbed, as criminals, “Tibetan or violent "separatists" and even as “terrorists” (The 
Guardian, March 7, 2012; Yeh, 2012; Carrico, 2012).39 The understanding of the self‐immolations 
in exile, I suggest, is closely tied to the Chinese response to these actions. No information is 
found in the Chinese press concerning the demands expressed by Tibetans, the self‐immolations 
being characterized as a threat to national unity (Jagou, 2012, p. 82). The tight security control in 
the area of the self‐immolations is thus justified in order to maintain national security.   
 However, another side of the Chinese response should also be mentioned. By late 2011 
the authorities began expressing their “sympathy” for the self‐immolators in public statements, 
portraying them as “hapless victims” (Barnett, 2012, p. 47).  Chinese delegations to other 
countries also declared that the authorities had provided medical treatment to the dying self‐
immolator, as well as offered help to the family (Barnett, 2012, p. 47). The Chinese prime 
minister, Wen Jiabao, particularly expressed his sympathy in March 2012 during a press 
conference in the Chinese parliament, stating, “The young Tibetans are innocent and we feel 
pained by such behavior” (Barnett, 2012, p. 47). This public response has to be seen in relation 
to their violent criticism of what they termed “the Dalai Clique”, blaming the Dalai Lama for 
master‐minding the self‐immolations (The Telegraph, January 11, 2012).40  The “innocent 
monks” were thus portrayed as “victims” of a protest carefully planned and instigated by the 
exile leadership with the Dalai Lama at the forefront. In the state media the propaganda was 
taken to new heights by comparing the Dalai Lama with Hitler (Carrico, 2012).  
 The whereabouts of the majority of the survivors of self‐immolations in Tibet, around 
twenty, remains unknown, for example Lobsang Kunchok and Lobsang Kelsang who self‐
immolated on September 26, 2011 in Ngaba. While some have been imprisoned in conditions of 
strict isolation, others who have been set free have not been heard from (ICT special rapport on 
survivors, April 2015, n. 27). 
 
                                                 
38
 http://www.savetibet.org/second-tibetan-self-immolates-today-in-sangchu/ (acc.29.06.2015). Tibetans 
consider that after death, the dead body should be left in peace for three days.   
39
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/07/tibet-selfimmolations-monks-aba-china (acc.23.06.2015). 
The Chinese authorities have also called the war against the Dalai Lama a war against “terrorists” (Makley, 
2012).  
40
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9007449/China-accuses-Dalai-Lama-of-using-self-
immolations-for-political-gain.html (acc.23.06.2015).  
24 
 
Their messages 
In some cases (at the present time about thirty), self‐immolators have left behind messages, 
while others have shouted slogans before setting themselves on fire. Several have 
conceptualized their self‐immolation as a sacrifice of the body or an offering of light. In their 
messages, most have called for the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet or in addition offered 
prayers for his long life. Other common demands have been the preservation of Tibetan 
language and culture, religious freedom in Tibet and unity among Tibetans, while a few have 
also called for independence. Buffetrille suggests that calling for the return of the Dalai Lama can 
also be understood as a metaphor for independence, as he is the symbol of the Tibetan nation 
(2015).41  
 Some of the self‐immolators have wished to draw attention to specific issues (which I 
will return to in chapter 3), such as land rights, freedom of language, requests to Tibetans not to 
slaughter animals, or eat meat, or fight among themselves.   
**A list of all the self‐immolators so far (August 2015) is attached in Appendix.  
 
The response in exile    
As this thesis is devoted to exile Tibetan perceptions of the self‐immolations, I will briefly 
outline the Dalai Lama’s response at different points of time compared to the response of some 
Tibetan political activists.  
 Exile Tibetans regard the self‐immolations as the ultimate call for freedom inside Tibet. 
In the beginning, opinions were divided with regard to the self‐immolations, the most critical 
being the Tibetans’ spiritual leader (lama), the Dalai Lama, who occupies a central role in the 
lives of most Tibetans. The political guidelines of the Dalai Lama, the most central being the 
principle of non‐violence, and from 1988 also the Middle Way Approach, carry great authority. 
Through this “approach” the Dalai Lama seeks genuine autonomy for the Tibetan areas, while 
remaining a part of the People’s Republic of China.  Although the Dalai Lama resigned as the 
political leader of the Tibetan people in March 2011, non‐violence and the Middle Way 
Approach, despite being challenged, firmly hold their ground in the exile community.  
 In the beginning, the Dalai Lama was ambiguous with regard to the self‐immolations; he 
did not praise them, instead expressing the view that they violated fundamental Buddhist ethics. 
These actions were also problematic according to the Dalai Lama’s non‐violent stance, as a self‐
immolation involves inflicting violence on a body. Further, he questioned the effectiveness of 
such acts. During a conference in Sydney in 2013 he said, “It´s a sad thing that happens. Of course 
it´s very, very sad. In the meantime, I express doubt how much effect (there is) from such drastic 
actions” (The Telegraph, June 13, 2013).  
                                                 
41
 As I will show with my empirical findings, it is interpreted as such by those exile Tibetans who support the 
goal of independence.   
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 However, although The Dalai Lama has stated that he does not support these acts, he has 
never publicly told Tibetans inside Tibet to stop setting themselves on fire. The Dalai Lama has 
expressed that he is in a difficult position for several reasons. He stated his concerns in an article 
in July 2012, calling the self‐immolations “a very, very delicate political issue”. Here he expressed 
that it is best for him “to remain neutral”, adding, “Now, the reality is that if I say something 
positive, then the Chinese immediately blame me”. “If I say something negative, then the family 
members of those people feel very sad. They sacrificed their… life. It is not easy. So I do not want to 
create some kind of impression that this is wrong.”42 (quoted in Buffetrille, 2012, p. 14). Since the 
Chinese leadership continuously blame the Dalai Lama for instigating the self‐immolations, he 
has to be very careful (Binara et.al 2012). In 2012 and in 2013 the Dalai Lama referred to the 
self‐immolations as a form of sacrifice and non‐violence (Daily News & Analysis, November 18, 
2012; The Tibet Post, October 24, 2013),43 pointing to the underlying motivation and to the fact 
that a self‐immolation causes no physical harm to others. In the article in The Tibet Post he is 
quoted as having said, 
 These sad incidents show that the people involved believe in non-violence. These people are not 
drunk or overwhelmed by family problems and they could have turned to violence against others. 
Instead they chose to sacrifice themselves. Tibetans remain committed to non-violence.  
More recently, he has refrained from saying anything at all.  
 While the Dalai Lama at the outset was, and still is, critical of the self‐immolations, some 
Tibetan political activists, have from the beginning praised the self‐immolators as heroes and 
martyrs. The self‐immolations have not only challenged communist China, but also certain 
values and beliefs in the exile community, regarding taking one’s own life and the meaning of 
non‐violence. Nevertheless, in this thesis I will attempt to show that today the self‐immolations 
are generally seen as lending support to central Buddhist values such as compassion and non‐
violence, and as strengthening the political project of exile Tibetans.   
 
Literature on the self-immolations  
So far two international seminars about the self‐immolations have been organized. The first took 
place in France in December 2012, published in Revue d’Études Tibétaines, edited by Katia 
Buffetrille and Françoise Robin. The second was organized in New Delhi in April 2013. The 
papers presented there are available online. In addition, The Journal of Cultural Anthropology 
(JCA) published a special issue on the subject in April 2012, edited by Carole McGranahan and 
Ralph Litzinger, the first academic writings on the self‐immolations. I draw upon many of these 
                                                 
42
 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3617428.ece (in Buffetrille 2012, acc.27.04.2015). 
43
 http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-acts-of-self-immolation-are-in-principle-non-violent-dalai-lama-
1766257 (acc.10.07.2015). 
http://www.thetibetpost.com/en/news/international/3691-tibetans-remain-committed-to-non-violence-his-
holiness-the-dalai-lama (acc.10.07.2015).  
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contributions throughout this thesis. Here I shall provide a brief introduction, and focus on a few 
chosen works which discuss the response to the self‐immolations in the exile community.   
  The special issue of the JCA was entitled “Self‐Immolations as protest in Tibet”, 
and the title indicates the analytical approach. The act of protest is analyzed from various angles 
by contextualizing the self‐immolations within the political situation inside Tibet and in relation 
to Buddhism. It also takes a look at the Chinese response to the self‐immolations, as well as the 
Tibetan responses in exile. The various authors (Craig; Makley; McGranahan;  Paldron; Tan) 
attempt to make sense of these acts, as well exploring the political and historical factors leading 
to them, as Shakya (2012a) and Fischer (2012) attempt to do in a more elaborate way.  
 The issue also includes contributions by Tibetans, of which the most relevant for me is 
that of Dhondup Tashi Rekjong (2012), addressing online debates on the self‐immolations 
among Tibetans in exile. Dhondup introduces the reader to four stages which have dominated 
the discussions online. At the first stage, immediately after the self‐immolations, Tibetans 
unanimously expressed solidarity with the self‐immolators. However, as he points out, starting 
with the second stage, opinions began diverging over whether these were violent or non‐violent 
acts, while at the third stage, arguments over whether the self‐immolators were calling for 
independence (rangzen) or the “Middle Way Approach” arose. At the fourth and final stage the 
question over whether the self‐immolations should continue was brought to the surface. These 
are topics I also found relevant during my fieldwork, especially that of violence and non‐
violence, that of the aim of self‐immolators: rangzen or the Middle Way, as well as the 
importance of showing solidarity, and they will be addressed in the following chapters. 
However, the fourth and final stage that Dhondup Tashi mentions, was not addressed by my 
interlocutors. This might be related to the fact that during my fieldwork the frequency of self‐
immolations had slowed down, compared to 2012 when Dhondup Tashi wrote his article. His 
article also confirms that in the beginning, the self‐immolations elicited different opinions, 
exemplified through online debates. He made an important remark, namely that the question of 
violence and non‐violence was not introduced by exiles, but by the Chinese authorities who 
proclaimed that the act of setting oneself ablaze was violence. The exile Tibetans responded by 
calling the self‐immolations non‐violence. This highlights how the understanding of the self‐
immolations in exile is closely tied to the Chinese response, in other words, there is a dialectic 
relation between the Tibetan diaspora and the Chinese authorities.  
 The contributions in the French seminar were more tangible – based on empirical data – 
and analytical than those published in the JCA, which were more reflexive, open, and introduced 
various ways of understanding the self‐immolations.  
 The publication of the French seminar opens with contributions analyzing the subject 
within a historical and contemporary political framework. This is followed by debates and 
interpretations on the self‐immolations made by both Chinese and exile Tibetans. The rest of the 
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contributions make use of a comparative perspective by discussing self‐immolations in other 
parts of the world, with contributions from specialists on social and religious movements, 
among others James Benn (2012) who had done research on self‐immolations in the Buddhist 
tradition in China.  
 One of the contributors who presented interpretations of self‐immolations by exile 
Tibetans is Chung Tsering (2012). In the same way as Dhondhup Tashi, he bases his article on 
material from the internet, drawing on articles written by Tibetans. Chung Tsering’s paper is an 
informative summary rather than an analytical study. Like Dhondup Tashi, he presents some 
ongoing themes around the topic, differentiating between converging views and issues of 
debate. The views converge on the causes of the self‐immolations, which according to all 
contributors are the Chinese policies in Tibet. The other converging view is that the self‐
immolators are very courageous. Regarding the issues of debate, Chung Tsering presents the 
question of violence/non‐violence, Buddhist/non‐Buddhist, whether the self‐immolations 
should continue, the success of the “Middle Way Approach", and whether exile Tibetans are 
doing enough to fulfill their moral obligation.   
 As I will show in the course of the thesis, the question of violence/non‐violence is no 
longer highly contested, and there exists a high degree of consensus on the self‐immolations as 
non‐violence. Still, the success of the Middle Way Approach continues to be questioned by 
rangzen supporters, as well as whether exile Tibetans are sufficiently active in the Tibetan 
struggle. Regarding the success of the Middle Way Approach, the filmmaker and writer Tenzing 
Sonam (2013) also reflected upon this in his paper “Rethinking the Tibet Movement”, presented 
at the seminar on the self‐immolations in Delhi. His conclusion was that the Middle Way is,  
“Inadvertently assisting the very process of cultural annihilation that the policy seeks to protect. 
The longer we wait in this limbo of political ambivalence, the more time we give China to carry 
out its final solution, and the more in vain the sacrifices of our compatriots will be. The time has 
come to rethink the Middle Way Approach and reinstate Tibet’s independence as the 
cornerstone of our struggle”.  
 
 What Tenzing Sonam’s paper exemplifies, is that the interpretation of the self‐
immolations in exile is also conditioned by the political project. Building upon the work of 
Dhondup Tashi Rekjong, Chung Tsering, and others, in the following I explore the response to 
the self‐immolations two years later in Dharamsala.  
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Figure 4: The korlam.  
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2  McLeod Ganj and the Tibetan diaspora 
 
With numerous Tibetan shops, cafes, restaurants and a few monasteries, McLeod Ganj is known 
as “little Lhasa” (Anand, 2002). This is also the location of the Dalai Lama’s modest temple, the 
Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) and a number of Tibetan NGOs, making this small hill 
station the Tibetan religious and political center in exile. For many tourists it is a Shangri‐la44 in 
exile.  
 McLeod Ganj is forever changing along with the seasons and people continuously coming 
and going. As winter sets in with foggy days, covering the small hill station in a blanket of snow, 
people retire into the warm comfort of their woolen jackets or shawls, enjoying hot bowls of 
thukpa – Tibetan thick noodle soup – endless rounds of glasses of boiled water, or snuggling 
beneath heavy Indian blankets in cold rooms. The streets become empty compared to the hectic 
summer tourist season. 
 As spring was followed by summer, the town slowly but surely woke up from its winter 
sleep. The nuns from the monastery on Jogiwara Road got out on the rooftop in the evenings for 
their debating classes and the sound of their hands clapping could be heard from a distance. 
Cafes reopened and the streets pulsated with movement as the residents once again moved 
outdoors and loads of tourists began arriving. The streets were filled with new and strange faces 
and the never‐ending din of car horns. Late night fights on Mount View between Indian tourists, 
and occasionally between Indian tourists and Tibetans, became common events. McLeod Ganj 
again became chaotic, but for many people these hectic months presented opportunities for 
business and for forming new acquaintances. Only during the early, quiet mornings, or on days 
of heavy rainfall followed by fog enveloping the lush hilltops, would McLeod Ganj once more 
settle into silence.                                                              Figure 5: A January morning in McLeod Ganj.  
    
                                                 
44
 The romanticizing myth of Tibet as Shangri-la has always held a strong appeal to the western imagination. 
Tibet is imagined as a mysterious land, “esoteric and beyond ‘ordinariness’ ” (Shakya, 1991 
p. 2), inhabited by wise lamas, simple monks and people who are all devoted to Buddhism, living in perfect 
peace and harmony (Lopez 1998).    
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McLeod Ganj – the town and its history 
Dharamsala is divided into two parts, ‘lower’ and ‘upper’ Dharamsala, situated approximately 10 
km apart, the latter also being known as McLeod Ganj. My fieldwork was mainly carried out in 
McLeod Ganj, which I generally refer to as “Dharamsala”, sometimes including the surrounding 
area where Tibetans live. It is also here that most of the political activities of the Tibetan exile 
community are conducted.  
 Dharamsala is located in Kangra District, in the state of Himachal Pradesh in northwest 
India. It is a place of ethnic diversity, with a history of migration. During the Raj period, it used to 
be the summer ‘hill station’, of the British. Following India’s independence, the Muslims living in 
Dharamsala left for Pakistan, while Hindus from Pakistan moved to Dharamsala. The local 
population, known as Gaddis, are mostly seminomadic goat herders, numbering around 20,000 
(Diehl, 2002, p. 39; Grent, 2002, p. 112). From the 1960s, Dharamsala began providing shelter to 
Tibetan refugees as well. The Tibetan population of Dharamsala is estimated to be around 
15,000 (Tibetan Review, July 29, 2014)45, with the majority being engaged in tourism, 
handicrafts, retail business, medical services, military service, work for the Tibetan government 
or Tibetan and other NGOs (Grent, 2002, p. 112). For the most part Tibetans live in McLeod Ganj 
or in Gangkyi (Gangchen Kyishong), halfway between McLeod Ganj and lower Dharamsala; the 
latter houses the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), the Library of Tibetan Works and 
Archives, Men‐Tsee‐Khang46 and Nechung Monastery. 
 The road from lower Dharamsala to McLeod Ganj, Jogiwara Road, is steep and twisting. 
About 1,5 km after the Tibetan settlement in Gangkyi the main road bifurcates; whereas 
Jogiwara Road continues straight ahead, becoming even more narrow and steep, the other 
Temple Road, turns left, and is named after the “Dalai Lama’s temple”47 which is situated on this 
road. Encircling the temple is the korlam (‘circumambulation path’), where Tibetans practice 
ritual circumambulation to gain merit, and some exercise (see chapter 4).  
 Jogiwara and Temple Roads are the two main roads of McLeod Ganj. Only one‐way traffic 
is allowed – cars drive up Jogiwara Road to Main Square, the center of town where all the roads 
in town meet, and down along Temple Road.48 From the tiny and always busy Main Square, 
where one can expect to run into familiar faces at any time, smaller roads lead the visitor in 
different directions.  
 
 
                                                 
45
  http://www.tibetanreview.net/to-be-or-not-to-be-a-citizen-the-tibetan-dilemma/ (acc.08.05.2015) 
46
 Tibetan Medical and Astrological Institute. 
47
 A commonly used name.  
48
 Temple Road from the Dalai Lama temple (Tsuglagkhang) to lower Dharamsala was at the end of June 2015 
named “Potala Road” (after the Dalai Lama’s palace in Lhasa) by the government of Himachal Pradesh to honor 
the Dalai Lama’s 80
th
 birthday on the 21
st
 of the Sixth month (Tibetan lunar calendar) and July 6 (Western 
calendar).  
http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=36175 (acc.30.06.2015).  
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Figure 6: Map of McLeod Ganj.  
 
In exile  
Kham, the eastern part of Tibet was invaded by the People’s Liberation Army on October 5, 1950 
(Goldstein, 1989, p. 690). Following an unsuccessful appeal to the UN on October 19, 1950, the 
small Tibetan army surrendered. On May 23, 1951, the Tibetan government was forced to sign 
the so‐called “17‐Point Agreement”, in which it was declared that Tibet should return to the “big 
32 
 
family of the Motherland – the People's Republic of China” (Goldstein, 1989, p. 763), thus 
renouncing the claim to Tibetan sovereignty49 (Fjeld, 2005, p. 9).  
 Between 1951 and 1959 Mao Zedong tried to follow a policy of persuasion in Lhasa. 
When the Chinese entered Tibet, they pledged to support “freedom of religion”. With the 
launching of the so‐called “democratic reforms” in 1956 in the regions adjacent to China, a 
change of attitude was evident, the Communist Party becoming increasingly hostile towards 
monasteries and the practice of religion (Norbu, 1986, p. 132). In Kham this led to armed revolt 
(McGranahan, 2005, p. 571). The situation further deteriorated in 1958 when Mao Zedong 
launched a more aggressive campaign, mainly in Amdo and Kham. The same year, the resistance 
army Chushi Gangdruk (‘Four Rivers Six Ranges’)50 was formed, which not only fought the 
Chinese army, but also played a crucial role in securing the Dalai Lama’s escape to India 
following the uprising in Lhasa in 1959 (McGranahan, 2010; Dunham, 2005).  
 The Dalai Lama fled Lhasa on March 17, 1959, entering Indian territory two weeks later 
(Shakya, 1999, p. 207). He has remained in exile ever since. By the end of June 1959, some 20, 
000 Tibetans had followed him into exile, the number rising to more than 100,000 over the next 
year.51  According to official exile Tibetan sources, the Chinese invasion, involving war, 
imprisonment, execution and famine, has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands 
Tibetans and the destruction of thousands of monasteries (Houston and Wright, 2003, p. 220).  
 Most Tibetans residing in Dharamsala today were born elsewhere, but live there because 
of studies or work. Many come from Tibetan settlements in South India such as Bylakuppe or 
Mundgod, or from Ladakh, Bir, Dehradun or Darjeeling in North India, while others are born in 
Tibet, having escaped to India over the last 10‐15 years.52 Many Tibetans in Dharamsala make a 
living from tourism, running shops, cafes, restaurants or hotels (Vasstveit, 2009, p. 34). Another 
important source of income is the ‘sweater business’. Tibetans buy cheap sweaters from lalas53 
in nearby Ludhiana, Punjab, and then sell them with surplus on the street in big Indian cities in 
winter.   
 However, not all Tibetans are engaged in paid work, and there is much concern about 
lack of work opportunities. Most of the young Tibetans who have arrived in recent years, known 
as “newcomers”, have neither work nor other sources of income, and spend their days 
wandering up and down the streets of McLeod Ganj.  
                                                 
49
 In the Seventeen Point Agreement, China also undertook “to safeguard the social and cultural independence 
of Tibet” (Fjeld, 2005, p. 9), including religious freedom.  
50
 An ancient name for Kham (Jamyang Norbu, 1994).  
51
 Tibet.net: 128,014 persons, according to the 2009 survey.  
52
 There are about 35 different Tibetan self-sustained settlements in India, all under the authority of CTA. Of 
approximately 130 000 Tibetans living in exile, 75 percent reside in India (Brox, 2012, p. 453; McConnell, 2012, 
p. 79). The main source of income among Tibetans in the settlements in South India is agriculture, while trade 
dominates in North India.  
53
 A common name for the Hindu caste kayasth, the majority of whom in the state of Punjab are involved in 
business. 
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Central Tibetan Administration (CTA)  
The Tibetan parliament in exile was instituted in 1960 by the Dalai Lama and is regarded by the 
exile community as a continuation of the Lhasa government that ruled an independent Tibet 
prior to the Chinese invasion (Brox, 2012, p. 453). The “Constitution of Tibet”, promulgated by 
the Dalai Lama in 1963, stated that the Tibetan government in exile was committed to returning 
to Tibet and that a future independent Tibet would be governed on the basis of democracy. It 
also stated that if Tibetans remained in exile longer than anticipated, a democratic governance 
was also to be deployed in exile (Brox, 2012, p. 454). In 1991 the Constitution was revised, and 
as Brox points out, “Democratization was pushed forward using principles of institutionalized 
separation and balance of powers: it distinguished between the legislative, executive and 
judiciary” (2012, p. 454). Being a democratic institution, the government in exile thus represents 
a break with the traditional political system in Tibet. In an effort to make the exile governance 
more democratic, the Dalai Lama resigned from his political position in March 2011, a decision 
that was strongly opposed both by the Tibetan leadership and the people. Nevertheless, after 
2011 the Dalai Lama's function is officially limited to that of being the spiritual leader of the 
Tibetan people.  
 Members of the Tibetan Parliament are elected by Tibetans who hold a valid Green 
Book54 and are above the age of 18. As CTA aims to represent Tibetans both inside Tibet and in 
exile, the elected members represent the three Tibetan regions – U‐tsang, Amdo and Kham (ten 
delegates from each region) – regarded as constituting traditional Tibet; the five main religious 
traditions (two representatives from each tradition) – Gelug, Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya and the Bon 
religion; and, finally, four seats are reserved for exile Tibetans outside India, with two 
representatives being elected from North America and two from Europe (2012, p. 459). In May 
2011, a few months after the Dalai Lama’s withdrawal as the political leader of the Tibetan 
people, the government in exile changed its name to from Government in exile to “the Central 
Tibetan Administration”.55 
 
Two political strategies: autonomy or independence   
While CTA seeks to represent all Tibetans, there has for a long time been a split in the exile 
community with regard to political strategy and the defined aim for Tibet’s future status. While 
                                                 
54
 The Green Book is issued by CTA, and has almost become the passport of Tibetans in exile. It is on the basis 
of this that Tibetans claim their rights from CTA and is also used for school admission, university scholarships, 
and employment within CTA or businesses run by CTA http://tibet.net/support-tibet/pay-green-book/ 
(acc.27.04.2015). 
55
 The name change gave rise to disagreements in exile: http://tibetoffice.org/media-press/commentaries-
opinions/the-legitimacy-and-role-of-the-central-tibetan-administration (acc.01.06.2015)  
http://www.thetibetpost.com/en/news/exile/1778-kalon-tripa-clarifies-tibetan-parliament-name-change-
decision (acc.01.06.2015). TYC was particularly against this name change on the grounds that this would 
weaken the case for Tibet’s independence which is the nationalist aspiration of TYC: 
http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=29622&t=1&c=1 (acc.01.06.2015).   
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the stated aim of CTA and the Dalai Lama is to achieve meaningful autonomy within China, also 
known as the “Middle Way Approach” (umey lam), several Tibetan organizations work for 
independence, rangzen.56 Conflicts between people sympathizing with either of these two 
strategies also challenge the notion of the diasporic identity as continuous, uniform and stable, a 
theme I will return to later in this chapter. These strong conflict lines are, I will argue, crucial to 
understanding the strong emphasis on unity in the Tibetan exile community. As a background to 
the following chapters, I provide an outline of the two opposing positions, viz. that aiming at 
autonomy and that aiming at independence. I shall do this by introducing the central political 
actors in Dharamsala, positioning them within the political landscape of the Tibetan exile 
community.   
 
CTA and the Dalai Lama  
Based on Tibet’s de facto independence in 1950, the Dalai Lama and the exile government 
defined Tibetan independence as their political aim in the 1960s.  However, in 1988 the Dalai 
Lama changed this aim to the current “Middle Way Approach”, seeking meaningful autonomy 
within the PRC. A year later he received the Nobel Peace Prize, after which the Tibetan 
leadership regarded it as difficult to again adopt the rigid goal of independence.   
 This change of approach should also be seen in relation to the talks in Beijing between 
representatives of the Chinese government and the Tibetan exile government. After the 1988 
riots in Lhasa, Beijing announced that if the Dalai Lama gave up his campaign for Tibetan 
independence, he could return to China (although not necessarily to Tibet).  In other words, 
adopting autonomy as the political goal was the condition for the Dalai Lama’s return (Goldstein, 
1997, p. 87). However, these and subsequent talks led nowhere. In official exile circles, the 
change of stated political aim from independence to autonomy is explained differently, with an 
emphasis on continuity in policies. According to one of the parliamentarians I interviewed, the 
Middle Way Approach was not adopted suddenly, but developed over a period of time, beginning 
already in the 1970s. This parliamentarian pointed out that this had a number of reasons, the 
most urgent being the increasing migration of Chinese into Tibet. The hope of the Tibetan 
leadership was that if the aim of independence was abandoned, the Chinese authorities might be 
persuaded to save Tibetan civilization from the threat of extinction.  
 When the Dalai Lama retired as political leader in March 2011, CTA chose to continue to 
flag “autonomy” as their official political strategy. A pamphlet published by the exile Department 
of Information and International Relations stated that the essence of the Middle Way “is to 
secure genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people within the scope of the Constitution of the PRC" 
(2009, p. 5).  Although CTA no longer seeks an independent Tibet, it still holds that the three 
                                                 
56
 Margaret Nowak writes that the term rangzen is of recent origin. She argues that prior to the Chinese 
invasion and indoctrination (from 1949), no standard Tibetan words for modern political concepts like 
“independence”, “socialism”, or “exploitation” existed (1984, pp. 31-32). 
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main regions, U‐Tsang, Amdo and Kham, together constitute Tibet, and that Tibetans constitute a 
single national group. The Middle Way Approach is inspired by the Buddhist idea of the value of 
the middle ground between two opposing ideas, playing on the connotations evoked by the 
prestigious Madhyamika ('Middle Way') philosophical school, which is of fundamental 
importance in Tibetan monastic culture. The main means of achieving such ground is through 
non‐violent action, which the Tibetan leadership has been advocating ever since coming into 
exile, trying to engage with the Chinese leadership through dialogue. Non‐violence has not yet 
been successful in producing results, but it remains a strategy that all Tibetan organizations, 
including those who advocate independence as their political aim, share with CTA. 
 
Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) and Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) 
From the 1970s a new generation of exile Tibetans began graduating from universities and 
college, a generation that was far more critical in their thinking than their parents (Kolås, 1996, 
p. 58) Young Tibetans in exile soon decided to hold a conference with the purpose of uniting 
exile youth. The Dalai Lama agreed and covered all the expenses for the conference (Avedon, 
1985, pp. 140‐141).  TYC was founded on October 7, 1970 with the Dalai Lama’s blessings, and 
soon became a loud voice criticizing the exile Tibetan establishment. Over the years TYC 
continued to grow and today has 71 regional branches with over 15,000 members worldwide 
(Houston and Wright, 2003, p. 224), and is mainly funded  through membership and voluntary 
donations. As Boyd writes, “The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) has been a main ingredient in 
this growing awareness of the place of dissent in a democratic polity” (2005, p. 90). On its 
foundation it incorporated the Dalai Lama’s goal of independence – a goal that the Dalai Lama 
held at the time – and continues to fight for an independent Tibet. Apart from organizing 
political campaigns such as hunger strikes and protest marches, TYC engages in social and 
educational campaigns, and also organizes workshops, for example in leadership training for 
Tibetan youth.57 For the TYC activists, Tibet's pre‐1950 independence is an historical fact, and 
they refuse to settle for less than what they hold Tibetans are entitled to.  
 The relation between TYC and the exile leadership has become increasingly tense over 
the years, especially after the Dalai Lama adopted the Middle Way policy in 1988. Criticism from 
the younger generation has not been welcomed by the exile leadership, but is rather seen as 
disrespectful and “at worst a threat to their legitimate power” (Boyd, 2005, p. 93).58  TYC also 
has a contested reputation in the exile community as many label the organization as “anti‐Dalai 
Lama” due to its focus on independence. One TYC activist told me that they are labeled as 
“traitors” in the exile community: “We are traitors in China, and in Tibet. Also here we are being 
                                                 
57
 TYC has organized many hunger strikes, for example the one in 1998 during which the first Tibetan, Thupten 
Ngodup, self-immolated. During my fieldwork, TYC organized a March from Dharamsala to Delhi, (Figure 20, 
chapter 4). 
58
 See also Brox (2012, p. 462).  
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treated as traitors by our own government. Our desire is rangzen (independence], and since 
rangzen is considered bad, those who stand for rangzen are treated accordingly”.   
 The activists, however, hold that difference of opinion is a fundamental right in any 
democratic society, and the main TYC office in Dharamsala firmly holds upholds independence 
as the organization’s main goal. Nevertheless, due to increasing pressure towards unity and 
conformity in exile, eight local TYC branches have accepted the Middle Way.  
 
 Students for a Free Tibet was established in 1991, aiming to engage students in the 
Tibetan struggle for freedom. Along with TYC, SFT also holds an independence stand, but enjoys 
a better reputation in the exile community, one reason perhaps being that TYC through the years 
has been led by people who have played an important role on the political scene, and were 
among the first to publicly voice opinions which did not harmonize with the politically correct 
views.   
 Along with smaller NGOs, such as the Regional Tibetan Youth Congress of Dharamsala 
and the Regional Tibetan Women’s  Association of Dharamsala, SFT is one of the main organizers 
today of the “February 13” campaign (chapter 5), also known as Tibetan Independence Day, as 
well as well‐established events such as the celebration of the Panchen Lama’s birthday or the 
candle‐light vigils for self‐immolators. SFT also organizes social or educational events, such as 
talks to raise awareness of the popular social medium WeChat or organizing film evenings, such 
as the Lhakar59 film series.  
 
Gu-chu-sum  
Gu‐chu‐sum was formed on September 21, 1991 by former political prisoners from Tibet. The 
name refers to the numbers, 9, 10 and 3 – representing three specific months when large‐scale 
protests in Lhasa took place, viz. September 1987, October 1987 and March 1988. Many of the 
first members of the organization had fled Tibet after their participation in these 
demonstrations. Gu‐chu‐sum wishes to create awareness of the situation inside Tibet as well 
providing welfare services to former political prisoners and their families in exile. Since the 
organization was formed by Tibetans who had been imprisoned because of their commitment to 
rangzen, ‘independence’ was at the start the political aim of the organization. In September 
2013, Gu‐chu‐sum unexpectedly changed its political goal of rangzen to autonomy, a decision 
that remains contested among the Gu‐chu‐sum employees and the members of the organization 
who had been imprisoned in Tibet for demonstrating for independence.  
 During my fieldwork, only a handful of people expressed to me their frustration at the 
conflict between upholders of rangzen and the Middle Way respectively. There is, however, still 
considerable tension beneath the surface (chapter 5). Although ‘autonomy’ is the official 
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 I will return to Lhakar below.  
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position, it continues to be challenged, not only by organizations calling for rangzen, but also by 
individuals working in the CTA or in organizations that support the official position of 
negotiating with China for autonomy. The fact that self‐immolations continue is seen by some of 
my interlocutors as an indication of the failure of the autonomy approach.  One of them 
suggested,  
In exile, after 33 or 34 years of middle way hasn’t produced any change. Instead it has produced 
friction among the Tibetans themselves. His Holiness is no more our political leader, and also 
people inside Tibet are noticing that the Chinese are not responding to the middle way and maybe 
that we should go back to [demanding] complete independence, since the middle way has shown to 
be ineffective. This will gain momentum and will increase. 
 Throughout this thesis the conflict line between autonomy and independence will move 
under and over the surface, both in the perceptions of the self‐immolations and the practices 
commemorating these. Challenging the need for unity often found in diasporic settings, these 
conflicts often remain muted and, as will be clear in the following, represents a problematic 
issue in Dharamsala.    
 
The Tibetan diaspora  
“I am Tibetan 
But I am not from Tibet. 
Never been there. 
Yet I dream 
of dying there” 
                               
                                             Tenzin Tsundue, poet and activist (2013, p. 13).  
The term ‘diaspora’ has traditionally been reserved for a group of people who for political or 
other reasons have migrated or sought exile in other countries. Thomas Hylland Eriksen writes 
in Ethnicity and Nationalism that the term was originally used for Jews in Europe whose primary 
identity – although they might have lived in Europe or elsewhere for generations – was 
connected to their ancestral land (2010, p. 186; see also Cohen, 2008). Further, he points out 
that the term diaspora emphasizes “continuity, stable collective identities, territoriality and 
boundaries” (2010, p. 187). Moreover, as Chris Vasantkumar points out, ‘diaspora’ often carries 
an inherent idea of a spatially and temporally distinct homeland to which the diaspora 
community looks (2013, p. 229).  
 Since 1959, the exile Tibetan community might also be called diasporic. Tibetans are in 
exile for political reasons, and the term diaspora also connects their primary identity to their 
ancestral land, carrying the inherent idea of a distinct homeland. Diaspora also emphasizes a 
continuous, homogeneous and stable collective identity, which is crucial for securing unity. I will 
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show, however, that in the exile Tibetan case, the emphasis on continuous and stable identities is 
problematic, because identities remain contested on the ground, as Houston and Wright (2003) 
also have argued. Instead they suggest studying diaspora both as a process and as a condition. 
According to them, viewing diaspora primarily as a condition, implies the unified and 
homogenous representation of identities, set by the nationalist discourse in exile. Diaspora as a 
process, on the other hand, makes visible the lived refugee experiences where the dominating 
representations are enacted and made meaningful in various ways. Studying diaspora both as a 
condition and as a process shows the dynamic interplay between ideas or representations and 
action. In the following, I draw on Houston and Wright’s understanding of diaspora and aim to 
show how “Tibetan‐ness” carries different meanings for different people in Dharamsala. In order 
to show ways in which Tibetan diasporic identities are contested, in the following I shall 
describe events and debates around the Indian national elections in May 2014, an event that 
brought conflicting concerns to the fore. 
 
Indian elections and the question of Indian citizenship  
One day, right after the elections, Lhasang, the General Secretary of Gu‐chu‐sum, called me into 
his office. He sat at his desk, pointing at his computer screen. His Facebook page was open, 
showing a photo of the Dalai Lama greeting Modi, India’s prime minister‐to‐be. He had written 
the caption for the photo as “India’s next Prime Minister Narendra Modi”, and wanted me to 
check his spelling. Many Tibetans added Facebook postings about the Indian elections, often 
accompanied by a photo of the Dalai Lama meeting Modi. Lhasang did not vote in the elections, 
yet he, like many other Tibetans, whether born in Tibet or in exile, followed them anxiously.  
 The Indian elections brought to the surface discussions concerning Tibetan identity and 
the relation of exile Tibetans to their host country. All Tibetans born between 1950 and 1987 
were given the right to vote, in spite of not having Indian citizenship. The Indian Citizenship Act, 
§3(1) (a) states, “[e]very person born in India, (a) on or after the 26th day of January, 1950, but 
before the 1st day of July, 1987; […] shall be a citizen of India by birth” (landinfo.no).60 Although 
Tibetans born within this period have the right to apply for Indian citizenship,61 most of them 
choose not to do so. As an alternative, the Indian government grants them a Registration 
Certificate (RC),62 which has to be renewed annually. For those Tibetans who have become 
Indian voters, their RCs could be relinquished, meaning they would no longer have the status as 
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 http://www.landinfo.no/asset/2958/1/2958_1.pdf (acc.07.05.2015). 
61
 Even though Tibetans have the right by law to apply for Indian citizenship, to acquire it has never been easy, 
as Lhagyari Namgyal Dolkar’s case from 2008 shows. Although she was born in 1986, and thus had the right to 
apply for citizenship, she was denied it. However, she took her case to the High Court in New Delhi, and was 
finally granted citizenship in 2010, after two years of legal battle.  
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/25-yr-old-first-Tibetan-to-be-Indian-citizen/articleshow/7323090.cms 
(acc.01.06.2015).  
62
 The Tibetan Green Book, issued by CTA often has to be claimed on the basis of a RC. 
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“foreigners” or “self‐claimed refugees”.63 My interlocutors did not know whether their RCs 
would be have to be relinquished by voting, causing considerable confusion, partly a result of the 
lack of clear guidelines from CTA, which has never encouraged Tibetans acquiring Indian 
citizenship.64   
 Despite – or rather, because – of the lack of legal clarity, debates over the possible 
consequences of voting arose in Dharamsala around the elections. These debates did not merely 
address Tibetan participation in the national elections, but also the issue of applying for Indian 
citizenship. The elections brought to the surface concerns about the future of the Tibetan 
freedom struggle in exile, as well as preservation of Tibetan identity, challenging the notion of 
collective, stable diasporic identities.   
 
Indian elections and Indian citizenship: loyalty, opportunities and dignity  
A few days prior to the announcement of the election results, I had observed a discussion 
regarding the acquisition of Indian citizenship between two Tibetans, Shamba and Drukmo, at 
the SFT office. Shamba, a man in his late 20s, worked for SFT in Dharamsala, whereas Drukmo, in 
her early 20s, worked for Tibetan Women Association (TWA). Their discussion centered on the 
question of loyalty to the phayul (‘fatherland’), i.e. Tibet, on the one hand, and opportunities in 
India on the other. On the basis of this discussion I wish to argue that for some Tibetans the 
acquisition of citizenship, is not only a question of identity, but also dignity.  
 Drukmo was seated on the couch next to me and seemed to be busy with her work.65 
Because it was Lhakar day, she was wearing traditional Tibetan clothes, a chupa she had 
inherited from her mother. Lhakar (meaning “white Wednesday”),66 initiated after the major 
uprisings in Tibet in 2008 (Lhakar.org), is a movement devoted to the preservation of Tibetan 
identity. It is marked every Wednesday, both in exile and some places inside Tibet, encouraging 
Tibetans to wear Tibetan clothes, eat Tibetan food, and speak Tibetan language. Soon a heated 
discussion arose between Drukmo and Shamba: whether to apply for Indian citizenship or not. 
During the discussion Drukmo was literally jumping out of her chair. “She is too emotional”, 
Shamba laughingly said to me. Shamba was in favor of Tibetans participating in the Indian 
elections, and did not seem to be against the idea of Tibetans applying for Indian citizenship. 
Tibetans will obtain greater rights, he argued.67 Although not having an Indian passport, he was 
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 I use the term “self-claimed refugees” as Tibetans in India are not officially classified as refugees, but as 
foreigners, since India is not bound by any international refugee convention. The term “self-claimed refugees” 
is also used by a Tibetan activist in this article: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/they-would-
rather-be-tibetan-refugees-than-indian-voters/ (acc.08.05.2015). 
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 There were also discussions as to whether the loss of RC would lead to the loss of the Green Book as well, 
which grants Tibetans specific rights.  
65
 The SFT office was the place where everyone came together during the lunch hour, including some women 
from TWA.     
66
 Known as the "soul day" of the Dalai Lama.  
67
 Some of the opinions expressed here are paraphrased; those which are direct quotations are marked by 
quotation marks.    
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considering applying for one, despite being discouraged by CTA. Drukmo, in contrast, was 
strongly against participation in the elections and acquiring Indian citizenship, emphasizing that 
if Tibetans became citizens of India, it would disable them from legitimately fighting for a free 
Tibet. Besides, she said, her loyalty lay with Tibet, not with India.  
 Drukmo’s arguments were not uncommon. In the media, the well‐known poet and 
activist Tenzin Tsundue had also argued against voting, invoking the same reasons (Tibetan 
Review, July 29, 2014).68 For him the main goal of Tibetans is still to return to their homeland. A 
CTA member expressed similar opinions to me: 
Since you are here (in exile) then you have to take care of your children, take care of your family, 
but at the same time Tibet. So I have been telling my people why we came to India. We did not come 
here to settle down. We came here to carry on with our struggle, and eventually go back to Tibet. 
That should be the first motivation. Living here, you of course have to live, take care…but still if 
every Tibetan starts thinking about themselves, then who will struggle for Tibet? You look at His 
Holiness, at this age he is still travelling, travelling here and there. Why he is doing so? For him 
there is no need, but still he is doing it for us.   
 Citizenship and the struggle for Tibet were however not directly related for all my inter‐
locators. Shamba insisted that his Tibetan identity was deeply ingrained. A piece of paper can’t 
strip him of his Tibetan identity or decide where his loyalty lies, was his opinion. To support his 
point he said that his family is Tibetan, he speaks Tibetan, eats Tibetan food and is also working 
for the cause of Tibet. For Drukmo, on the other hand, the acquisition of citizenship is more than 
just a piece of paper; in the long run it will effect Tibetans’ self‐representation, and their 
involvement with the Tibetan struggle will diminish as a result of having tied a legal bond to 
India. According to her, Tibetans in exile hold a particular political responsibility.  
 Shamba disagreed: most Tibetans, who are not directly involved in politics, don’t give 
that much consideration to political affairs. They are living their personal lives and have goals 
that don’t always correlate with the political interests of CTA or the political activists.   
 This debate between Shamba and Drukmo represents the two dominating positions 
during the elections, conceptualized in terms of a conflict between loyalty to Tibet and access to 
opportunities. The argument for opportunities is based on the need of asserting one’s dignity as 
a human being. A female professional activist from Gu‐chu‐sum, Metok, holds an Indian 
passport. She expressed to me the same opinions as Shamba, but in addition she argued for 
participation in the elections and her own acquisition of Indian citizenship in terms of “rights”. I 
suggest that obtaining citizenship in terms of ‘rights’ is, on a more fundamental level, perceived 
as a matter of dignity.   
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 http://www.tibetanreview.net/to-be-or-not-to-be-a-citizen-the-tibetan-dilemma/ (acc.08.05.2015). 
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 Metok was one of the Tibetans in Dharamsala who was determined to vote. “I have to use 
my right”, she told me. So she left for Dehra Dun (her “hometown”) to vote on May 7. Her case 
was somewhat unique. She was a descendant of a royal family that had ruled Tibet for a long 
time, yet she had made the decision to become an Indian citizen. Still, this did not in any way 
diminish her Tibetan identity69 or loyalty to Tibet. She is a committed supporter of 
independence, and on one occasion said that one of the reasons why she could not support 
autonomy, was that she could never stand witnessing the Chinese flag on Tibetan soil. Her 
strong bond to Tibet was related to her noble background, as well as the fact that her late father 
had been a political prisoner for over 20 years.   
 Despite Metok’s strong emotional bond to Tibet, her life in India evoked sentiments for 
her host country as well. In May I joined Metok and her Indian friend, Nandini, for a short visit to 
Delhi, and as we were passing through Connaught Place, our glance fell upon on the gigantic 
Indian flag flying in the wind in Central Park. Both Nandini and I were touched and had a feeling 
of pride; Metok felt the same, saying, “Even though I am Tibetan the Indian flag still touches 
something in me”.   
 However, Metok told me that this was not the reason why she applied for Indian 
citizenship, nor was it simply due to the opportunities citizenship could open. Rather she saw it 
as her right, as she repeated on several occasions. Having being born and raised in India, she 
regarded citizenship as her right. I believe this emphasis on rights is a matter of dignity, in terms 
of having value as a human being, which the status of being a refugee denies. Being a stateless 
refugee or a foreigner gives no access to rights on a national level. Ingsel, a man in his late 30s, 
made the point that for him citizenship is about gaining dignity and value as a human being, and 
he was planning to apply for citizenship soon. “With a passport, I will have more dignity, more 
value”, he said, adding, “I can take my family for vacation or something, you know”. When disputes 
between the local Indians and Tibetans take place in Dharamsala, a common insult directed at 
Tibetans is their status as ‘refugees’ or ‘foreigners’. Although Ingsel’s move might be thought to 
have negative consequences for the Tibetan freedom struggle, still, as the father of two children, 
it is more important for him to secure their future.  
 Due to his family commitments, it is not possible for Ingsel to actively contribute to the 
Tibetan freedom struggle in exile. He expressed this in the following way:  
If a man goes to the market to buy vegetables or something else for his family, and hears an 
announcement for a protest, political happening or gathering or whatever, will he just drop 
everything and join that? No, because he has a family he has to go to. He has other priorities in life.  
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 To me Metok came across as “more Tibetan” than other India-born Tibetans. For example, she always 
referred to her boyfriend with the honorific term “la”, as well as expressing that she could never imagine 
marrying a non-Tibetan, and certainly not an Indian. Fjeld (2005) argues that the nobility in Lhasa regards 
themselves as cultural custodians, which sheds some interesting light on my own observations.    
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 Still, he had been politically active in his younger days, participating in many 
demonstrations and, once even getting locked up in Tihar jail in Delhi with fellow 
demonstrators. People hold multiple identities, although some identities are more heavily 
invested in than others  (Moore, 1994 in: Winther, 2008, pp. 204‐205). Ingsel is not only an exile 
Tibetan struggling for the freedom of his country, as Tibetans usually are portrayed by CTA and 
NGOs. While this part of his identity was more predominant in his younger days, today his role 
as a father and a husband is more heavily invested in than other identities. Today, Ingsel is well‐
settled in India, married with a house of their own and plans for a small business.  
  Another of my interlocutors, Kalsang born and raised in exile who also was well‐settled 
in India, had in spite of firmly expressing to me that Tibet was “his country”, at the same time 
expressed (on the condition that he was anonymized in my thesis) no wish for returning or 
settling down in a free Tibet in the future. When asked why, he replied, “To be honest, I am 
afraid. Tibetans who live there are very different from us”. In Dharamsala I heard many rumors, 
circulated by both Tibetans as well as local Indians, that the Tibetan ‘newcomer’ boys have an 
aggressive nature, and do not hesitate to stab people during fights. Kalsang’s reluctance to move 
to Tibet was partly related to these rumors, which he had himself repeated. In addition, he said, 
all his relatives are in India. “I have everything in India. Why would I settle down in Tibet?” Almost 
60 years have passed since the uprising in Lhasa in 1959, and this has created a gap between 
Tibetans in exile and those in Tibet. Nyima, a full‐time activist from SFT, told me, “When Tibetans 
from Tibet come into exile, we see that there are many gaps between us. I mean it has been 60 
years. They have been raised differently and we have been raised differently”.  
 In contrast to Kalsang, however, Nyima wishes to return to a free Tibet in the future. “I 
will go back, obviously, I am working so hard for it. I know if I go back, everything will not be 
smooth. But if we don’t go back then who will?” Nyima’s last sentence expresses concerns that are 
similar not only to those of CTA members, but also Tibetans who are not engaged in politics on a 
professional level. In one of my conversations with, Jigme, a former monk in his mid‐40s, I 
mentioned to him that a neighboring ama-la (‘mother’) in her late 50s was well‐settled in India. I 
added that she had no memories of Tibet since she came into exile in the age of six or seven. To 
my surprise Jigme became irritated, saying, “These people need to be taught a lesson, maybe then 
she will remember something from Tibet”. Later on he repeated, as he had in many earlier 
conversations, that Tibetans in exile are getting too comfortable in India and are only concerned 
with earning money. For Jigme, renewing his RC annually is something rather satisfying, for “it 
reminds me that I belong somewhere else”.  
 I describe these observations to show that, identities remain contested among exile 
Tibetans, pointing to the fact that “Tibetans” in Dharamsala are far from being a homogenous 
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refugee community. It also illustrates a concern with preserving a cultural and ethnic identity 
which is felt especially strongly in a diasporic community.70  
 
Identity as process and product71 
The meanings of “Tibetan‐ness” or “refugee” are not univocal, they are constantly negotiated and 
changing. Different backgrounds and circumstances lead people in different directions or imply 
different experiences of living in exile in India. For some, a concept like ‘refugee’ is a vital part of 
their Tibetan identity and their self‐representation (in other words, is more invested in than the 
other identities the individual holds), thereby being one of the important reasons for their 
continuous political work. This is the case with Tibetans like Drukmo or Tenzin Tsundue. Others, 
such as Metok, Shamba or Ingsel, though they share with other Tibetans the experience of being 
refugees, and also their love for Tibet, they do not wish to be labeled as refugees or being treated 
as such. 
 Identifying oneself as Tibetan does not mean the same for all Tibetans. One way to 
understand the differences is to concretize commonly used abstractions in order to capture the 
interplay between ideas and processes, as suggested by Roy Wagner (1986 [1981]). Wagner 
argues that ideas or abstractions are meaningless unless concretized with reference to human 
activity. For Tibetans who argued against participation in the Indian elections, this implied 
recapturing the meaning of Tibetan‐ness in terms of loyalty to their fatherland Tibet. Their ideas 
of Tibetan‐ness were, to use Wagner’s word, “extended” (Wagner, 1981, pp. 38‐39) 72 with the 
example of Tibetans who voted; those who voted were understood to become “less Tibetan”. For 
those that did vote, their ideas or conventions on Tibetan‐ness were extended as well; being a 
Tibetan could also mean casting a vote in the elections or holding Indian citizenship.    
 Identity is never something ready‐made, but rather is, as Anand argues, “a product of 
constant negotiation and renegotiation among several interrelated discursive and material 
factors” (Anand, 2000, p. 284; Lisa Malkki, 1997, p. 71). Here I understand values, exile and 
Indian politics, or religion as discursive factors, and education, economy, family situation, or 
legal status as material factors.   
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 Another major concern expressed to me, for the most part by Tibetans born inside Tibet, is the preservation 
of the Tibetan language. Two full-time male activists, one from TYC and another from Gu-chu-sum, said that 
Tibetans born in exile do not speak “pure” Tibetan, since it is too mixed with English, nor do they, in their 
opinion, excel in written Tibetan. They believe that the Tibetan language is the most important aspect of 
Tibetan identity. These concerns for the preservation of the “pure” Tibetan language are also discussed by a 
young Tibetan, born in USA, on Lhakar Diaries:  
http://lhakardiaries.com/2014/04/30/speak-tibetan-stupid-concepts-of-pure-tibetan-the-politics-of-belonging/ 
(acc.08.05.2015). The article also addresses concerns, of racial purity among Tibetans. Childs and Barkin (2006) 
also discuss these concerns writing that CTA has attempted to discourage Tibetans from having social relations 
with Indians and Westerners. Further, they also write that some leaders have publicly spoken against Tibetans 
marrying non-Tibetans, on the grounds that it will dilute the Tibetan race (2006, pp. 46-49). During my 
fieldwork, only one Tibetan openly expressed this opinion to me.  
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 A formulation by Anand, 2000. 
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 See: Sørum (2003), for another application of Wagner.  
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 That identities are “dynamic, processual, and contextual”, as for instance Zdzislaw Mach 
(1993, p. 5) points out, is well known in anthropology today. Identities emerge through our 
involvement with the world (or others), through action, much as Ingold describes the identity of 
a stone:  a stone’s “stoniness is not in the stone’s ‘nature’, in its materiality. Nor is it merely in the 
mind of the observer or practitioner. Rather, it emerges through the stone’s involvement in its 
total surroundings” (2011, p. 32). Likewise, what Anand terms the discursive and material 
factors together constitute the “total surroundings” for exile Tibetans, in relation to which a 
variety of diasporic identities form.   
 There are situations when exile‐born‐Tibetans feel a strong connection and belonging to 
India, as Metok did on seeing the Indian flag in Connaught Place, or when Tibetan youngsters are 
listening to Hindi songs, or when India plays cricket against Pakistan. When ‘diaspora’ and being 
a ‘refugee’ is understood merely as a condition, identities become reduced to homogenous and 
static ready‐made products. The lived refugee experience in the context of diaspora as a 
condition becomes conventionalized. For Wagner (1986 [1981]), conventionalization involves a 
limitation of meaning, indeed becomes meaningless, if it is not concretized so that the 
relationship between the idea of being a Tibetan and of Tibetan‐ness and the persons supposed 
to represent these ideas becomes visible. Thus for Tibetans who participated in the elections or 
followed the debates about the elections, a new set of meanings was added to being Tibetan.  
 Though identities remain contested and are constantly negotiated, the idea of diaspora 
as a condition whereby “Tibetan identities assume a singular, unified and homogenous form” 
(Houston and Wright, 2003, p. 217) is appealing because it succeeds in strengthening a sense of 
unity and belonging in the diaspora. Cohen lends support to this: “While the increased 
complexity and deterritorialization of identities are valid phenomena and constitutive of a small 
minority of diasporas, ideas of home and often the stronger inflection of homeland remain 
powerful discourses” (2008, p. 2), a statement which certainly rings true in the case of the 
Tibetan diaspora.  
 As Tibetan youngsters grow up with stories from Tibet, concepts such as “Tibetan”, 
“refugee” or the Dalai Lama himself, give them a sense of belonging in environments considered 
far from home (Venturino, 1997, pp. 101‐106). In the long run, specific concepts become a vital 
part of their own self‐identification and self‐representation, though meaningful in different 
ways. The following chapters will show how attempts are made at reproducing Tibetan identity 
by highlighting specific values and goals, in other words, at creating collective homogenous 
identities in exile and thus keeping the Tibetan community intact in a diasporic setting. 
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Figure 7: Children practicing Tibetan traditional dance, Tibetan Children’s Village (TCV) Day 
School.  
 
 
Figure 8: Making soap bubbles, Panchen Lama’s birthday on April 25, TCV Day School.  
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3  Self-immolation: sacrificing one’s life     
 
“I am giving my body as an offering of light to chase away the darkness, to free all                                                                                 
beings from suffering”. 
Last message of Lama Sobha, self‐immolated on January 8, 2012 
 
In this chapter my aim is to present how the self‐immolations are made meaningful among 
Tibetans in Dharamsala, drawing on interviews as well as informal conversations, observations, 
online discussions, literature on the self‐immolations and publications and statements by the 
CTA, the Dalai Lama and various NGOs.  
 The self‐immolations are, as already mentioned, understood by Tibetans in exile to be a 
sacrifice. This understanding is often based on the notes and messages self‐immolators have left 
behind, stating they are “offering” or “sacrificing themselves”. While it is not possible to know in 
what ways each self‐immolator understands his or her action and to grasp the complexity of the 
motivation behind the act, I focus on the efforts of Tibetans in exile to interpret the self‐
immolations in terms of a culturally meaningful death. Their interpretation is guided by faith in 
certain values, and should therefore also be seen as a response to the Chinese leadership’s 
condemnation of the self‐immolations as suicide and the self‐immolators as criminals (The New 
York Times, January 31, 2013),73 or even as terrorists and ‘bad Buddhists’ (Jagou, 2012, pp. 84‐
85). This categorization, I suggest, can be viewed as an attempt to reduce the self‐immolations to 
a “bad death”, and hence to undermine acts that the Chinese authorities regard as a threat to 
national unity (Jagou, 2012, p. 82). 
 As noted in the introduction, self‐immolations have been understood as sacrifice ever 
since the first one, when Thupten Ngodup self‐immolated in New Delhi in 1998. Today Thupten 
Ngodup is commonly referred to as “Pawo Thupten Ngodup”. Pawo, literally ‘hero’, is now 
frequently translated as ‘martyr’. Tsering Shakya reports that the Tibetan community in North 
America holds an annual basketball tournament in Thupten Ngodup’s honor, and a song has also 
been written about him (2012a, p. 21). Further, Tsering Shakya writes that his “death has now 
become ritualized and a part of the political memory of the Tibetan diaspora” (2012a, p. 21). In 
Dharamsala, April 29 – the day Thupten Ngodup died – is commemorated as Martyr’s Day.74                        
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 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/world/asia/chinese-court-issues-severe-sentences-in-tibetan-self-
immolations.html?_r=1 (acc.27.05. 2015).  
See also: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/07/tibet-selfimmolations-monks-aba-china 
(acc.27.05.2015).  
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http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=34846&article=Tibetan+exiles+remember+Pawo+Thupten+Ng
odup+on+Martyrs'+Day&t=1&c=1 (acc.21.05.2015), dealing with the commemoration in 2014. I did not 
participate as I did not hear about the event, but very few people were present.   
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    Figure 9: Thupten Ngodup, from a card sold in the 
market in McLeod Ganj in 2006. Photo taken from Clare E. Harris (2012, p. 143).  
 This chapter starts by introducing the role of religious offerings in Tibetan Buddhism 
and as a central aspect of Tibetan daily religious practice, looking particularly at fire offerings. 
Although the self‐immolations are politically motivated, it is also important to contextualize 
them within Tibetan Buddhism, also because the first self‐immolators were monastics or former 
monks. Further I describe how the self‐immolations are made meaningful among Tibetans in 
exile. I will analyze the self‐immolations as a sacrifice by applying Michael Lambek’s (2007) 
understanding of sacrifice ‘as a kind of beginning’, because I suggest that they can be regarded as 
an attempt at substantiating a beginning for Tibetans in exile, not be confused with change, 
although a new beginning of course carries a potential for change. As Tendor Dorjee, a Tibetan 
activist, told me, “the self-immolations are just a spark, which kindles the actual fire.”  Towards the 
end of this chapter, I shall go further into the notion of sacrifice, suggesting that self‐immolations 
are made to be a “good” form of death for exile Tibetans.  
 
Tibetan Buddhism and offerings  
Offerings are a central aspect of the daily religious practice among Tibetans. Geoffrey Samuel 
argues that Tibetan Buddhism is relevant to lay people as a practical religion, its main goals 
being protection of the communities and ensuring the good health and prosperity of its 
members (2012, p. 165). The act of offering is an important part of this practical religion, as both 
modest daily offerings and occasional large‐scale ones are part of a transaction which serves to 
gain merit and ensure good karma. The most common form of offering is that made to monks, 
monasteries and lamas, in the form of food, clothes or money (2012, p. 168). Making offerings to 
monasteries on a regular basis is regarded as the most important kind of offering, since lay 
people depend on the monks for carrying out significant rituals, such as the death rituals.  
 An important category of offerings performed by monks are ‘fire offerings’. There are 
different kinds of fire offerings; some are performed by lay people, others by Buddhist tantric 
practitioners. In Tibetan Buddhism fire is associated with the highest religious goals; it is a 
symbol for the meditative state (the inner fire bringing non‐duality) and enlightenment. In all 
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cases of fire offerings, be they internal or external, fire is believed to transmit, transpose, and 
transform, creating and annihilating at the same time (Bentor 2000, pp. 606‐610).   
 Following Van Gennep’s insights (1960, as discussed in Metcalf and Huntington, 1992, 
pp. 29‐33) on identifying a common set of features in different rituals, I suggest that a self‐
immolation can be seen as a fire offering. In the quote at the beginning of this chapter, Lama 
Sobha called his own self‐immolation “an offering of light”, which, although annihilating the 
person carrying it out, also has the potential for creation, in the sense of transforming that 
person into a martyr. Understanding the self‐immolations as fire offerings, inspired by a 
religious tradition, is one of several possible interpretations. Whether this interpretation is valid 
for all the self‐immolators is impossible to know. However, as I will show, my interlocutors 
consider religious interpretations relevant and should for that reason be taken into account, 
although, I hold, interpretations based on Buddhist terminology and ideas also have to be 
understood in relation to the nationalist discourse in exile.  
 To better comprehend how the narrative of sacrifice is tightly intertwined with the 
current nationalism among Tibetans in exile, it is necessary to apply a historical perspective. In 
the following I want to point to similar forms of protests, and to self‐immolation referred to in 
Buddhist texts. I suggest that the contemporary Tibetan self‐immolations should also be 
reflected upon in relation to these texts.  
 
Suicide as sacrifice in Tibet  
Robert Barnett argues that suicide is not an uncommon response to political events in Tibet, 
citing numerous cases during the Cultural Revolution and more recent years (2012, pp. 58‐59). 
During the Cultural Revolution, in Lhasa, “it is said that guards had to be posted along the Kyichu 
river to prevent people, even entire families, jumping into the river” (2012, p. 58). Moreover, 
Tsering Shakya (2012a) states that although there is no history of self‐immolations as political 
protest in Tibet, the act itself is not unknown in Buddhist scriptures that are well known in 
Tibet. For instance, the Lotus Sutra describes a self‐immolation, committed by prince 
Bhaishajyaraja as an offering to the Buddhas. His act is said to be motivated by the highest 
aspiration in Buddhism, being performed for the benefit of all living beings. For this reason his 
self‐immolation is praised in the Lotus Sutra as a form of sacrifice and the prince as a 
Bodhisattva (Kern, 1965, pp. 378‐380). Another example is Tsuklak Trengwa’s history of 
Buddhism in Tibet from the sixteenth century, where he describes the self‐immolation of a 
Buddhist monk, Dolchung Korpon, in the 11th century, who self‐immolated in front of the most 
sacred statue in the main temple in Lhasa, the Jowo, “for the purpose of ensuring moral conduct 
among monks” (Warner, 2012; Tsering, 2010). Tashi Tsering also mentions Karma Chagme 
(1613‐1678), “who gave one of his left fingers as an offering lamp to the Jowo” (Tsering, 2010 in 
Buffetrille 2012, p. 9).   
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 As Shakya (2012a) points out, there is no Tibetan word which is exactly equivalent to the 
word “sacrifice”. In Chinese Buddhism, on the other hand, self‐immolations are well‐documented 
since the fourth century AD (Benn, 2012). Shakya suggests that it was the Chinese Communists 
who introduced Tibetans to the political act of self‐sacrifice, in the 1960s. He argues that 
Tibetans have appropriated the concept of sacrifice “from the language of resistance coined and 
championed by the Communist Party” (Shakya, 2012a). ‘Sacrifice’ in the Tibetan context 
therefore has to be understood within the evolving discourse of Tibetan nationalism.  
 With this historical background in mind, I will move on to present my own empirical 
findings on how Tibetans in Dharamsala talk about the self‐immolations, validate them as a 
sacrifice, transforming the act of setting oneself ablaze into a meaningful death, as well as 
proclaiming and manifesting particular values.  
 
Self-immolation as sacrifice  
Upon my arrival in McLeod Ganj, I met an established consensus on the self‐immolations as a 
form of sacrifice and an act of non‐violence. Moreover, there was a consensus that the one and 
only reason causing these horrendous acts was the Chinese policy inside Tibet, involving the on‐
going repression and discrimination of Tibetans. There were, however, different opinions as to 
whether such actions should be applauded or not and what role they should have in the Tibetan 
political struggle. Nevertheless, the self‐immolators’ status as pawo (‘heroes’ and, by extension, 
‘martyrs’) in the Tibetan community is, I will argue, uncontested. These findings are based on 30 
interviews with Tibetans from various backgrounds: CTA members, professional activists from 
TYC, Gu‐chu‐sum, SFT and International Tibetan Network, monks, lay people, as well as informal 
conversations with many others in Dharamsala.  
 In the following I will present a selection of quotes that represent these views. Thereafter 
I will present the views of two Tibetan men who set themselves on fire (but survived), based on 
my interviews with them.  
 The use of the words ‘sacrifice’ and especially ‘non‐violence’ when speaking of the self‐
immolations is so common that Tibetans used them without elaborating (unless asked) on their 
sacrificial and non‐violent nature. In some of the quotes presented below, Buddhism is explicitly 
invoked to address and justify the acts as sacrifice. The reference to Buddhism is important, 
firstly because killing oneself normally constitutes a form of suicide in Buddhism,75 and secondly 
because it is Buddhism, with the Dalai Lama at the forefront, that conditions the discourse of 
Tibetan nationalism. The quotes referring to Buddhism are thus not only religious explanations, 
but also, I hold, grounded in the nationalist discourse. 
                                                 
75
 Although suicide as a form of martyrdom is known to have taken place among Buddhists, it is still a 
controversial practice (Jerryson, 2010). Vinaya, the corpus of regulations governing monastic life in Buddhism, 
gives clear sanctions against the taking of life, including one's own (Craig, 2012; Jerryson, 2010). Well-known 
examples are the suicides of Buddhist monks during the Vietnam war, starting with the monk Thich Quang 
Duc’s self-immolation in 1963.  
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Karma, a male CTA member in his mid‐50s, expressed it this way: 
In Buddhism it is said that among taking lives, taking one’s own is the most sinful. There is an 
ongoing debate whether these acts are in conflict with Buddhism. The motivation for this kind of 
sacrifice is the conviction that ‘my life is the most precious thing I have and I am giving it up for the 
good of the Tibetan people.' So with that selfless motivation, Chinese leaders can also escape the sin 
of killing and torturing the Tibetan people. This is the highest form of sacrifice, benefitting other 
sentient beings. 
Karma invoked Buddhism to address the sacrificial nature of these acts, and thus highlighted the 
altruistic motivation inspiring them. The monk Bhutuk (26) referred to the well‐known story of 
the tigress to illustrate the sacrificial nature of the self‐immolations: 
It is a very great sacrifice. In Buddhism there are stories about the Buddha’s previous lives. In one of 
his lives he sacrifices his life to a very sick tigress, by cutting his limbs and feeding her. The self-
immolations in Tibet are like that. The self-immolators self-immolate for the sake of Tibetan 
culture, which will be very helpful for the world if it is preserved.  
 These quotes exemplify that although there is no tradition of self‐immolation as a form of 
offering or protest in Tibet, religious explanations of the self‐immolations are offered and 
religious meanings activated. Indeed, as these quotes illustrate, self‐immolations are 
characterized as offerings to benefit all sentient beings, on the basis of the underlying 
motivation.76 Buddhism contributes to making sense of these actions as “good deaths”. At the 
same time, this invalidates the Chinese categorization of the self‐immolations as suicide and the 
self‐immolators as criminals and ‘bad Buddhists’. The messages left behind by the self‐
immolators referring to their act as a sacrifice or offering, is often activated upon making the 
self‐immolations meaningful as a sacrifice, as for instance Lama Sobha’s message quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter. Another interpretive frame, found in the second quote, are the Jataka 
tales, describing the Buddha in his previous life sacrificing his body with an altruistic motivation, 
thus achieving a “good death”. Among the Jatakas, one of the most popular tale is the story of the 
hungry tigress to which Buddha offered his body as food in to order to save the lives of her cubs 
(Craig, 2012). The self‐immolators are ascribed by most Tibetans the same altruistic motivation. 
Lama Sobha also mentioned this tale in the audio message he left behind: “I am sacrificing my 
body with the firm conviction and a pure heart just as the Buddha bravely gave his body to a 
hungry tigress. All the Tibetan heroes too have sacrificed their lives with similar principles”.77 
 Other Tibetans invoked nationalist sentiments rather than Buddhism. To them, self‐
immolation is a sacrifice, an action undertaken for the Tibetan nation, transforming the self‐
immolator into a martyr. Blood sacrifices play an important constitutive part of all nationalist 
                                                 
76
 See Williams (1997, pp. 205-230) on the significance of motivation in Buddhism. 
77
 http://www.savetibet.org/harrowing-images-and-last-message-from-tibet-of-first-lama-to-self-immolate/ 
(acc.01.06.2015).  
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identities according to Carolyn Marvin and David W. Ingle (1996). The willingness to sacrifice 
oneself is “the sign of the patriot, the proven and the true member of the nation‐group” (1996, p. 
773). That is exactly how the self‐immolators are talked about in the following quotes. 
Metok (26), the female professional activist we met in the previous chapter, expressed the 
opinion that,   
 For me, it is a pure martyrdom. It is not something easy to decide upon, saying ‘I want to sacrifice 
my life for this nation’, you know. For the cause, we know in exile, there are like so many politics 
going on, but for these people, it is just the purity, like no selfishness. It is just, ‘I am going to 
sacrifice my life for this nation’ – and this is just it – its pure martyrdom, a self-immolation. So I 
really look up to these people, I respect what they have done. These are like true martyrs for me.  
 For Metok the self‐immolators are the true patriots, “the proven and the true member of 
the nation group”. These are people she identifies with, imbuing her identity with nationalist 
sentiments. When addressing the self‐immolations, many Tibetans, while recognizing their 
sacrificial nature, emphasized that they cannot be regarded as “desperate acts”, as often claimed 
by the Chinese authorities. Thus Nyima, a female professional activist in her late 20s, said: 
 For me, these are not even desperate acts as many call them. I think it’s like they are trying to say 
they have control over their own bodies. The Chinese government can control the land, whatever 
they want, but they themselves have control over their bodies and I am going to choose how I am 
going to end it. It’s not an easy thing to do.  
 I suggest that since suicide is normally understood as a desperate act and accordingly as 
a “bad death”, it was important for many Tibetans to insist that the act of setting oneself on fire 
cannot be regarded as desperate. On the contrary, it is important for exile Tibetans to focus on 
their heroic nature, motivated by national sentiments. They are an act of taking control over 
one’s own body, (Parry, 2004, p. 269) and hence of resistance to a state that claims ownership of 
these bodies. A young Tibetan man, Pempa (28), expressed it in these words:                           
Sacrifice and suicide are different. Suicide is about accepting that I lose to my problems, my pain. It 
is an act of giving up. Sacrifice is not giving up: ‘I am dying for my nation. Rather than letting the 
enemy win, I rather die’.  
 Central to the distinction made above between suicide and sacrifice is the question of, 
motivation. In the first quotes Buddhist knowledge is taken in use to explain the motivation 
while in the latter ones by applying national sentiments. Even when Buddhism is not referred to 
explicitly, it is still activated discursively in order to argue against the condemnation of self‐
immolation as a suicide. These excerpts exemplify what I found to be a common way for exile 
Tibetans to make the self‐immolations meaningful as a sacrifice, namely pointing to their 
underlying motivation, regarded as inspired by altruism and unselfishness, virtues that rank as 
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the highest in Mahayana Buddhism,78  transforming the self‐immolations into moral acts. At the 
same time, the sacrifice is understood as being made for a higher cause – the Tibetan freedom 
struggle.  
 These are the dominating ways of talking about the self‐immolations, but I also met 
Tibetans who talked about it differently. Although they also understood the self‐immolations to 
be a sacrifice, this did not involve an acceptance. Such opinions were only expressed to me by lay 
people who were born in Tibet and not involved in politics professionally.79 In the following I 
will present some of these views, which are critical to this form of protest, and also question 
whether the motivation behind them is the same in each case. I argue that the latter views points 
towards a complexity of motivation, something which is difficult to generalize about.  
 
The problem of generalizing  
Pema, a man in his late 20s, expressed his opinion in this way:  
First thing, it is a big waste of human life. I believe there are better options. These people have faith 
in religion, love for their country and people. They have much courage and determination, but if 
you look at the sacrifice and action afterwards – there is a big gap. If it was me, I wouldn’t self-
immolate. There is no change… How much does a human life mean? It is too much waste of strong 
people.   
 Though Pema regards the self‐immolations as a form of sacrifice, he believes that the 
sacrifice has not served its purpose; it has not brought any significant change. He also expressed 
the view that the self‐immolations are a result of a lack of knowledge among Tibetans in Tibet, 
saying that they do not know how things function on an international level. Similar views were 
also expressed by other young men who were born in Tibet.   
 While Pema said that he did not approve of self‐immolations, two other young men born 
in Tibet, Wangchuk and Dhondup, expressed doubts as to whether one can really fully know the 
motivation behind these actions. Wangchuk was quite outspoken, while Dhondup was quiet and 
mostly nodded in agreement. According to Wangchuk, the physical act of setting oneself on fire 
is a form of suicide, although it most certainly is a sacrifice also. When I mentioned to him that 
the majority of the activists I had spoken to characterized these acts as a great form of sacrifice, 
he waved his hand at me in a resigned way, saying, “These people know what to say”, an opinion 
also expressed by other Tibetans, born both in exile and Tibet, who encouraged me to speak to 
“normal” people, instead of professional activists. Furthermore, Wangchuk found it hard to 
generalize about the self‐immolations, because in most cases it was impossible to know the 
motivation behind them. “Confusion comes when we do not know the motivation”, he said. In the 
                                                 
78
 The Vietnamese Thich Quang Duc who self-immolated in Vietnam in 1963 is remembered in South Vietnam 
as a “A being close to attaining Buddhahood” (Gouin, 2014, p. 177).  
79
 This does not mean that all lay people born inside Tibet spoke of the self-immolations in such terms. Most of 
them spoke of the self-immolations as presented earlier.  
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last second of their life people can shout they are doing this for their country or people, 
Wangchuk continued, “But who can really know anything about their motivation?” 
 Wangchuk struggled with generalizing about the motivation behind these actions. 
However, he did not refer to the self‐immolations, apart from the physical act, as a form of 
suicide. As I know from my experience of talking with ordinary Tibetans, many find it hard to 
state definite opinions on the topic. Lobsang (30), a monk born in Kham, also found it difficult to 
talk about the self‐immolations. He differentiated between two “categories” of self‐immolators 
on the basis of motivation: “One type of self-immolation is Buddhism, the other is not Buddhism”. 
For him, the latter category is often accompanied by anger, resulting in bad karma. Even though 
Lobsang expressed that this category of self‐immolations was “not Buddhism”, this should not be 
taken to mean that he regarded them as invalid. It rather meant that from a Buddhist 
perspective, anger at the moment of death is not considered good, as it can be regarded as a 
form of violence.80 I believe that this is what Lobsang meant, for although he distinguished 
between the self‐immolations according to Buddhist views on the importance of the state of 
mind at the moment of death, he also compared these acts to similar acts on another level, 
asserting that whether “Buddhist” or “non‐Buddhist”, the self‐immolations are “political” and 
“good for Tibet”. He also justified killing oneself for the sake of others, which he believes the self‐
immolators are doing, but based on his separation between “Buddhist" and “non‐Buddhist” self‐
immolations, I argue that for him it is rather a question of distinguishing between violence and 
non‐violence.  
 In fact, the question of whether the self‐immolations are violent or non‐violent is 
addressed more frequently than whether they are sacrifice or suicide. The dominant opinion 
among exile Tibetans is that they constitute the highest form of non‐violence. If Tibetans refer to 
the act of setting oneself on fire as “violent”, it is only in relation to the physical violence inflicted 
by the individual on his or her own body.  
 
Self-immolation as non-violence  
In addition to suicide being, generally, regarded as a sin in Buddhism, thus potentially rendering 
the self‐immolations contested, violence is in direct conflict with the Dalai Lama’s political 
strategy which, in turn, is based on Buddhist ethics. At the outset, the Dalai Lama stated that he 
opposed the self‐immolations since it would appear to be a form of violence against oneself. 
After Thupten Ngodup’s self‐immolation in 1998 he expressed,  
I am deeply saddened by this. For many years, I have been able to persuade the Tibetan people to 
eschew violence in our freedom struggle. Today, it is clear that a sense of frustration and urgency is 
                                                 
80
 When the Dalai Lama visited Thupten Ngodup at the Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital on April 28, 1998 – the day 
before he passed away – he made a request to Thupten Ngodup: “The Dalai Lama told the conscious man that 
he should not harbor any feeling of hatred towards the Chinese” (Jamyang Norbu, Shadow Tibet, August 6, 
1998). In Tibetan Buddhism, harboring anger at the moment of death can result in an unfortunate rebirth.  
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building up among many Tibetans, as evidenced by the unto-death hunger strike and the tragic 
incident of yesterday.81  
 In recent years, however, his position has become more ambiguous, as will be seen 
below. When the question of violence was addressed by a number of my interlocutors, it became 
clear that they did not understand self‐immolation as a form of violence. In fact, Tibetans with 
whom I discussed this all agreed that self‐immolation constitutes a form of non‐violence. 
Motivation was put forward as defining self‐immolation as non‐violence. Their non‐violent 
nature was also justified with reference to their effect, as they did not result in harm to others. 
This understanding of non‐violence represents a Gandhian view, for according to Gandhi, non‐
violence can legitimately involve inflicting violence on oneself for the sake of others.82 In recent 
years the Dalai Lama, too, has characterized self‐immolation as a form of non‐violence due to its 
underlying motivation which does not involve causing harm to others (Daily News & Analysis, 
November 18, 2012).83 The CTA likewise holds that the self‐immolations show the respect of 
Tibetans for the Dalai Lama’s principle of non‐violence.84  
 Gandhi’s non‐violence also points to the connection between nationalism and dead 
bodies, as the violence a self‐immolator inflicts on his or her body is legitimized by being 
regarded as being done for the sake of others: the Tibetan people. Gandhi’s definition of non‐
violence thus makes self‐immolation a patriotic (heroic) act. Kirti Rinpoche85 said the following:   
The act itself is violent. Burning yourself, fire, is quite violent, but it is not harmful. The self-
immolators have not even hit anyone, caused others harm. They are sacrificing their life only. It is a 
violent act, but it is not harmful. They did not even direct bad words to the Chinese government. 
They have written messages which we can read and in these they have not written any bad words. 
They only want freedom and return of His Holiness.  
                                                 
81
http://www.tibet.to/tyc1998/tyce.htm#09 (acc.18.05.2015). In Buddhism inflicting deliberate self-harm to 
oneself is not acceptable (Ardley, 2003, p. 48). Prior to the 1998 hunger strike, however, TYC had requested the 
Dalai Lama not to intervene or attempt to stop the hunger strike, something he had agreed to (Ardley, 2003, p. 
47).  
82
 http://www.mkgandhi.org/africaneedsgandhi/gandhi's_philosophy_of_nonviolence.htm (acc.12.05.2015). In 
exile, the former prime minister Samdhong Rinpoche has for a long time expressed his adherence to Gandhi’s 
ideas.  
83
 http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-acts-of-self-immolation-are-in-principle-non-violent-dalai-lama-
1766257 and http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=33263 (acc.18.05.2015). 
84
 http://solidaritywithtibet.org/faqs/ “Solidarity with Tibet” is a campaign launched by CTA in December 2012. 
Here CTA describes the self-immolations as a form of non-violence, insisting that they cause no harm or 
violence to others: “Tibetan self-immolations are the ultimate selfless form of civil disobedience for a greater 
common cause” (acc.18.05.2015).  
85
 The highest lama of Kirti Monastery in Dharamsala. Kirti Monastery in Ngaba County, Sichuan, is one of the 
biggest Tibetan monasteries along with Drepung and Sera. 13 of the 142 who have self-immolated so far were 
monks in Kirti Monastery, while 11 of 142 were former monks at the same monastery (ICT, April 14, 2015) 
https://www.savetibet.org/resources/fact-  sheets/self-immolations-by-tibetans/.    
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Kirti Rinpoche defines the self‐immolations as non‐violence because the self‐immolators do not 
cause physical harm to others, nor mental harm with their last words. Dorjee, a professional 
activist in his mid‐30s, understands non‐violence in the same way: 
This is definitely non-violence. It is the ultimate form of non-violent protest. It looks violent, 
definitely. When you see somebody burning, it’s a very graphic image. People are turned off by it. 
Sometimes even I can’t see those videos, you know. They are setting themselves on fire to not harm 
anybody else. They could put on a bomb and walked into a Chinese office or a supermarket you 
know. But they chose just to sacrifice their bodies without harming anybody else. So I think it is the 
ultimate form of non-violent protest.  
Dorjee argues for the non‐violent nature of the self‐immolations by contrasting them to suicide 
bombings, as the self‐immolators do not harm others. In other words, their motivation is non‐
violent.  
Karma, a male CTA member in his mid‐50s, defined violence in the same way, but also connected 
the non‐violent nature of the self‐immolations to Buddhism:  
A person who has decided to take his life will have no hesitation to kill as many people as possible 
first, as you see in the USA. That could have been done by these now 127 or 128 people, but has not 
happened. That is the wonderfulness of Tibetan culture and what we have imbibed from our 
religion.   
Jamyang another CTA member in his late 50s, related the non‐violent nature of the self‐
immolations directly to the non‐violent strategy of the Dalai Lama, which for him is the main 
reason why the Tibetan protests have remained non‐violent. In his view this is a clear sign of the 
respect Tibetans have for their spiritual leader:  
And self-immolation itself, I think, in a way is a form of respect for the non-violence principles 
upheld by His Holiness. It’s your life, ‘I am harming myself and not others’, this kind of thing. I think 
the self-immolation grows out of the non-violence philosophy so dearly upheld by His Holiness. 
 Although non‐violence, in the last two quotes, is explained with reference to Buddhism, 
this explanation differs from the Dalai Lama’s early understanding, where inflicting harm to 
oneself is also categorized as a form of violence. The quotes also exemplify how the Buddhist 
principle of non‐violence is applied to understand the self‐immolations as moral acts and 
meaningful as a “good death” within a Tibetan cultural framework. What all the quotes have in 
common with those presented in the beginning (on the sacrificial nature of self‐immolations) is 
that they refer to Buddhism, where non‐violence stands as a core value.   
 
Complex motivations  
In the following I will present the opinions of two Tibetans, Lhakpa Tsering and Sherab Tsedor, 
who attempted to self‐immolate in India. Then I will present a few other cases of self‐
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immolators. I aim to show that the motivation behind the self‐immolations is more complex than 
what is captured by the generalizing ways of talking about it in exile, because in some cases the 
self‐immolators wish to call attention to multiple issues.  
 Lhakpa Tsering, born in 1982 in a small town in Tibet, attempted to self‐immolate in 
Mumbai on November 23, 2006, during the Chinese president Hu Jintao’s visit to India. At the 
time, he was the president of RTYC in Bangalore. Sherab Tsedor (28), born and raised in exile, 
attempted to self‐immolate on November 4, 2011.Explaining the motivation behind his self‐
immolation, Lhakpa Tsering said:  
I self-immolated because I didn’t have any other option left. Hu Jintao was the first Chinese 
president, communist president who came to India. Also he was the leader of the so-called Chinese 
TAR region – Tibetan Autonomous Region. He was the leader during 1989 and at that time he 
ordered martial law inside Tibet and killed thousands of Tibetans, innocent people. That’s why it 
was a big opportunity for us to protest in front of him. So I chose to self-immolate to paint his face 
black. In that way the world governments could realize who he really is. That’s why I did it. I needed 
attraction of the world, so I did that.  
Sherab Tsedor, sharing a personal story, explained his motivation differently:  
I am just a common Tibetan who wants to enjoy my life. When I was released from Tihar jail (after 
a protest) in Delhi, my father gave me a khata. He said, ‘Today I truly feel proud of you for the first 
time’. That is why I began engaging in activism. I engaged to make my father happy. After one year 
I felt that it was not only for my father, but for all human beings. After about two years, I began to 
understand the importance of our struggle for our future. This made me sacrifice. I self-immolated 
because I felt I have to raise the voice of the self-immolators inside Tibet. I felt a responsibility for 
the martyrs inside Tibet.   
 Lhakpa Tsering’s motivation was above all to ridicule Hu Jintao; at the same time, his act 
also carried a potential for attracting the world’s attention to the political situation inside Tibet. 
In other words, it was also a political protest against Chinese policies of oppression. At the time 
of his self‐immolation, in 2006, only one Tibetan, Thupten Ngodup, had self‐immolated, so that 
neither in Tibet nor India had the narrative of sacrifice yet developed into its current form. 
When Sherab Tsedor attempted to self‐immolate, a far greater number of Tibetans had self‐
immolated. For that reason his motivation is somewhat different, because he also wanted to 
raise the voices of ‘martyrs’ who had set fire on themselves inside Tibet. However, his 
motivation for activism not only grew from a sense of commitment to the Tibetan freedom 
struggle and the self‐immolators inside Tibet, but also from a wish to retain his father’s respect. 
 Lhakpa Tsering and Sherab Tsedor exemplify that the motivation behind a self‐
immolation is more complex than what is captured by dominant generalizations. The motivation 
can be political protest, commitment to the Tibetan freedom struggle, or simply to the Tibetan 
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nation, and even personal relations. Lhakpa Tsering also expressed his conviction that although 
he recognizes the other self‐immolations as a sacrifice, it is difficult to know or generalize about 
the underlying motivations,  
It is a sacrifice definitely. That is all I can say. Whatever they did, only they know what they 
sacrificed for. No one can tell why they sacrificed. It is definitely a sacrifice. That is all I can say, but 
why, I cannot say. Because they have their own reasons.  
 The main motivations of self‐immolators inside Tibet as presented by CTA and the NGOs, 
are the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet and freedom for Tibetans in Tibet. Overall, the self‐
immolations are interpreted as political protests for a national cause. Although the majority of 
the self‐immolators have indeed called for the return of the Dalai Lama, the second motivation 
seems to be a generalized interpretation by exiles,86 based on a range of messages calling for 
different things. The most common issues are freedom of language, freedom of religion and unity 
among Tibetans inside Tibet. In his message, Lama Sobha put an additional emphasis on unity 
among Tibetans inside Tibet and urged Tibetans to avoid disputes over land and water.87 Such 
disputes are a result of the increase in Chinese mining and hydropower projects. In addition, 
although he begins his message by hailing Thupten Ngodup and all the other “Tibetan heroes 
who sacrificed their lives for Tibet”, regarding his own sacrifice, on the other hand, Lama Sobha 
says, “I offer this sacrifice as a token of long-life offering to our root guru His Holiness the Dalai 
Lama and all other spiritual teachers and lamas”.88 His message exemplifies complex 
motivations; it is an “offering”, to the Dalai Lama and other spiritual teachers, an offering calling 
for the return of the Dalai Lama, expressed later on his message, as well as calling for unity 
among Tibetans inside Tibet. As a monk, he conceptualized his self‐immolation in Buddhist 
terminology, and his last words also seem very much inspired by Buddhist ideas.                                       
 Messages by other self‐immolators likewise show that it can be difficult to generalize 
concerning their motivation. Rikyo, a Tibetan woman (33) who self‐immolated in Ngaba, Amdo 
on May 30, 2012, left the following message:  
Prayers for world peace and happiness! To ensure His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet, do 
not indulge in slaughtering and trading of animals, do not steal, speak Tibetan, do not fight. 
                                                 
86
 Although in some cases, “freedom in Tibet” has in fact been demanded, for example by Gudrub on October 
8, 2012, or Dolkar Tso, August 7, 2012. Still, “freedom in Tibet” can be interpreted by exile Tibetans in different 
ways (chapter 4).   
87
 Many other self-immolators have called for unity among Tibetans inside Tibet, among them Ngawang 
Norphel and Tenzin Khedrup who self-immolated on the same spot in Kham on June 20, 2012. Buffetrille also 
writes about the concern for unity among Tibetans inside Tibet, and emphasizes that some self-immolators 
have called for this (2014, p. 10).  
88
 The entire message: http://www.savetibet.org/harrowing-images-and-last-message-from-tibet-of-first-lama-
to-self-immolate/ (acc.01.06.2015). 
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Bearing all sufferings of sentient beings on myself, I do not resist by fighting if I get into Chinese 
hands alive, be united, study Tibetan culture.89 
  Rikyo calls for a whole range of issues, including requesting Tibetan not to slaughter 
animals. Her statement expresses concerns with the preservation of Tibetan identity, which for 
her is necessary to ensure the return of the Dalai Lama.                                                                                                            
 Another example is Chagmo Kyi, female (26), self‐immolated in Rebkong, Amdo on 
November 17, 2012, stating, “Return of His Holiness to Tibet! Freedom of language! Equality of 
nationalities. China’s new leader Xi Jinping must meet with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Peace”.90 A 
third example is Passang Lhamo, female (62) from Kyegudo, Amdo, who self‐immolated in 
Beijing on September 13, 2012. She is believed to have survived the self‐immolation, and 
although she did not leave a message, she is thought to have self‐immolated as a protest against 
the central authorities’ seizure of land. This followed in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake 
which leveled the town of Kyegudo. Passang Lhamo had travelled to Beijing to appeal to central 
authorities “to allow her to retain her ancestral home” (ICT),91 pointing to personal as well as 
macro‐political motivations.  
 These examples illustrate that there can be different motivations behind the act of 
setting oneself ablaze. Although the majority of the statements refer to Tibetans as a distinct 
group, or Tibet as a distinct place or nation (Barnett, 2012, p. 55), many also include other 
themes, for example related to ongoing local politics and development. These are, however, 
blurred in exile representations, and generalized as calls for freedom for Tibet or Tibetans as a 
national group. The opinions I have presented from my own interviews and conversations 
exemplify that activists, CTA members and lay people all emphasize macro‐political issues, 
connected to identity or nation, although some are reluctant to generalize on motivation. The 
self‐immolations are justified as moral acts, as sacrifice, because they are believed to be carried 
out for such larger macro‐political issues, but as Passang Lhamo’s case exemplifies, this is not 
always clear.     
 
Self-immolations as ritualized acts  
In the following, I shall analyze self‐immolations in terms of ritual as I believe this will help us in 
understanding why nearly all Tibetans regard these act to be a form of sacrifice.  
 David I. Kertzer shows how ritual plays an important part in modern politics, as “politics 
is expressed through symbolism” (1988, p. 2). One of these symbolisms are, in his view, seen in 
rituals. He regards ritual action (in contrast to habitual action or custom) as being wrapped in a 
web of symbolism; moreover, it is standardized as well as repetitive, “channeling emotion, 
                                                 
89
 http://www.india-seminar.com/2013/644/644_last_message.htm (acc.01.06.2015). 
90
 http://www.india-seminar.com/2013/644/644_last_message.htm (acc.01.06.2015).  
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 http://tibet.net/2013/01/land-grabbing-persists-in-kyegudo-a-tibetan-woman-burned-herself-in-protest/  
 (acc.01.06.2015).  
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guiding cognition, and organizing social groups” (1988, p. 9). Furthermore, our beliefs about the 
world are acquired, reinforced and eventually changed through rituals (1989, p. 9).  This, I 
suggest, characterizes the self‐immolations as well. The burning bodies of the self‐immolators 
have become a vivid symbol of the Tibetan resistance against the Chinese occupation, expressing 
strong nationalist sentiments in exile, as well as reinforcing resistance against the Chinese 
occupation. Moreover, the self‐immolations have come to symbolize the ‘body politic’ (Scheper‐
Hughes and Lock, 1987) that constitutes Tibet inside PRC. In the exile community today, 
“burning Tibet” is a commonly used metaphor for the situation inside Tibet, painted on walls 
(Fig. 10, 11) and printed on T‐shirts, bags and other items.92                                                        
                                                                                              
Figure 10: Mural by TYC on Jogiwara Road, honoring the self‐immolators, depicting Tibet “on                                                   
     fire”.            
                                                                         
     Figure 11: From a popular hangout among Tibetan youth and tourists.                                     
            Barnett also suggests that the self‐immolations should be seen as a form of ritual, pointing 
out that Tibetans have ritualized the act of self‐immolation by “giving it a specific form, and 
conducting it in public space” (2012, p. 59). It is the ritualization of the acts which has, he argues, 
contributed to transform the self‐immolations into a sacrifice, and hence they stand apart from 
political suicide during the Cultural Revolution and in the post‐Mao era. Political suicides were 
more private in nature and did not take on a specific form. In contrast, the public nature of the 
                                                 
92
 On January 28, 2013, CTA published a “White Paper” on the self-immolations, titled “Why Tibet is Burning?”, 
http://tibet.net/2013/02/cta-releases-white-paper-on-self-immolations-in-tibet/ (acc.01.07.2015). A catalogue 
of the self-immolations until May 27, 2013, published by TYC, is also titled “Tibet Burning”.  
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self‐immolations as well as their standardized form have contributed to reframe the notion of 
suicide as “a clear, emphatic statement embodying high motives and collective purpose, one in 
which the act of self‐killing is noble, virtuous, and beneficial to the nation” (Barnett, 2012, p. 59).  
 There are examples of Tibetans who have killed themselves in recent times for the cause 
of Tibet, but without being conceptualized in the same way as the self‐immolators. One such case 
is the 26‐year old Dhondup Phuntsok who on April 2, 2012 jumped from the Howrah Bridge in 
Kolkata, wearing a “Free Tibet” T‐shirt (phayul.com, April 8, 2012).93 Though he was referred to 
as a martyr by political activists, for example by Tenzin Tsundue, his death is not incorporated 
into exile community in the same way as those of the self‐immolators. Photos of Tibetans who 
have killed themselves for the cause of Tibet in non‐ritualized ways are not displayed in NGO 
offices or public places in Dharamsala. Moreover these deaths – in contrast to the self‐
immolations – are not reported in any official document, such as the International Campaign for 
Tibet webpage. Following Barnett, I suggest that in the symbolism of nationalist politics in exile, 
self‐immolations have become the one main ritual that contributes to reinforce Tibetan 
nationalism. Self‐immolation is today synonymous with making an offering to the Tibetan 
nation, or “a higher cause”, as some Tibetans call it.  This ritualization is taken further and 
reinforced through the display of photos and statues of self‐immolators in public places in 
McLeod Ganj, as Shakya (2012b) also has observed. The commemoration of self‐immolators 
through candle light vigils in Dharamsala is also an important and crucial action which has 
contributed to this ritualization.   
 The specific form of the self‐immolations and the fact that they take place in public has 
contributed to their ritualization, giving them certain meanings while excluding others. These 
meanings, serve to remind the Tibetan community of the sacrifice that has been made, so that 
the legacy of the self‐immolators’ sacrifice is incorporated into the future. I will return to these 
processes of ritualization in McLeod Ganj in the next chapter.  
 Here, however, I turn to the specific meanings of a sacrifice. The activist Tendor Dorjee, 
was quoted, at the start of this chapter, as saying, “The self-immolations are just a spark”, and it is 
this beginning that I will explore by taking Lambek’s (2007) understanding of sacrifice as my 
starting point, and also by comparing it to other acts which are also understood as a form of 
sacrifice.  
 
Sacrifice as a beginning  
Lambek (2007) writes that, “….each act of sacrifice is simultaneously a passion; each turns us 
irrevocably in a certain direction, locates us on a certain path; and each invites identification and 
repetition”. In his article Sacrifice and the Problem of Beginning, Lambek (2007) suggests 
considering sacrifice as a kind of beginning. He points out that beginnings are not naturally 
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 http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=31196 (acc.19.04.2015). 
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given, but should be seen as active and human‐made (2007, p. 22). Sacrifice, whether of animals 
or humans, is always an attempt to change the course of things, or to initiate new beginnings 
which are beyond control.94 According to Lambek, beginnings and endings are two interrelated 
processes as one cannot exist without the other: “endings form and substantiate beginnings” 
(2007, p. 27). Rane Willerslev’s (2009) work on voluntary death among the Chukchi in Siberia 
can illustrate Lambek’s point. Voluntary death involves the killing of a family member who 
expresses a wish to die (2009, p. 693), regarded as an offering to the deceased, ensuring, “the 
maintenance and furthering of life through the act of taking life” (2009, p. 701). Willerslev treats 
voluntary death as a form of sacrifice, and not as a form of suicide, arguing that voluntary death 
is a ritualized event, following a set of definite rules and proscriptions. It is an established part of 
the Chukchi’s cultural knowledge and therefore a meaningful death.  
 Considering that the self‐immolations are understood as a form of sacrifice among exile 
Tibetans, they could be seen as an attempt at changing the course of things and initiating a new 
kind of beginning. Further, I suggest that the ritualization of the self‐immolations through 
representation in public places is an attempt at consolidating the beginning they have 
substantiated, as well as defining what this beginning should be, something I will return to in 
chapters 4, and 5.  
 Lambek argues that blood sacrifice or self‐sacrifice stands in contrast to the classic gift, 
because reciprocity is not possible in the case of the former.95 The sacrifice and the sacrificer are 
one and the same. For that reason, “blood sacrifice or self‐sacrifice makes an especially good 
beginning, a first gift because it is a gift that does not – indeed, cannot – return to its origins. It is 
the gift that cannot be returned, or cancelled, or withdrawn. The only thing to do with it is to 
honor it” (Lambek (2007, p. 29). This is also valid for self‐immolations and leads to an important 
point: the Tibetan community remains indebted to the self‐immolators. The relationship 
between the self‐immolators and those left behind is invested with morality. A female CTA 
member, Dolma, explains: 
… these acts of supreme sacrifice are made with great expectations that are put on the rest of us, 
and people in the free world. Therefore, every time there is another self-immolation the 
responsibility on us becomes bigger, becomes larger. And obviously we are pained because we have 
no control over it.  
Another CTA member, Rinchen (40), put it similarly, 
                                                 
94
 For an elaborate study on another form of sacrifice, which is similar to the self-immolations regarding the 
extremity of the act, but is different in many other ways, see Nasser Abufarha’s study on Palestinian self-
bombers (2009).  
95
 Lambek differentiates between ‘sacrifice’ and the ‘gift’ on the basis that sacrifice is the ‘first’ gift; the original 
source of the “hau” to which the gift must return. This distinction is according to him unaddressed in the 
analysis of Mauss’ and his successors. As every gift following Mauss engenders  return, “how do we know that 
any given gift is not always a return. How is a gift marked as first?” Lambek (2007, p.29) asks. He suggests that 
sacrifice is one way to mark a gift as ‘first’. 
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I have tremendous respect for these people and of course it´s our duty to do what they have left. 
They have sacrificed for us. Their sacrifice shouldn’t go in vain. So it´s our duty to do more for Tibet. 
I have tremendous respect for these people.  
 The significance of remembering the self‐immolations as a form of sacrifice, as well as 
the ritualization of their representation in public places, is, I believe, that it serves as a reminder 
of the obligation Tibetans believe they have to continue, or substantiate, the beginning which the 
self‐immolators have initiated by ending their lives.  
 By looking at the self‐immolations in terms of sacrifice we understand only one, albeit 
important, aspect. I believe that Lambek’s idea of sacrifice as a new kind of beginning can be 
taken a step further. Why is it that a sacrifice, in contrast to a suicide, necessarily substantiates 
new beginnings? What kind of death is a sacrifice, as opposed to a suicide? By relating the 
concept of sacrifice to the framework of the anthropology of “good” and “bad death”, new 
insights regarding self‐immolation can be developed. My argument is that the categorization of 
the self‐immolations as a form of sacrifice fundamentally is about the concern of the living with 
“good” vs. “bad death”, and not merely with the self‐sacrifice itself. Importantly, it is also a way 
of relating the living and the dead.   
 
“Good” and “bad death”  
The remembrance of the self‐immolations as a form of sacrifice and a non‐violent action is a way 
of categorizing them as a “good death”. This is necessary in order to create social continuity and 
consolidate the beginnings which the self‐immolators have initiated. Thus the dead are also 
written into history and incorporated in society as heroes or martyrs. The notion of sacrifice is a 
way of classifying the self‐immolations as a “good death”, which alone can secure new 
beginnings or the regeneration of life. Following the anthropological literature on death (Bloch 
and Parry, 1982; Hertz, 1960; Palgi and Abramovitch, 1984), self‐immolations can be 
interpreted as a “good death”, because it has been made culturally and morally meaningful 
through an emphasis on motivation and cause found beyond the individual: they have given up 
their life for the sake of the Tibetan people. Moreover, it is carried out in a non‐violent way, 
bringing no physical harm to others. The motivation behind these actions or their nature, 
regarded as altruistic, unselfish, and non‐violent is what ultimately makes the self‐immolations a 
good way of dying. For exile Tibetans, a self‐immolation articulates and manifests important 
Buddhist values, also at the core of the political project in exile. Another such culture‐specific 
aspect is the setting: all self‐immolations are carried out in public places, either in the town 
center, or in front of a monastery or the town hall.  Finally, it is a “good death” because it is an act 
of resistance against an authoritarian state. Through this act Tibetans take control of their 
bodies. A “good death” is characterized by control over one’s own death, symbolizing a victory 
over death (Bloch and Parry, 1982b). Overall, it is a ‘heroic’ death. Self‐immolation among 
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Tibetans has been transformed into a culturally meaningful death, in a similar way as voluntary 
death is among the Chukchi. Following, the self‐immolations carry the potential for regeneration 
and continuity.  
 
The living and the dead 
Remembering the self‐immolations as a sacrifice as a “good death” forges a connection between 
the living and the dead, securing social continuity. In the Tibetan case it also serves to connect 
the Tibetans inside and outside Tibet. Here memory should, as Lambek  has argued in an earlier 
article, be understood as something actively created between people (1996, p. 239). It is a 
cultural practice, a practice that “is to be understood as moral rather than simply technical, 
intellectual or instrumental" (1996, p. 235). The memory of the self‐immolations as a sacrifice 
creates an active, moral relationship between the self‐immolators and those left behind, the 
latter having the obligation for pursuing the self‐immolators wishes and thus honoring them. 
Lambek and Antze (1996, pp. xi‐xxiv) take memory to be an “identity‐building project” 
(Lambek,1996, p. 249), a process that is never neutral. Following them, I suggest that also in the 
Tibetan case memory of the self‐immolations serves to imbue exile Tibetans’ identity with 
national sentiments, reminding them of specific values and obligations.  
  In this chapter I have presented a general, analytical understanding of sacrifice as an 
attempt to change the course of things or to invite new beginnings. What is the beginning in the 
Tibetan case, and how do the living attempt to pursue it? The next chapter will discuss this by 
contextualizing this act of sacrifice further in the exile Tibetan context. This will bring to the 
front the living who define the beginning, (or actively create a relation between the self‐
immolators and those left behind), and how it is to be pursued through faith in certain values 
and goals, such as compassion and non‐violence. While this chapter has exemplified how these 
values are articulated as well as transforming the self‐immolations into heroes, the next chapter 
will focus on how these values are consolidated and reproduced.  
 The next two chapters will, accordingly, explore practices through which attempts are 
made to consolidate and continue the self‐immolations into the future as a “good death”, 
practices through which the living attempt fulfill their moral obligations. While, this chapter has 
looked at the general understanding of the self‐immolations by Tibetans from various 
backgrounds, in the next chapter my attention will be devoted to central political actors – the 
NGOs and CTA – because it is they who form the dominating narrative(s) regarding the self‐
immolators. 
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Figure 12: Butter‐lamp offerings in the korlam.  
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4  Self-immolations: practices of commemoration  
 
Commemoration is a social and cultural process of healing and reclaiming, through thought and 
memory, through action and ritual. 
                                                                                                            (Kwon, 2006, p. xii) 
This chapter will explore commemoration practices – candle light vigils and representation of 
the self‐immolators in public places in McLeod Ganj – through which Tibetans with authority in 
the exile community in Dharamsala attempt to incorporate the self‐immolators into the lives of 
their compatriots. I aim to show that these practices contribute to producing consensus with 
regard to self‐immolations as a sacrifice and a form of non‐violence, and the self‐immolators as 
heroes and martyrs. I also argue that these practices are necessary if the self‐immolations are to 
continue to be regarded as a “good death”.  
 Death always causes disorder in social life, society being “stricken in the very principle of 
its life in the faith it has in itself” (Hertz, 1960, p. 78), leading to a possible threat of “potential 
demoralization” (Abramovitch n.d.).96 Commemoration of self‐immolators in public places is 
therefore crucial “to reassert core cultural values” (Abramovitch n.d.), and thus to avoid such 
danger of a “potential demoralization”. Accordingly, commemoration may be seen as a way of 
reasserting faith in certain values that are at the core of the exile Tibetan political project. If 
Tibetans should loose faith in these values, the freedom struggle could fall apart, and the self‐
immolations would be transformed into a “bad death”. Commemoration is therefore vital to 
transform “death into fertility” (Bloch and Parry, 1982b).  
 I will first describe the candle light vigils held in Dharamsala, organized jointly by three 
NGOs. This is the most immediate form of commemoration in the aftermath of a self‐immolation, 
and hence an episodic event. There is another, more permanent, practice of commemoration 
through which the self‐immolators become immortalized and remain present in the political 
landscape of McLeod Ganj: the representation of self‐immolators in public places, in the form of 
statues and photos. I shall apply Verdery’s (1999) ideas about the political lives of dead bodies 
to analyze these representations. I then wish to take a closer look at the politics of 
commemoration, which, far from being neutral, are always guided by faith in certain values and 
goals, and, conversely, I hold that commemoration of self‐immolators plays a vital role in the 
reproduction of these values. Finally, I will discuss the relevance of these two commemoration 
practices in reinforcing Tibetan nationalism, and keeping alive the Tibetan freedom struggle, 
which I interpret to be “the beginning” for political actors.  
 According to Verdery, dead bodies are given political life all over the world (1999, p. 1). 
Her work sheds light on the political life of Tibetan dead bodies through pointing to the cultural 
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 http://henry-a.com/death/anthropology-of-death. 
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work of commemoration, transforming bodies into political symbols. Following Kwon (2006), I 
understand commemoration as a culturally defined moral practice of remembering the dead, 
and reclaiming them and thus incorporating them, “vertically into society and horizontally into 
history” (2006, p. xi). According to Verdery’s examples, commemoration could be erecting 
statues and holding reburials of a handful of chosen dead. In McLeod Ganj, the commemoration 
practices are also moral practices of remembering the dead, to be undertaken by the living in 
order to fulfill their moral obligation and honor the sacrifice made by the ‘heroes’.  
 In exile, commemoration of self‐immolators is guided by two important motivations. 
Firstly, commemorating the self‐immolators as heroes is motivated by the intention of 
invalidating and disempowering the Chinese state narrative of the self‐immolations as suicides, 
driven by personal or family tragedies, and the self‐immolators as criminals and terrorists. In 
addition, the Chinese authorities’ seizure of the burned bodies, dead or alive, has become a 
standard practice. This can be interpreted as an attempt to regain control and subjecting 
individual bodies to the Chinese state. Accordingly, commemoration in India can be seen as a 
way for Tibetans of taking back the self‐immolators, or reclaiming ownership of them in a 
political sense.  
 Secondly, these commemorations are motivated by the faith of the organizers in certain 
values and goals, on the basis of which the self‐immolators are reclaimed and incorporated into 
society. Their commemoration contributes to the reproduction of these values, as well as to 
reassert Tibetans’ faith in them. Although self‐immolators are believed to have died for a 
political cause, and a few have in fact left behind messages stating their motives, once they are 
dead they have to be reclaimed in order to be written into exile society as national heroes and 
martyrs.  
 
Candle light vigils – a commemoration ritual  
In McLeod Ganj, the candle light vigils have been held ever since the uprisings in Tibet in 2008 in 
connection with the Beijing Olympics (Stephan, 2009). Photos and videos from the vigils in 2008 
show huge gatherings of Tibetans, standing together around photos of naked, lifeless protesters 
with bloody and unrecognizable genitals or swollen faces where the eyes are barely visible. 
People stand with candles in their hands, and with tearful eyes attempt to chant a prayer for the 
dead. When the self‐immolations began in earnest in 2011, the candle light vigils were resumed, 
and they continue to be held in memory of any Tibetan who is killed or severely injured in Tibet 
while protesting against Chinese policies. The vigils are organized jointly by three main NGOs: 
Students for a Free Tibet (SFT), Regional Tibetan Women’s Association (RTWA) and Regional 
Tibetan Youth Congress (RTYC). Because of the strong rangzen symbolism involved, such as the 
Tibetan flag, singing of the national anthem, and because two of the organizers, SFT and RTYC, 
hold rangzen aspirations, CTA members do not usually attend, participating instead in their own 
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organized prayers in the Tsuglagkhang, together with monks from Namgyal Monastery and 
others. While candle light vigils are a new phenomenon, CTA and the monks perform the 
traditional death rituals. 
 A candle light vigil is always organized when information on a self‐immolation has been 
received, usually on the same or the next day. Thus they are not planned in advance. The Chinese 
restrictions, which become even more severe after a self‐immolation has taken place, make it 
harder to obtain information from Tibet, and the vigils take a spontaneous form when 
information arrives.  
 I regard the vigils as a commemorative practice, or more specifically as a political 
ritual,97 due to the context in which they take place, the intentions of the organizers, and the 
perceptions of others of the performance (Dodin, 2012, p. 80). I will elaborate on this later. My 
focus now will be on the organizers and their motivations. I argue that there are three main 
aspects of the candle light vigils: firstly, it is a practice through which the living fulfill their moral 
obligation and honor the sacrifice that has been made; secondly, the self‐immolator is reclaimed 
as a hero or martyr; thirdly, the vigils are also an attempt at healing, and creating motivation and 
hope. Moreover, I regard the vigils as a (political) commemorative rituals which Paul Connerton 
argues differ from other kinds of rituals by their ability to evoke social memory and to remind a 
community of its identity (Connerton, 1989, p. 71). Applying Connerton’s understanding, I 
attempt to show that through this political action the organizers attempt to remind exile 
Tibetans of their national identity and their core values.  
 However, I will not analyze the vigils using an elaborate ritual theory, primarily because 
a vigil is never something planned, or held at regular intervals, nor do the same people attend it 
every time. 98 Although in my experience a volunteer from RTYC always made an announcement 
with a megaphone around McLeod Ganj a few hours prior to the vigils, most Tibetans and 
foreigners who join the vigils do so spontaneously, their motive being simply to show solidarity 
and respect. 
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 I regard them as a ritual for analytic purposes, and also because like all rituals, the vigils are formalized, 
stereotyped and repetitive (Connerton, 1989, p. 44). Tibetans, however, do not refer to the vigils as rituals. 
98
 I am aware that analyzing a ritual by focusing on the audience’s participation is a common anthropological 
today, but in this case, however, it turned out to be rather difficult. Because the vigils were each time attended 
by different people, whom I did not know, it became difficult for me to analyze their participation in terms of 
motivation or effect. Still, I made several attempts at analyzing participation by applying Bruce Kapferer’s 
analysis of a Sinhalese exorcist ritual (Kapferer, 1984), by focusing on the location, form and content of the 
vigils; I found it difficult, however, to state whether the rituals opened up ‘reflexive rooms’ (providing people 
the opportunity to view their society from outside) for the participants. Whenever I asked people about the 
importance of the vigils, or why they attended them, they simply replied that it was an act of solidarity, or a 
prayer for the dead. It is difficult to know what such answers really signify. Regarding reflexivity, Kapferer also 
asks whether a ritual is reflexive for the anthropologist (who is an outsider and a researcher) or the audience 
(1984, p. 203), especially when certain rituals, such as the vigils, have become a normal part of people’s lives.  
68 
 
Candle light vigil – March 30, 2014  
In a candle light vigil, Tibetans and non‐Tibetans gather in memory of the deceased, forming a 
line, each with a lit candle in their hands. The number of participants varies between 40 to 50 
people,99 which is few compared to 2008 and considering the number of Tibetan residents in 
town. The vigil is usually, though not always, led by monks. It is also flexible, bystanders 
sometimes joining it along the way. The vigil usually begins close to 6 pm and lasts for about an 
hour. Reciting prayers, people go two or three times around a small Tibetan temple, located by 
the hectic Main Square of McLeod Ganj, making the vigil visible to everyone in the area: Tibetans, 
local Indians and foreigners. The procession then continues down Temple Road to the 
Tsuglagkhang100, approximately 400 meters away (see figure 6, chapter 2). As an example, I will 
in the following give a detailed description of a candle light vigil that took place on March 30, 
2014, following 128 self‐immolations inside Tibet and seven in exile. 
 
Preparations – at the Main Square  
It was a Sunday, and the clock hit quarter to six. Most of the NGO workers were, as at previous 
vigils, already in place at the Main Square, busy sticking candles in small, square pieces of 
cardboard. The NGO representatives were mainly from RTWA in Dharamsala. Tibetans each 
took a candle, while most of the foreigners, who were not so familiar with the event, waited to be 
handed one. A few activists were handing out flyers with basic information about the self‐
immolator, in whose memory the vigil was being held (fig.13). The information was identical 
with the press release made by the NGOs. Since I knew the organizers, I squatted on the ground 
to give a hand with sticking the remaining candles in pieces of cardboard.  
 This time the vigil was held for a nun from the Kham region in Tibet, who had self‐
immolated the previous day (March 29, 2014). The Bathang area, where the self‐immolation had 
taken place, had witnessed its first self‐immolation. The flyer entitled “TIBET BURNS WITH 
129TH SELF‐IMMOLATON”, included a drawing of a nun on fire, portrayed within flames and 
standing peacefully with her eyes closed and crossed arms. It also gave basic information about 
the self‐immolation: time and place, and includes a statement by a CTA member, Bawa Kalsang 
Gyaltsen, a native of Bathang province: “The Chinese security forces have surrounded the 
hospital area and flooded the whole region with armed security personnel fearing Tibetan 
protest”. Statements from two NGO workers are also included. One of them reads, “All the 
Tibetan self‐immolators have called for the return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and demanded 
freedom for Tibet”.  Names of the three organizing NGOs – RTWA, RTYC, SFT – are listed at the 
bottom of the flyer.  
                                                 
99
 Of 50 participants, about five to ten would usually be tourists.  
100
 Sometimes, procession continues to the TCV Day School after finishing the rounds around the temple, and 
the vigil ends there instead.    
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                         Figure 13: The flyer for the vigil.  
 As we were in the middle of the preparations, Gawa, a male volunteer from RTYC, 
holding a megaphone, made an announcement about the self‐immolation, first in Tibetan, and 
then in English. In the English announcement the self‐immolator was referred to as “our brave 
martyr”, as at previous occasions, and Gawa requested people to join the vigil. It was always 
Gawa who made the announcement for the vigils around town a few hours prior to its beginning.   
   
The vigil – the prayer and kora 
The vigil began close to 6 pm. The participants formed a line and immediately began chanting 
the usual prayer. Some hurried to light their candle so they could join the line of people. Nyima, 
one of the SFT workers, was being interviewed on the side by an Indian cameraman. Jinpa, the 
monk I knew well from Gu‐chu‐sum, led the vigil. The vigils are usually led by monks, though not 
always. Jinpa carried a big laminated photo of the Dalai Lama with a silk khata101 draped around 
it. The photo was always carried in the front by the person leading the vigil, to show that the 
Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader of the Tibetan people. The Tibetan national flag was carried by 
a few participants. On some occasions activists from SFT bring flags from their own office, as 
they did on the very first vigil in 2014, on February 7. An old Tibetan man who participated in all 
the vigils carried his own flag in one hand and a lit candle in the other. As the Tibetan and non‐
Tibetan participants began the vigil, the NGO activists stayed on the sideline coordinating the 
lines, so that people did not create any hindrance for the traffic passing by.  
 In the first part of the vigil the participants, Tibetans as well as tourists, walked three 
times around a small monastery located on the way from the Main Square. As we walked round 
the monastery, a RTYC volunteer walked beside us as usual, stepping the ground with greater 
determination and reciting the prayer more powerfully than the rest in an attempt to encourage 
the participants, as well as persuading bystanders to join the vigil.  
 
                                                 
101
 A khata is a thin, silky ceremonial scarf (usually white) presented to people, statues and holy objects as a 
sign of respect. Tibetans bring them when they attend an audience with the Dalai Lama.  
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Towards the Tsuglagkhang 
After the kora, the procession began moving down Temple Road, towards the Tsuglagkhang. It 
was difficult to keep the candles lit, and many stopped to re‐light them. Tourists stood on the 
side of the road and watched curiously, taking photos. The NGO activists, too, remained for the 
most part on the sideline, and continued coordinating the line. Temple Road is lined by shops, 
most of which are owned by Indians, especially Kashmiris. Some of the shop owners stood 
outside their shops, their hands tucked under their armpits, silently watching the vigil pass by. I 
never spotted any Kashmiris or local Indians attending the vigils. They seemed indifferent.102  
 
Tibetan National Martyrs' Memorial  
Entering the Tsuglagkhang complex, the participants gathered in front of the Tibetan National 
Martyrs’ memorial (Fig. 19, p. 83), located in front of the Tibetan Museum. The memorial itself is 
a nearly two meter high square pillar of black stone, with the inscription “Tibetan National 
Martyrs’ Memorial” in English, Tibetan and Hindi. A small stone globe is placed on top of the 
memorial, on which “TIBET” in capital letters is written, as well as the names of the three major 
regions.  A wall through which bodies of Tibetans seem to be stretching out, shouting with their 
arms raised in the air, is also part of the memorial.  
 Holding candles, participants in the vigil stood shoulder to shoulder, while the activists 
in the front started to sing the Tibetan national anthem. The Non‐Tibetans, including me, 
listened silently. One minute of silence followed, broken by a series of speeches. A young woman 
in her late 20s from RTWA introduced the speakers, first a monk and then an activist. The monk, 
probably in his 30s, held two sheets of paper which I assumed to be his speech. After having 
spoken in Tibetan he said something in English, reading out from the flyer, but finding 
pronouncing some of the English words difficult. Next Tenzin Tsundue, the poet and well‐known 
activist representing RTYC, gave a speech in English, as he often does during the vigils, mainly 
targeted at the foreigners that were present. He focused on the reasons behind the immolations 
and why they also should be of concern to the international community. He particularly spoke 
about international trade with China, which, he claimed, was indirectly contributing to the 
political situation in Tibet and the rest of China. It was also important for Tenzin Tsundue to 
highlight why people are being forced to choose this dramatic form of protest, 
In other free countries there is for example the media to speak to, there is the judicial activism, 
through legal processes, but all of them are not possible in Tibet because everything is being run by 
the Chinese government and they have being dictatorially running all of these mechanisms in the 
interest of the Communist Party. 
He also emphasized the importance of non‐violence as the value driving the Tibetan struggle:  
                                                 
102
 This was confirmed when I conducted informal interviews with them. 
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We have an unflinching faith in the power of non-violence. And non-violence is the one that is not 
only sustaining our freedom struggle, we know and have absolute conviction that this non-violent 
path, the true guiding principle of His Holiness, and the basic principle of Buddhism that we 
practice – we believe and we know that it will take us, deliver freedom for Tibet and also benefit the 
Chinese people and the Chinese government. And therefore we have our unflinching conviction in 
the power of non-violence, which comes from our love and compassion. These are the practices that 
we have been maintaining. 
 He mentioned that there was as yet no information about the physical condition of the 
nun who self‐immolated, and briefly described how the Chinese authorities had handled 
previous self‐immolations. Finally, he requested the foreigners to spread “this message of love 
and compassion”, to share it with acquaintances at home and to take action.  
 The woman from RTWA took the microphone and addressed the Tibetan crowd with a 
powerful voice, being on the verge of crying, before Tenzin Tsundue spoke once again, this time 
only to the Tibetans. Thereafter the gathering broke up, everyone shouting "Pö gyel-lo", “Victory 
to Tibet”, three times, the Tibetans raising their fists in the air.  
     
Figure 14: Candle light vigil, April 15 2014, held in memory of Thrinley Namgyal, a 32‐year old 
man who had self‐immolated the same day at noon (local time) in Kardze, Kham (Tibet).  
 The vigils are filled with traditional Tibetan elements, but also with national symbols – 
the Tibetan flag, singing the national anthem, gathering in front of the National Martyrs’ 
Memorial and shouting “Pö gyel-lo” – which make the political nature of the vigils visible. On the 
other hand, the more traditional elements can give the impression that Tibetans are carrying on 
with Tibetan death practices, for example praying for the deceased, a practice which is 
72 
 
characteristic for cremation rituals.103 I nevertheless hold that in this context the traditional 
elements also should be understood as political action. Overall, I regard the vigils as a political 
ritual.                                                                                                                                                                            
 Despite the presence of Tibetan traditional rituals, such as performing kora while 
reciting prayers, which communicates certain shared meanings, I argue, following Dodin (2012, 
p. 80), that traditional rituals gain political signification in the context of the organizer’s 
intentions and the perception of the vigils among participants and onlookers. The context makes 
the ritual political because they are organized in the aftermath of a self‐immolation, an act which 
in itself is regarded as a political protest; secondly, the first part of the vigils is carried out in the 
middle of McLeod Ganj, with the intention of attracting everyone’s attention and informing them 
about the political situation in Tibet; thirdly, the vigils are political because they are perceived as 
such, for example by CTA members who do not attend them, mainly because they are regarded 
as part of a political campaign, initiated by the NGOs, two of them being rangzen groups, and at 
the same time a political protest challenging the Chinese state. 
 Although the participants of the vigils vary from time to time, the NGO organizers are 
always present. They have a crucial role in organizing and carrying out the vigils. They are the 
central actors, so the motivation behind the vigils must be understood from their point of view, 
which I will elaborate on in the following. They also inform the perception of the vigils among 
the general public.  
 
A basic act of solidarity  
All NGO activists expressed to me their conviction that the candle light vigils are an act of 
showing solidarity with the self‐immolators, their families and Tibetans inside Tibet.  Sonam, a 
male professional activist in his late 20s, said it in this way,  
It is a simple act of showing solidarity. In case of self-immolations or shootings inside Tibet, at the 
very basic, least and immediate level we can at least show solidarity. They deliver a strong message 
unity among the Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet. It also highlights for the Tibetans inside Tibet 
that Tibetans outside are aware of the situation inside Tibet and shows a high degree of solidarity.  
 Every Tibetan I spoke to, whether they participated in the vigils or not, stressed their 
importance as acts of solidarity. Showing solidarity can be regarded as the most important 
motivation for the organizers as well as the participants. I take this as indicating that showing 
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 There are four Tibetan ritual practices for disposing a corpse. The most practiced among them in Tibet is sky 
burial, which involves cutting up the corpse and feeding it to vultures. Cremation is commonly used in exile, 
while in Tibet it is reserved for incarnate lamas (See Klass and Goss, 1997, p. 384). However, the self-
immolators (of whom the majority have been laypeople) are entitled to ritual cremation carried out by 
monastics, Buffetrille writes. She suggest that, “it is a sort of transubstantiation which materializes the change 
of status of the self-immolator from being an ordinary person before his act to a ‘holy being’ after his self-
immolation” (2015). The reaction of some Tibetans confirms this, according to Buffetrille, as in certain photos 
online one can see Tibetans prostrating before the self-immolator.   
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solidarity is a way of fulfilling a moral obligation and honoring the self‐immolator; thus this also 
helps exile Tibetans to renew the connection between themselves and Tibetans in Tibet. Further, 
through the ritual process, motivated by showing solidarity, other transformations also take 
place: the self‐immolator is reclaimed as a national hero or martyr, and finally the vigils attempt 
to heal by giving comfort and consolation, partly achieved through the act of solidarity. The 
three aspects – solidarity, reclaiming the hero and healing – are all part of the vigils, but I 
separate them for analytical purposes. Overall, the vigils, being a political commemorative ritual, 
remind Tibetans of their national identity, through values and goals highlighted in them. 
 
Showing solidarity, reclaiming and, healing 
It is the moral duty of the NGOs to remember and honor the self‐immolator, and second, to 
inform the Tibetan and the international community, including the Chinese authorities, about 
the sacrifice. The public nature of the vigils is crucial to achieve these aims. Thupten, a 
professional male activist from TYC in his mid‐30s, expressed this sense of moral responsibility,  
The self-immolator died for us and to do prayer is our moral responsibility. And candle light vigil is 
also same. This person died for the cause of Tibet, for the happiness of 6 million Tibetan people, for 
the freedom of 6 million people. So that’s why we are organizing the candle light vigil. 
 For the organizers such commemorative events are also important as solidarity events, 
since they also renew the connection between Tibetan outside and inside Tibet. Sonam, quoted 
above, insisted that vigils show that all Tibetans stand together. Nyima, a female activist in her 
mid‐20s, put it very well,  
Candle light vigil is a kind of medium between Tibetans inside and Tibetans outside. They self-
immolate and we do a candle light vigil. It shows that we are together.  
 This clearly shows the connection between Tibetans in exile and Tibet. They are believed 
to become more connected through the self‐immolator who is reclaimed as a national symbol of 
Tibetan resistance: as a hero and martyr, uniting Tibetans as one ethnic group.     
 
Reclaiming  
Through the act of solidarity the self‐immolator is also reclaimed immediately or as soon as 
possible after his or her self‐immolation and the Chinese authorities’ seizure of the dead body, 
and incorporated into the exile community as a national hero and martyr. The martyr role is 
clearly expressed in the public announcement of the vigils and at the square right before the 
vigils begin. The incorporation of the self‐immolators as martyrs is also highlighted when the 
participants gather in front of the National Martyrs’ Memorial, singing the national anthem to 
honor the self‐immolator’s memory. Through this ritual process of reclaiming, the main goal is 
the national Tibetan cause for which the self‐immolator sacrificed her or his life, while values 
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such as compassion and non‐violence are also emphasized. Thus compassion is highlighted in 
the prayer recited by the participants. Tashi, a professional TYC activist, explained to me that the 
prayer is for the strength to be compassionate, and that the very act of self‐immolation is driven 
by love and compassion because the self‐immolator sacrificed his or her life hoping to bring 
freedom to other people.104 “So we pray that people everywhere should have a mind like that. And 
also the person who self-immolated wished that”, he added. Compassion is also highlighted in the 
speeches, for example in Tenzin Tsundue’s speech on March 30, where he said, “We have our 
unflinching conviction in the power of non-violence, which comes from our love and compassion”. 
He concluded by urging the foreigners who were present to take the Tibetans’ message of “love 
and compassion” back to their own countries. Compassion is also believed to be the reason why 
these vigils have remained non‐violent. Tenzin Tsundue highlighted the value of non‐violence in 
his speech, and people I interviewed did the same.  
 Through this process of reclaiming the dead, certain values, which can be seen as being 
at the core of the Tibetan movement, are highlighted, values which especially appeal to the 
international participants, as they represent the Tibetan movement as guided by moral 
concerns.  
 
Healing 
Finally, the vigils are also an attempt at healing – giving consolation, sowing the seeds of hope. 
Here I particularly have in mind the self‐immolator’s family and Tibetans inside Tibet. The latter, 
despite their absence from the vigils, are still a very important audience for the organizers. It is 
they who first and foremost motivate the NGOs to hold the vigils, and taking action and standing 
together in solidarity is a genuine attempt to console and give hope to Tibetans both inside Tibet 
and in exile.  
 This action also has the potential to inspire the participants in the vigils; this, too, can be 
considered as a form of healing, something Kavita, from SFT, expressed in this way,  
It is a space to mourn. Mourning is important, grieving. It empowers you to take action. Candle 
light vigils give you a space to come to terms with each individual who have burned themselves. It is 
also a way to give respect for their courage and stand in solidarity with their families… The first 
step is to face the fact, okay today there is another person. And then tomorrow I have to do 
something, challenge my anger, frustration into some meaningful action. I, myself at least think like 
this after having participated in such a vigil.  
However, she also added that, 
 There was a period when you had many self-immolations and then also many candle light vigils, 
sometimes every day. People felt a bit hopeless, like ‘how is this helping’? For the large part it is a 
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 See chapter 3.   
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space for mourning, but it is also problematic because you feel like, ‘I am helpless’, I can only light a 
candle… Because of the frequency of the self-immolations, and the frequency of the candle light 
vigils some Tibetans feel disillusioned about the effects of having a candle light vigils.  
 This is an important point. During my fieldwork, the vigils were not attended by many. 
None of my friends (except Jinpa, from Gu‐chu‐sum who had lost his cousin in a self‐immolation) 
or acquaintances, often men in their late 20s to late 30s, both born in exile and Tibet, 
participated. They expressed the view that a vigil was a hopeless act, and did not regard 
participation as taking action, nor as anything that could provide consolation and hope. A male 
friend, Kunchok, in his mid‐30s, explained that he regarded the vigils as futile, since they did not 
lead to any change, an opinion shared by Sherab, also in his mid‐30s, born and raised in exile: 
“People are setting fire on themselves, and they are fucking walking around with candles”, Sherab 
once said, quite upset. The “they” he referred to were the NGOs, who according to him were not 
taking effective action. This could be interpreted to mean that according to Kunchok and Sherab, 
the living are not fulfilling their moral obligation by honoring the sacrifice made by the martyrs.  
Although the organizers of the vigils try their best to heal, there is no possibility of their 
succeeding. It is a difficult and perhaps an impossible task. As Metcalf and Huntington point out, 
although rituals “make a show of power” (1992, p. 6), there is still the risk that, like all other 
shows, they may fail.  
 
A commemorative ritual  
As the vigils can be seen as a commemorative ritual, centered on the self‐immolator, they serve, 
through the values and goals they highlight, to remind Tibetans of their national identity. 
According to Connerton, commemorative rituals serve to remind a community of its identity 
more effectively than other rituals because the values and goals of a community are highlighted 
through the person being commemorated. Connerton refers to this feature as “re‐enactment” 
(1989, p. 61), and regards re‐enactment as being of “cardinal importance in the shaping of 
communal memory” (1989, p. 61). In the same way I would argue that memory is shaped 
through some of the values which are highlighted, especially compassion and non‐violence. In 
addition, memory is also formed through the fundamental reason for the self‐immolations, 
namely the continued Chinese occupation, which is also at the heart of what is being 
communicated or shared. Because of their collective character, the vigils bring Tibetans together 
through an act of solidarity. Moving in a line together and standing shoulder to shoulder singing 
the national anthem, are actions which by bringing people together remind them of their 
common background and identity in a diasporic setting.  
 Tibetan identity in exile is formed and reformed through such commemorative practices. 
Within the context of diaspora such events hold a particular significance, since, to use the words 
of one parliamentarian, they are “a way of keeping the community intact”. Despite the fact that 
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the vigils are attended by very few Tibetans, they still leave a mark on people merely through 
their presence, and for a short time remind Tibetans of who they are, why they are in exile, and 
of their responsibilities.  
 In the following I wish to present the other type of commemoration of the self‐
immolators: their representation in public places. While the vigils are episodic, and become a 
part of the past after an hour or so, representation has a permanent character, making the self‐
immolators accessible to all Tibetans. Even those who are absent from the vigils are confronted 
by the self‐immolators, if not daily then at least occasionally. The legacy of the self‐immolators is 
secured through putting up photos and erecting statues of them in public places. As I will show, 
this activity also represents a hierarchy of values and goals.  
 
The representation of self-immolators in public places  
Although people talk about the self‐immolations at home, displaying their photos in private 
homes is, with a few exceptions, not common.105 By contrast, the presence of the self‐immolators 
is strongly felt in public places. Moving around McLeod Ganj, Tibetans are continuously 
reminded of them. The representation of the self‐immolators is mostly confined to the 
Tsuglagkhang complex, including the korlam ground – areas to which Tibetans can claim 
ownership and one of the most important and sacred or “powerful” places (Huber, 1999a, p. vii) 
in exile (Fig. 6). It consists of the Dalai Lama’s residence, Namgyal Monastery, the Tsuglagkhang 
temple106 itself and the Tibet Museum. Around and within the Tsuglagkhang complex photos and 
statues of the self‐immolators have been set up by monks from Nechung Monastery, by TYC, 
RTYC and CTA, but as I will argue later, TYC (RTYC) and CTA’s representation constitute 
different ways of portraying the self‐immolators.  The area is visited daily by Tibetans and 
tourists, as well as being a place of pilgrimage where Tibetans make kora and offerings. Thus, as 
Huber writes concerning Tibetan sacred spaces and  powerful places, the Tsuglagkhang, being 
the main Dalai Lama temple in exile, can be regarded as an ‘extraordinary’ or ‘empowered’ place 
for Tibetans, “as being both of this world yet somehow apart from it” (Huber, 1999a, p. vii), as it 
involves a specific relationship between the place itself and Tibetans who move through it, 
performing different practices, including kora (Huber, 1999b, p. 77).  
 Photos of self‐immolators are also displayed in semi‐public places, such as the various 
NGO offices, for example that of SFT and the TYC office, both of which displayed one photo each 
of the self‐immolators. In the main office room of SFT, a photo of Karma Ngedon Gyatso, who I 
witnessed self‐immolate on August 6, 2013 in Kathmandu, rested on a desk with a khata around 
it, while the main TYC office displayed a photo of Jamphel Yeshi who self‐immolated on March 
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 Jinpa, at Gu-chu-sum, had a photo of Thupten Ngodup’s self-immolation in his room. Jinpa was a very 
politically active layperson, and had participated in demonstrations in Amdo in 2008; in addition, his own 
cousin, Sangye Tashi, self-immolated in Labrang, Amdo on November 27, 2012.   
106
 The equivalent of the Jokhang, or Tsuglagkhang in Lhasa, the most sacred place in Tibetan Buddhism.  
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26, in 2012 in New Delhi. In the latter case, the photo was framed and hung on a wall in the 
entrance room along with photos of the Dalai Lama. “Pawo Jamphel Yeshi, age 27” was typed in 
big green letters below. On the one side was a smiling portrait of Jamphel Yeshi, and on the other 
a photo of him engulfed in flames. These photos were separated by the slogan “Pö gyel-lo”, the 
slogan that was shouted at the conclusion of the candle light vigils.  
 Outside the Dharamsala office of RTYC a big poster with photos from Jamphel Yeshi’s 
self‐immolation is hanging on a wall (Fig. 15). The office is located in a lane branching off from 
the Main Square. Even though this lane is hidden, it is still busy, many Tibetans and foreigners 
passing through it on their way to a popular restaurant located a few meters from the RTYC 
office.  The poster hangs on the opposite side of the office, on a low brick wall. It shows the same 
two photos: one is a portrait of a smiling Jamphel Yeshi, while the other one shows him running, 
enveloped in flames. Under these two photos there are five smaller photos from his self‐
immolation, arranged chronologically. The last one is a close‐up of Jamphel Yeshi after his self‐
immolation. His face is black, partly covered in pieces of bandage and his eyes are barely visible. 
The photo is very unpleasant to look at and gives one chills upon closer inspection. Two hands, 
held in a praying position, are drawn on each side of the two big‐sized photos. At the top of the 
photo, a Tibetan inscription translates as: “Patriotic hero, Jamphel Yeshi, victory to you”. Next to 
it there is another plastic poster with the heading, “Proof of Tibet’s independence”.   
     
   Figure 15: Poster with photos from Jamphel Yeshi’s self‐immolation. 
 Photos of Jamphel Yeshi  and Thupten Ngodup are more widely circulated in the exile 
community than those of other self‐immolators. There are several reasons for this. While 
Thupten Ngodup was the first Tibetan to self‐immolate, Jamphel Yeshi’s act brought attention to 
the Tibetan struggle in international media. By the time of Jamphel Yeshi’s self‐immolation in 
2012, 30 Tibetans had already put themselves on fire inside Tibet, without any significant 
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international attention having been paid to their sacrifice. When Jamphel Yeshi self‐immolated, 
this changed. Photos were shared online within a few hours. National Geographic elaborately 
covered he self‐immolation (National Geographic, April 28, 2013).107 The self‐immolations inside 
Tibet, on the other hand, are impossible to cover as the Tibetan population as well as the media 
are strictly controlled; mobile phones are usually confiscated after a self‐immolation, so the 
documentation is poor, and it is virtually impossible to interview witness or family and friends 
of the self‐immolators without putting them in danger. In the case of Thupten Ngodup and 
Jamphel Yeshi on the other hand, information is readily available and photos circulate freely. As 
the Tibetan writer, Topden Tsering writes, “… Jamphel Yeshi, in one single stroke, amplified the 
new radicalization of the Tibetan freedom struggle”, (Rangzen.net, April 2, 2012).108  Moreover, 
he argues that the self‐immolators as well as other protesters who had been “rendered invisible 
by China’s strong arm” were “given an intimate face” through the photos of Jamphel Yeshi.  
 Both of them self‐immolated during political protests in Delhi, which leaves no doubt 
regarding the motivation behind their acts. Moreover, they had clearly expressed their 
motivation: a free Tibet, a cause for which they chose to give up their life.  
  It is important to note that since Thupten Ngodup’s and Jamphel Yeshi’s motivation, “a 
free Tibet”, understood as independence, rangzen, is identical with that of TYC and other 
rangzen support groups, their photos and names are frequently used by them as examples, to 
support their own nationalist aspirations. This points to the relevance of the political framework 
of exile for understanding how the self‐immolations are made meaningful. 
 
The Tsuglagkhang complex   
The representation of self‐immolators displayed in and around the Tsuglagkhang has been put 
in place by the Nechung Monastery, TYC and RTYC. Thupten Ngodup and Jamphel Yeshi are also 
represented here, but in a context where self‐immolators inside Tibet also occupy a prominent 
place. In the following I will take the reader on a walk around the Tsuglagkhang complex where 
the other self‐immolators also are remembered. I wish to show that their representation – on 
the korlam, and within the complex (the Tibetan Museum) – can be seen as different ways of 
remembering and reclaiming the dead. 
 A little further down from the Dalai Lama temple there is a path, called korlam, that leads 
into the woods, encircling the temple and leading back to its entrance. Many Tibetans do their 
kora here every day, encircling109 the Dalai Lama temple. There were never very many young 
people to be spotted in the korlam; none of my friends used to walk there. Often I would ‘force’ 
the Gu‐chu‐sum students Jinpa and Tashi along with me. When Tashi, for instance, came along, 
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 http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130426-tibet-burning-protest-china-world/ 
(acc.16.04.2015). 
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 http://www.rangzen.net/2012/04/02/tibet-burning-the-politics-of-self-immolations/  (acc.10.05.2015).  
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 Circumambulation is a way of honoring a sacred person or place in Tibetan Buddhism (Huber, 1999b).   
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he would finger his prayer beads and jokingly mumble, “Om mani padme hum” in an attempt to 
imitate the prayer of elderly. The first part of the korlam is hidden among trees, which is the 
usual hangout of some cows and a large group of monkeys. Many Tibetans bring along food to 
feed the animals, which is seen as a form of offering. Small stones with carvings of the “Om mani 
padme hum” mantra are placed on the sides of the path. The space between the trees is filled 
with the five‐colored Tibetan prayer flags. 
 The first part of the korlam ends in a large open space. Below there is a nursing home for 
elderly Tibetans and a big prayer wheel on the right, followed by a wall in which are mounted 
smaller prayer wheels. This open space is now also devoted to the remembrance of the self‐
immolators. Photos of 120 self‐immolators are framed and hung on a board on which flames are 
painted (Fig. 16, p.81). The name, age, place and the date of each self‐immolation are given in 
Tibetan and English on the photos, the last one being dated April 24, 2013.This board has been 
set up by Nechung Monastery, which owns this part of the korlam. A row of benches with soft 
meditation cushions are placed against the wall, underneath the board.  
 Numerous electric candles are placed close together in front of the board, which can be 
seen as modernized fire offerings. Three pictures are placed on top of the board: in the middle is 
a smiling Dalai Lama sitting in front of a huge gold statue of Buddha Shakyamuni.110 Pictures of 
two deities are placed flanking his photo, resembling the traditional way of framing the Buddhas 
in religious paintings. On the right side of the board hangs a big poster with information in 
English about the Chinese invasion of Tibet and its effects. It also explains the Middle Way policy 
of the Dalai Lama. The last paragraph is devoted to the self‐immolators. Here “Freedom in Tibet” 
and “The return of the Dalai Lama of Tibet” are stated to be the two main requests of the self‐
immolators. They are referred to as “brave” and their act as a “sacrifice”. The message concludes: 
 “In order to leave behind a fresh memory of the sublime, sincere and heroic aspirations 
of these martyrs in the minds of surviving Tibetans, and to ensure the blessings of the three 
jewels111 and all the divine protectors for them, we have framed the portraits of all the martyrs 
with this prayer: 
“O protector Chenrezig112, may you compassionately care for 
Those people who have undergone myriad hardships,   
Fully sacrificing their most cherished bodies, lives and possessions,  
For the sake of the holy Dharma, teaching‐holders, people and the nation.”         
 This prayer was composed by the Dalai Lama in 1960 for all those who had lost their 
lives as a result of the Chinese invasion. The first time I saw the board I was moved to tears. The 
board was big and the photos so many. It was overwhelming, even though it did not include the 
                                                 
110
 The historical Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama. 
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 These are the Buddha, the Dharma (Buddhist teachings) and the Sangha (the community of monks and 
nuns), constituting “Buddhism”.  
112
 The Tibetan name of Avalokiteshvara, the Bodhisattva of compassion. 
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16 who self‐immolated after the board had been set up. One day in February as Jinpa, Tashi and I 
approached the board during our kora, Jinpa silently stood watching the photos, before he saw 
one that was hanging crookedly. Noticing this, he walked over to the photo and straightened the 
frame, saying, “Tibetan heroes. Very important.”  Although Tibetans do not come here on a 
regular basis, it is still a meaningful and significant part of the political landscape in McLeod 
Ganj, giving rise to many emotions. The annual martyrs’ day (see chapter 3) on April 29, is 
marked in front of this board.113 
           A few meters from this spot a small memorial (Fig. 17, p.81) with busts of Thupten Ngodup 
and Jamphel Yeshi stands on a black stone, between two trees – a memorial for the cause for 
which they gave up their lives, an independent Tibet, is highlighted. Pawo Thupten Ngodrup, as 
he is styled, has a broad smile while Jamphel Yeshi has a proud expression. Several khatas are 
tied around their necks. The black stone on which the busts rest is inscribed with some 
information about the two Tibetan martyrs, both in Tibetan and English. It is stated that they 
self‐immolated for Tibet’s independence, and further states, “This memorial statue is the symbol 
of the relentless sacrifices made by all Martyrs for the cause of Free Tibet”. The memorial is an 
initiative by TYC and has been sponsored by a Tibetan family residing in the USA. 
 From this memorial, the korlam continues uphill. Another big prayer wheel is placed on 
the right hand side, in an open pavilion. Two metal plates on one of the walls are said to date to 
May 25, 2012. They display the names in Tibetan and in English of self‐immolators up to May 
2012. The English list has the following heading: “Listed below are the names of the heroes and 
the heroines who are known to have passed away by offering their bodies to fire for the sake of 
the Tibetan community”. Below the names, the prayer composed by the Dalai Lama, quoted 
above, is written. Further up the hill, a new poster made by RTYC (Fig. 18, p.81) has been taped 
above a few small prayer wheels. The poster includes all the self‐immolations inside Tibet up to 
May 2014, though photos of 35 of those listed in the poster are missing. The photos are framed 
by flames, and the heading is “Sacrifice of life for Tibet”.                                                                                           
 The korlam continues steeply uphill before flattening out. The elderly make their way 
slowly, some resting on the benches along the path. Walking the last part was always a pleasure. 
On the one side is Dalai Lama’s lush garden, surrounded by a tall fence, and on the other side, a 
view of the Kangra Valley.   
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 TYC began a march from Dharamsala to Delhi on February 8, reaching Delhi on March 10 – the day of the 
1959 uprising in Lhasa. The march began from this particular spot in the kora, after the conduction of prayers 
(Fig. 20, p.89).  
81 
 
  
Figure 16: The board.                              Figure 18: Poster by RTYC                         
   
                    Figure 17: Busts of Thupten Ngodup and Jamphel Yeshi.   
 The entrance to the Tsuglagkhang complex is, on most days, a hectic place, especially 
during the tourist season. A big poster with photos of the self‐immolators, made by TYC, used to 
hang inside the entrance gate. This poster had the same heading: “Sacrifice of life for Tibet”. 
Later it was moved further inside the complex and hung next to the Tibetan National Martyrs’ 
Memorial.  
 One thing which all the representations of the self‐immolators described so far have in 
common, is that they are portrayed expressing heroism and dignity rather than as pitiful victims 
of a cruel system. Although the photos and statues have been set up by different actors (Nechung 
Monastery and TYC), the act of self‐immolation is always referred to as a sacrifice and the self‐
immolators as ‘martyrs’. As I showed in the previous chapter, the motivation for this sacrifice is 
regarded as selfless and collective in its nature. Further, the self‐immolators are also believed to 
have chosen this specific form of protest because of their faith in the Buddhist principle of non‐
violence, which for Tibetans in exile confirms their selfless motivation. I argue that their 
representation in public, as well as their commemoration in the candle light vigils, conveys these 
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specific values. The self‐immolators are reclaimed because they represent values that are at the 
core of the political project in exile, values such as commitment to non‐violence, unselfishness, 
patience, compassion, courage and love for Tibet. Displaying photos and putting up statues is a 
way of honoring people in any society, and presenting them as examples to be followed by 
others.  In the same way, the representation of the self‐immolators within the korlam, a sacred 
place for Tibetans, confers dignity and heroism on them. 
 The representation of Thupten Ngodup and Jamphel Yeshi through statues, however, 
differs from the other forms of representation. Because all exile Tibetans are familiar with the 
names of these two individuals, they also give a face to all the self‐immolators. Since they clearly 
expressed their motivation as being an independent Tibet, they are also chosen by TYC to 
represent all other self‐immolators, thus giving support to TYC’s struggle for Tibetan 
independence. In addition to this memorial, a larger statue was erected towards the end of my 
fieldwork. This statue of a monk on fire (Fig.19), erected in the Tsuglagkhang complex in May 
2014, is yet an example of the values with which the public representation of the self‐
immolators are impregnated. It is placed next to the Tibetan National Martyrs’ Memorial – a few 
meters from the main entrance of the Dalai Lama's Temple.   
 This statue was donated by a Chinese artist and unveiled on the Tibetan Uprising Day, 
March 10, 2014 (Voice of America, February 20, 2014).114 The inscription on the stone on which 
the statue rests was not yet in place, and at that time a paper was taped on it, with the 
inscription, “Burning Tibet (1998‐2013). Please remember them. In Tibet 122”. This statue was 
presented by overseas Chinese Tibet supporters on 10 March 2013”.  
 The monk’s glance is turned upwards, his mouth slightly open. After having seen the 
statue, Sonam, a professional activist, posted the following statement on his Facebook page, 
“Came across this powerful sculpture this morning at the temple and it reminded me of their 
compassion and courage!”  
 The monk’s face has a thoughtful expression. The flames that engulf him, on the other 
hand, seem to be in motion. Photos of self‐immolators are painful to watch and now one is faced 
with a self‐immolator, frozen in time; for those who visit the temple daily, it is a strong reminder 
of the self‐immolator’s pain, courage and strength. Nothing gives a stronger indication of the 
self‐immolators’ status as national martyrs than this statue, placed next to the memorial for all 
national martyrs. It also highlights a value which is at the core of the Tibetan movement today, 
shared by all political actors: non‐violence. In April 2015 another board, including photos of all 
the self‐immolators inside Tibet so far, has been set up by RTYC to the left of the memorial.  
                                                 
114
 http://www.voatibetanenglish.com/content/chinese-artist-presentst-tibet-burning-sculpture/1855076.html 
(acc.13.07.2015).  
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          Figure 19: Statue of the monk on fire. 
 In the following I will present how CTA officially represents and remembers the self‐
immolators in public places, which I argue is different from the representations discussed so far. 
Although in their interviews with me CTA members referred to the self‐immolations as a 
sacrifice, their official representation of these acts is more neutral and cautious compared to that 
of the NGOs.  
 
The Tibet Museum115  
Tibetan Museum also has an exhibition featuring the self‐immolations, consisting of large‐sized 
posters providing basic information. On several occasions I noticed that the museum was mostly 
visited by Indian tourists, though some foreigners also dropped by.  
 The exhibition is part of the “Solidarity with Tibet” campaign initiated by CTA in 2013. 
Currently this is the only public representation of the self‐immolations initiated by CTA in 
McLeod Ganj. It provides factual information, such as what the self‐immolations are, the reasons 
behind them and who the self‐immolators are. The action is not referred to as a sacrifice, but as 
“an ultimate act of civil disobedience”, nor are the self‐immolators referred to as ‘heroes’. Their 
photos are printed on a simple white poster. The causes of these actions are given as the 
repressive Chinese policies inside Tibet, and the two main demands of the self‐immolators are 
stated to be “The Return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tibet” and “Freedom for Tibetans”. 
Two exhibition posters give the last statements of eight self‐immolators. All address the lack of 
cultural and religious freedom in Tibet, which CTA is working to achieve. None of the 
                                                 
115
 The Tibet Museum is a part of the Department of Information and International Relations, CTA, and was 
established in 1998, “as a platform to promote the idea of Tibetan cultural distinctiveness, acknowledge their 
otherwise overlooked history, and launch an assault against the power of China in matters of museum 
representation” (Harris, 2012, p. 166).  
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statements, however, say anything about Tibetan independence. In contrast to the 
representation of the self‐immolations described above, here these acts come across as 
desperate and as the result of the political situation inside Tibet, where, it is implied, there are 
no other possibilities of protest.  
 This exhibition is a different form of remembrance, since it is presented within the 
official context of the museum. Compared to the other representations, it is pedagogical rather 
than inspiring. The primary intention is to inform Indians and foreigners about the political 
situation inside Tibet. One of the posters referred to above lists six appeals, all of them urging 
the international community to take action. Although the CTA’s representation focuses on the 
actions as such and their underlying causes instead of emphasizing the self‐immolators’ heroic 
status, it still acknowledges them as a national (and non‐violent) symbol of Tibetan resistance by 
placing them alongside other examples of peaceful resistance. This more neutral and cautious 
approach is confined to the museum.  
 
Reclaiming and healing  
As I have argued in the previous chapter, one of the main reasons why the self‐immolators have 
become an important political symbol is the ritualization of the act of itself, to which the 
representation of the self‐immolators in public places in Dharamsala also contributes. In 
addition, I also argue that the public representation contributes to the creation of a consensus 
regarding these acts as a form of sacrifice and the self‐immolators as heroes. Even though the 
CTA’s exhibition does not mention the word ‘sacrifice’ or refer to the self‐immolators as ‘heroes’, 
the self‐immolations are not referred to as a ‘suicide’. They are called acts of “civil disobedience”, 
acts which everywhere are thought to demand courage and determination.  In addition, as the 
exhibition is presented in the museum, the self‐immolators are given a place in Tibet’s national 
history.   
 The presence of statues and photos of dead people in public spheres is never neutral. It is 
driven by faith in certain values and goals, which also involves choosing between the dead and 
how to portray them.  
 As discussed in the introduction, Verdery (1999) argues that political reburials, and 
statues can be seen as a way of reclaiming the dead and changing the socio‐political order. These 
practices “mark a change in social visibilities and values” (1999, p. 19). Erecting statues is a way 
to stabilize the landscape by freezing particular values in it. In the exile Tibetan case, I suggest 
that this is also achieved through photos. Furthermore, the values in question are expressed 
through the Tibetan political project in exile. For the professional activist, Sonam, seeing the 
statue of the monk on fire reminded him of the self‐immolators’ “compassion and courage”. Since 
the self‐immolators today stand as the strongest symbol for Tibetan resistance, their 
representation is also a way of placing memories of the Chinese occupation in the landscape.  
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 TYC’s choice of erecting a statue of Thupten Ngodup and Jamphel Yeshi serves as a 
reminder of the cause they gave up their life for: an independent Tibet, an important value in 
TYC’s discourse on nationalism. For rangzen supporters the self‐immolators call for “freedom in 
Tibet” or “freedom for Tibetans” is interpreted as calls for independence. Lhasang (mid‐50s) put 
it the following way,  
Most of those who have committed self-immolations, as you say, there are two main slogans: the 
return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and a free Tibet. What do these two things mean? If one looks 
deeply into this, they don’t want His Holiness to return under the present situation. You see this is a 
deeply political thing. According to my interpretation, people they are saying, ‘We have our own 
leader, under the position of the Dalai Lama. You Chinese are not our leaders. His Holiness must 
return. Our leader must come back and you fake leaders (laughs), must move out of Tibet’. Free 
Tibet, free from what? Free from Chinese and their wrong policies. The actual demand of the 
slogans is: Independence, an own country.  
 The CTA’s selection of certain statements of the self‐immolators, only addressing the lack 
of human rights inside Tibet, is more in line with CTA’s political stand, and in contrast to rangzen 
supporters they do not interpret the self‐immolations as calls for an independent country. A CTA 
member, Jamyang (late 50s), interprets the aims of the self‐immolators thus, 
So, we are saying, we have our own culture, we have our own, you know this, world view, and we 
don’t want to change that. But politically we are happy to live under the, you know, auspices of the 
Chinese constitution. So if there is respect on the part of China and willingness to give freedom to 
develop our own culture, and live as we appeal, then I don’t think Tibetans would, you know, pose 
this problem for China. So this is the way I think we should look at why young Tibetans are self-
immolating. 
 These different representations of the self‐immolators can be seen as different ways of 
reclaiming or taking ownership of the dead and incorporating them into society. Various 
political agents – CTA and the NGOs – present the self‐immolations as a sacrifice and a national 
symbol of resistance, representing values such as compassion and non‐violence; however, the 
meaning of their sacrifice for the political struggle is interpreted differently, leading to the 
production of two different narratives on the self‐immolators. While TYC presents the self‐
immolators demand as rangzen, CTA interprets it to be human rights inside Tibet, such as 
cultural or religious freedom. I will return to this in the final chapter.  
 Statues and photos of self‐immolators in public places are both an important way of 
honoring the self‐immolators sacrifice, which contributes in carrying these deaths into the 
future as a “good” and culturally meaningful death. This contributes to maintaining the self‐
immolations as a “good death” because setting up statues and photos, is a way of bringing the 
self‐immolators “into the realm of the timeless or the sacred, like an icon” (Verdery, 1999, p. 5). 
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Thus their commemoration in public places can also be regarded as a process of healing for the 
Tibetan community. When Jinpa sees the photos of self‐immolators in the kora, he thinks they 
are heroes, and it evokes pride, while for Sonam, seeing the monk statue reminds him of their 
compassion and courage. Their heroic representation, especially their location next to the 
martyr’s memorial, and in a sacred place (the Tsuglagkhang), evokes pride and admiration, as 
well as providing the solace that they died for a cause.  
  
Politics of commemoration  
“Where does this illusory appearance of the past originate? Is it indeed an illusion?” 
      Maurice Halbwachs (1992, p. 49) 
Following Verdery (1999), Kwon (2006), and McGranahan (2010), I regard commemoration as a 
practice for forming social memory, and social memory as the dynamic impulse for creating as 
well as forgetting histories (McGranahan, 2010, p. 19).116 The memory of the self‐immolations as 
a non‐violent action illustrates the political discourse of non‐violence. In other words, 
commemoration as a practice is about forming the past, and the future, through a selection of 
dead who are seen to represent values and goals which suit the present social and political 
reality.  
 McGranahan argues that, “The work of history and memory takes place in a social 
domain that is always already hegemonic and laden with issues of power, representation, and 
reproduction” (2010, p. 19). This is a valuable insight for understanding the commemoration of 
the self‐immolators and their representation as a political symbol for Tibetan resistance. I argue 
that one of the main reasons why the self‐immolators have come to stand as an uncontested 
political symbol of resistance is the consensus regarding these acts as a form of non‐violence, 
which is the most important value of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan exile establishment. The 
self‐immolators do not (at least no longer) challenge the narrative of the Tibetan struggle as a 
non‐violent one. Despite disagreement regarding their motives, there is, however, no 
disagreement as to the peaceful and non‐violent nature of the self‐immolations. I suggest that 
non‐violence can be seen as the dominating value, or even conditioning value, in the Tibetan 
exile community.  
 Based on Louis Dumont’s (2013 [1980]) theory of hierarchies of values, non‐violence can 
be understood as the dominant value which encompasses other values. Although NGOs such as 
TYC or SFT have a rangzen stand, which is in conflict with CTA’s and the Dalai Lama’s Middle 
Way policy, they still make sure to highlight the non‐violent nature of the self‐immolations, thus 
supporting the Dalai Lama’s policy of non‐violence as well as his position as the leader of the 
Tibetan people. Since “high” ideas both contradict and include “low” ideas (Dumont, 2013, p. 
                                                 
116
 Here I differentiate between memory and history, based on McGranahan who argues that, “ If history is 
narrative, memory is what drives historical narratives; that is, memory consists of the stuff and the energy with 
which histories are forged or forgotten” (2010, p. 19).  
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301), TYC or SFT emphasizing non‐violence (the high idea) and stressing its importance can be 
understood to create an acceptance of their political stand of independence, as well as granting 
them the right to represent the self‐immolators, which is crucial if they also want to claim the 
dead. This can be regarded as an important motivation for the NGOs’ acceptance of non‐violence 
as the dominant value. 
  The Tibetan narrative of non‐violence, which has so far succeeded in granting 
widespread sympathy and support for the Tibetan cause, can be understood as another 
motivation for the NGOs. The Tibetan struggle in exile has always distinguished itself as a non‐
violent one. It was the Dalai Lama’s Nobel Peace Prize for his non‐violent approach which 
brought the world’s attention and support to the Tibetan cause. As a result, the majority of the 
professional activists also have gained faith in non‐violence as a strategy and firmly established 
it as their core political strategy. The value of non‐violence is highlighted in communication with 
foreigners because it lends support to the Tibetan freedom struggle, and in addition, to a certain 
extent also contributes to keeping alive the imagination of Tibet as a Shangri‐la, an imagination 
that has had a strong appeal to outsiders, in particular in the Western world.117   
          Commemoration is a means of forming the social memory of a community and motivating 
people to pursue the values and goals of the one who is commemorated. In the exile Tibetan 
case, commemoration is a means of maintaining the self‐immolators’ death as “good” by 
reclaiming them as national heroes of the Tibetan people. But how do the two commemoration 
practices described in this chapter contribute to preserving the self‐immolators’ death as a 
“good death”? Or more specifically: how do these commemorative practices contribute to 
ensuring the beginning the self‐immolators have attempted to substantiate? 
 
Pursuing the beginning  
I argue that these commemorative practices are an attempt to pursue the beginning or “the 
spark” the self‐immolations have ignited, as they contribute to transforming death into fertility 
(Bloch and Parry, 1982b) by reasserting faith in certain values (and goals) and keeping alive the 
Tibetan freedom struggle. The living have to undertake this as a moral obligation since they 
                                                 
117
 Although the fantasy of Tibet as a Shangri-la has succeeded in attracting the Western world, it can be 
argued that it has actually brought more disadvantages than positive outcomes for the Tibetan cause. Shakya 
(1991) argues that this myth is the reason why the Tibetan political struggle has never been taken seriously, 
being treated “as a question of sentimentality versus political expediency” (1991, p. 23). See also Dodin and 
Rather (2001, pp. 409-413). Maher (2010) argues that Buddhism has always been viewed as an entirely pacifist 
religion and Tibet as a place which turned into a Shangri-la with the introduction of Buddhism. In his article, he 
attempts to show a different and a violent side of Tibet, by focusing on how religious violence was justified and 
legitimized during the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama. As I argued in chapter 3, today the self-immolations are 
justified in a similar manner. Sperling (2001), in the same way as McGranahan, challenges the official exile 
narrative of non-violence, by bringing to fore the fifth Dalai Lama’s support of military force to defend Gelugpa 
interests, and points to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, “who actively sanctioned armed attacks on the Qing forces 
in Lhasa” (2001, pp. 324-325).   
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remain indebted to the self‐immolators. At the same time, this process also contributes for exiles 
to invalidate the Chinese narrative concerning the self‐immolators. 
 Without these commemorative practices, the self‐immolators’ sacrifice cannot be 
honored. They are necessary to secure the beginning the self‐immolators have substantiated and 
this beginning is about (as interpreted by political agents as well as the general public) keeping 
the political freedom struggle alive. In exile, an attempt is made to pursue this beginning by 
telling the international community about the situation in Tibet through the self‐immolators’ 
presence in public places and also through the political action of the candle light vigils, which the 
tourists can witness and participate in. Moreover, and most importantly, an attempt is made to 
achieve this beginning by awakening the social memory and national identity of Tibetans. A 
young Tibetan woman, Metok, born in India, said the following about the effect of the self‐
immolations on Tibetans in exile, 
The self-immolations have had the positive effect of awakening people’s ‘Tibetan-ness’, their love 
for Tibet. People feel we have to do something. Earlier it was old people who came out to protest – 
like on 10th of March. Now the scene has changed; now youngsters are coming out. 
 However, as I have showed in this chapter, TYC and CTA represent the self‐immolators 
differently, highlighting different goals. Therefore, I suggest that although commemoration 
practices for the self‐immolations contribute to consolidate one common beginning, namely 
keeping alive the freedom struggle, nevertheless, the beginning differs for rangzen and Middle 
Way supporters due to their contrasting goals. Thus, the struggle over control of dead bodies, 
and the power to shape their narratives, is not only played out between the Chinese state and 
the exile community, but also between two main political groupings in exile. Still, in the end it is 
the narrative of sacrifice and non‐violence which dominates in the exile community and 
triumphs over the diverging interpretations. In the final chapter I will explore why this so by 
insisting on understanding this in relation to the emphasis on unity, which is a common 
characteristic for nationalist movements. 
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Figure 20:  Pursuing “the beginning”: the TYC March from Dharamsala to Delhi, beginning in 
Dharamsala on  February 8 in the korlam, ending in Delhi on March 10 (1959 Uprising Day).  
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5  The “good death”: unity and continuity  
In this concluding chapter I shall focus on how the understanding of the self‐immolations is 
guided by the need for unity among Tibetans, a need which is emphasized again and again in the 
exile community.118 With regards to the self‐immolations, I argue that the emphasis is motivated 
by the wish to secure the social continuity a “good death” ensures. The creation of unity and 
homogenous identities is a central aspect of all nationalist movements (Wade 2001; Samper 
1997), especially movements which grow in exile (Malkki, 1995). In the Tibetan case also, 
nationalism “flattens identities” (Houston and Wright, 2003, p.222) in the name of unity. Thus, 
regional and religious affiliations which prior to the Chinese invasion were important are 
submerged in the nationalist project (Houston and Wright, 2003, p. 222; McGranahan, 2005, p. 
4).119 Likewise, political disagreement between Middle Way and rangzen supporters is also 
underplayed in the name of unity, although relations are, in fact, far from harmonious. I hold that 
it is in the context of the tension between these political differences and the simultaneous 
emphasis on unity that we have to understand the way self‐immolations are handled and made 
meaningful.  
 
Conflicts over strategies and the future of Tibet 
The exile political landscape split with the official adoption of the Middle Way Approach in 1988. 
Conflicts between Middle Way and rangzen supporters have been present ever since, and are 
regarded as a threat to unity, raising concerns regarding the future of the Tibetan freedom 
struggle. They become visible not only in the interpretations of the self‐immolators’ motives 
(chapter 4), but also in many other arenas and events. Although it can be hard for an outsider to 
discover these conflicts, as they are hardly ever played out in public, they are, however, 
continuously clearly expressed online, in blogs, articles, or comment boxes. Due to the emphasis 
on unity and the fact that most of the professional activists were reluctant to talk about the 
conflicts to an outsider, I sometimes questioned whether there were any conflicts at all. During 
my first days in McLeod Ganj, the author and filmmaker, Tenzing Sonam, told me that with 
regard to politically delicate issues, my biggest challenge would be to get behind people’s words, 
which proved to be true. In interviews most of the activists and CTA members emphasized that 
there were no major disagreements, referring to them as “discussions” or “debates”. The 
                                                 
118
 See for instance the inaugural speech of Prime Minister Lobsang Sangay, August 8, 2011: 
http://tibet.net/2011/08/inaugural-speech-of-kalon-tripa-dr-lobsang-sangay/# (acc.29.07.2015), referring to 
“unity, innovation and self-reliance” as the guiding principles of the exile community.  
119
 The reservation of seats for Tibetans from the three main regions and the five main religious traditions 
(chapter 2) is also an attempt at securing unity by giving all these groups representation in the exile parliament. 
The lack of political parties is another important means to hinder fraction and secure unification: “The 
fundamental idea of the parliament-in-exile is that there is no need for political parties since Tibetans share a 
common interest and are bound together in unity (Brox, 2012, p. 462).  
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following statement by a female CTA member, Dolma (35) regarding CTA’s disagreement over 
the celebration of a Tibetan independence day by the NGOs, would be a typical way of glossing 
over disagreements,  
See we are in exile, but it is a democracy. You do need differing ideas, it would be really really 
intelligent if everyone applauded everyone and there were no conflicting ideas. I think the essence 
of democracy, the whole beauty, the whole intellectual strength lies in the fact that people are able 
to debate, and not follow one way blindly. And yeah I do agree there have been discourses, 
conflicting, differing ideas on this, but they were all well-meant…That was not the conflict at all, it 
was not the issue at all. In a democracy that is welcome and I think we need that. Because that way 
people can judge, people can think, and that way we are able to engage a larger section of society. 
 Despite the fact that potential conflicts are swept under the carpet in order to promote 
unity, they nevertheless surface once in a while. The clearest example would be the events 
around March 10 (the annual commemoration of the Lhasa uprising in 1959) in 2015, when the 
conflict between these two political strategies and their supporters became evident publicly for 
the first time, especially in New York. Here the conflict resulted in violent clashes between 
Middle Way and rangzen supporters, as the latter used independence slogans such as “Free 
Tibet” or “independence for Tibet” which the CTA had advised against.120 In Dharamsala, Middle 
Way oriented NGOs, such as TWA and Gu‐chu‐sum, pulled out of the annual traditional march for 
the same reason, and for the first time SFT, TYC and NDPT (National Democratic Party of 
Tibet)121 carried out the march alone.122  
 The events around March 10 are an example of the tense relations between the two 
political aspirations, as well as the social control rangzen support groups are subjected to by 
CTA.  The NGOs, therefore have to carefully maneuver between working towards unity and at 
the same time diverging from CTA’s guidelines. It is within this framework the NGOs operate; 
how the self‐immolations are made meaningful and handled must, I argue, be understood in this 
context. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, they are talked about and represented in public places 
                                                 
120
http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?c=4&t=1&id=35872&article=Commemoration+or+Rewriting+Ma
rch+10th%3F#.VQn0Py24aYc.facebook (acc.09.05.2015). Following the March 10 incident, the RTYC president 
in New York was suspended by the executive office in Dharamsala, because he had “failed” to “uphold the very 
objective of the TYC – unity among Tibetans” , and also because he had breached important political guidelines 
of the organization by repeatedly having declared himself a Middle Way advocate.  
http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=35927&article=Largest+pro+independence+group+suspends+pr
esident+of+NY+NJ+chapter (acc.29.07.2015).  
121
 NDPT is a political party established by TYC in an attempt to introduce a party system in the exile community 
in order to make it more democratic, attempt which has met with little success. However, NDPT still exists and 
has its own office below the SFT office. 
122
 “Repairing Unity After 10 March 2015”: 
http://www.tibetanpoliticalreview.org/editorials/repairingunityafter10march2015#.VQE1MyYdrUA.facebook 
(acc.01.07.2015).  
“March Madness” by Jamyang Norbu: 
http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=35845&article=MARCH+MADNESS&t=1&c=4 (acc.01.07.2015).  
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in similar as well as divergent ways.  Thus, the self‐immolations are at once both a unifying as 
well as a disuniting symbol. The reason why they can be added multiple meanings is, I argue, 
related to the ambiguous nature of dead bodies which makes them a particular potent symbol in 
nationalist politics (Verdery 1999).  
 
Maneuvering between unity and divergence  
Verdery suggests that because dead bodies are silent and ambiguous, they allow many different 
readings (1999, p. 28; Cohen and Othiambo, 1997), and thus it becomes fairly easy to “discern 
different sets of emphasis, extract different stories, and thus rewrite history” (1999, p. 29). I hold 
that her suggestion is also valid in the Tibetan case, where the self‐immolators’ aims are 
interpreted according to different political standpoints (chapter 4). The self‐immolators who 
have survived inside Tibet are also silenced as their voices cannot be heard in exile, most of 
them having been imprisoned and not heard from after their release.  The fact that the self‐
immolators also are used politically was pointed out to me by a few of my interlocutors. Chodar 
(33), an independent political activist who had served as president of a local RTYC chapter and 
remained an eager rangzen supporter, said the following,  
Most people generally say, they are doing it (self‐immolating) for the preservation of culture, 
language or they can’t stay inside China. Some are, according to their political interest saying, ‘they 
are struggling for rangzen’. Some are saying for umey lam (the Middle Way Approach). For me 
these are all like bullshit things. Whatever they did they have their own reasons. We can’t say 
anything. Some have left behind notes and these we don’t have to elaborate. Whatever he says 
there, he did… In exile community I have found a lot of issues. Some are using them for their own 
political interest. They are misusing it. For me, it is bullshit things. They can’t use the martyrs for 
their own interests. Nobody can say why they are doing this. They have their own reason.  
 Another independent activist and monk, Namdak (late 20s), who currently supports the 
Middle Way Approach in spite of having independence as his highest wish, pointed to the same, 
but directed his comments first and foremost at rangzen supporters,  
Rangzen supporters of course have the right to use the names of the self-immolators, but 
sometimes they use the self-immolators’ names to an extreme point. They are saying that majority 
of the self-immolators want independence. I myself have done research on the last requests of 
around 100 self-immolators. There are only around 10 or 11 who have said that they want 
rangzen. Majority of them said His Holiness should come back to Tibet. The slogans for rangzen are 
only around 10 or 11. Many have said they want freedom inside Tibet, which could mean many 
things. So the majority has not shouted independence slogans, but rangzen people in exile are 
saying so. And for that reason, according to them, we should strive for rangzen. That is a wrong 
thing to do, I think… Overall I don’t like rangzen or umey Lam advocates using the self-immolators 
for their own interests.   
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 These quotes make it clear that the self‐immolations are open to different 
interpretations, and that the understanding of the self‐immolators’ aims diverges. Although 
political agents can express their contrasting interpretations, these cannot be extended beyond 
the accepted freedom of speech if they are perceived as posing a threat to unity and the larger 
national struggle. The NGOs in particular, who are subjected to CTA’s guidelines, have to 
carefully maneuver through a complex political landscape, attempting to nurture new visions, 
but at the same time avoiding unnecessary conflicts. In the end, it is the spirit of unity that 
triumphs through the uncontested narrative of sacrifice and non‐violence.  Another example of 
how a focus on unity triumphed over divergence is the commemoration of Tibetan 
Independence Day – February 13 – by rangzen support groups. 
 
February 13 – Tibetan Independence Day  
February 13 is marked by SFT and TYC as “Tibetan Independence Day”, since the 13th Dalai 
Lama, whose predecessors had been ruling Tibet since 1642, declared Tibet’s independence on 
February 13, 1913.123 This followed the collapse, in 1911, of the Qing Empire, which had 
incorporated Tibet under its rule in the eighteenth century (Barnett, 2014, pp. xxvi‐xxvii). The 
February 13 campaign was launched in 2013 by SFT to: “challenge China’s propaganda about 
Tibetan history as well as to strengthen the case for Tibetan self‐determination on the global 
stage” (Phayul, February 21, 2013).124 A professional SFT activist, Dawa, told me that in the light 
of the massive wave of self‐immolations, it became crucial to launch this campaign and celebrate 
Tibet’s past as an independent nation.   
 When the campaign was launched in 2013, it included big celebrations. I had been shown 
some photos at the SFT office, depicting, a number of Tibetan men, wearing Tibetan traditional 
dress and representing the three main Tibetan regions, riding through the two main roads of 
McLeod Ganj, in the evening there was a big concert. Naturally, after having seen these photos I 
was left with the impression that February 13 is a big day for the Tibetan community (though I 
had not been aware of this prior to my fieldwork). But I soon realized that I might have 
overestimated its importance and that not everyone shared the NGOs’ narrative of Tibetan 
history.  
 During my fieldwork, the day was not marked with the grand celebrations like the 
previous year, but it was celebrated more subtly and carefully. Importantly, this year (2014) the 
focus had shifted from the 13th Dalai Lama’s declaration of independence, to a stone‐pillar125 
                                                 
123
 http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=33027 (acc.03.07.2015). Statement on February 13, 2013 by 
Jigme Ugyen, at Tibet House, New York, President Tibetan National Congress: 
http://www.tibetnc.org/2013/02/12/tnc-naugural-statement/ (acc.03.07.2015)  
The second self-immolation in Boudhanath, Kathmandu was carried out on this day:  
http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=33030 (acc.03.07.2015).  
124
 http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=33075 (acc.03.07.2015).  
125
 In 2015, it also was the Tibetan flag:  
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which holds a historic significance for Tibetans, and to addition the three Dharma (Buddhist) 
kings.126 On this stone pillar, still standing outside Jokhang in Lhasa today, is inscribed a treaty 
between China and Tibet dated to 821/822 AD, stating,  
“Tibetans shall be happy in the land of Tibet, Chinese shall be happy in the land of China. The 
solemn agreement now made shall never be changed. The three Precious ones, all the Aryas, the 
sun, the moon and the planets and stars are invoked as witnesses”. (See also Richardson, 1985, 
pp. 125‐127).  
 This agreement between China and Tibet is from a time when Tibet constituted a great 
empire, expanding far beyond the area today known as TAR or “Pö Chö(l)kha Sum”. The Dharma 
kings ruled this empire. The independence celebrations in 2014 focused on celebrating “the 
legacy of the Tibetan empire” (from the poster on February 13, 2014), the pillar being regarded 
by the activists as proof of the historical reality of the empire. One can also find a copy of this 
pillar inside Tibet Museum in McLeod Ganj, with the above excerpt of the agreement inscribed 
on a golden‐colored metal plate, written in Tibetan, English and Hindi.   
  Figure 21: The pillar in the Tibetan 
Museum. The exhibition on the self‐immolations (chapter 4) can be seen in the back.                                                          
 I soon discovered that the focus on the pillar was due to a specific reason.  In 2013, CTA 
had not at all been pleased with the celebrations, mainly due to the emphasis on the 13th Dalai 
Lama’s proclamation of independence, giving rise to disagreement between CTA and the NGOs. 
The disagreements from CTA’s side concerned the status of Tibet in 1913, a CTA member 
questioning, “whether it meant the independence of the entire three provinces”, or merely the 
region which is equivalent to TAR today. Due to this disagreement, the activists had focused on 
the pillar, celebrating “the legacy of the Tibetan empire”, a safer and unifying symbol because 
                                                                                                                                                        
https://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/campaigns/political-action/february-13-2015-free-the-snowlion-flag-
of-tibet201d (acc.07.07.2015) 
126
 Bringing focus to Tibet as a Buddhist country, which, as Dreyfus and Shakya has noted, is what unified 
Tibetans before the rise of a nationalist ideology (see introduction).  
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CTA does not deny the legacy of the empire, a copy of the pillar having also been erected by CTA 
in the Tibet Museum.127  
 Disagreements around February 13 can, I suggest, be seen as another example of conflict 
between rangzen and the Middle Way Approach, and illustrates how the NGOs chose the 
emphasis on the pillar – a unifying symbol. The NGOs also succeeded in introducing a new 
campaign by carefully maneuvering through the political landscape and avoiding further 
potential conflicts. In a similar way, I argue, the self‐immolations have also been transformed 
into a consolidating symbol by emphasizing the unifying narrative of sacrifice and non‐violence, 
and sweeping divergent interpretations under the carpet.  
 
Consolidating the beginning through continuity   
The sacrifice of self‐immolation is “a spark” or a “beginning”, regarded as carrying a potential for 
changing the present political situation inside Tibet. However, I suggest that a beginning does 
not necessarily always imply something radically new, but can also be a re‐activation or 
regeneration of something already existing. Thus the sacrificial beginning can, as in this case, be 
seen as a continuity, which also characterizes a “good death” (cf. Willerslev 2009), securing a 
continuity of the Tibetan freedom struggle in exile with non‐violence as its core value.  
 As the spark that the self‐immolators are understood to have ignited is interpreted 
differently by various political actors, the sacrifice carries a potential for two beginnings, one 
realizable through the Middle Way Approach and the other through rangzen. But in the end it 
seems that unity and consensus triumphs, securing social continuity or regeneration of 
important values and by reproducing and reinforcing national sentiments, thus contributing to 
keeping alive the imagination of Tibet as phayul. This is particularly crucial in the context of 
diaspora where Tibetans are moving in different directions, some even applying for Indian 
citizenship (chapter 2). Reminding Tibetans of their national identity based on specific values 
also forges a connection between Tibetans in exile and in Tibet. The self‐immolations have 
brought an upsurge of national feeling and identification, and through their sacrifice impose a 
moral obligation on exile Tibetans to keep this connection alive and pursue the goal they hope to 
achieve: freedom for Tibetans.  
 The final responsibility of realizing the beginning continues to rest on the living, on those 
left behind. Just as Hertz (1960) brought attention to the moral and social commitments of the 
living towards the deceased’s body, Tibetans carry an obligation to those who have sacrificed 
their lives to realize the potential beginning which is necessary if the self‐immolations are not to 
be transformed into a “bad death”. In this case, the movement is not only directed towards 
                                                 
127
 I have collected more material on February 13 from observations of the day in 2014 and interviews with CTA 
members and professional activists from SFT and TYC, but unfortunately due to space limitations I am unable 
to present them.   
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securing one cultural unit (continuity with the past), but also as a cultural and national unit in 
the future.  
 With their continuing presence in exile through various commemoration practices, the 
dead (i.e. the self‐immolators) are made to inform the living of their national identity. They serve 
as a reminder of their past and of where their future lies, as well as shaping the narratives of 
new generations of Tibetans. The self‐immolators are regarded as Tibetan national heroes, who 
lay down specific moral values and goals to be pursued in the future; everyone, however, due to 
the ambiguous nature of dead bodies, has the freedom to interpret them and pursue them in 
their own way. The self‐immolations are, however, made meaningful by all political groups in 
the Tibetan exile milieu as a sacrifice, not as a suicide or another desperate act, which can be 
understood as constituting a “good” form of death, because it contributes in ensuring a social 
continuity and relating the living and dead. As a “good death”, the self‐immolations will continue 
to carry the potential to “reinforce cooperate solidarity” among Tibetans as one ethnic group, 
and in “revitalizing historical continuity” (Kwon 2006, p. 14), by continuing to reproduce 
national sentiments, and contribute to keeping alive the imagination of Tibet as phayul, 
“fatherland”. 
 
Summary  
This thesis has looked at how the act of setting oneself on fire is understood and made 
meaningful among Tibetans in Dharamsala, India, by analyzing it within the framework of 
“good” and “bad death”, and further contextualizing these ideas in relation to the nationalist 
framework of exile, conditioned by faith in certain values and goals.  
 The self‐immolations are understood by exile Tibetans to be a form of sacrifice, and the 
self‐immolators have the uncontested status of national heroes, an understanding which has 
developed dialectically to the Chinese response to these actions. Further, Buddhist myths, 
patriotism, and most importantly Buddhist values of compassion and non‐violence – the latter 
being the dominant value in the political project in exile – are activated to transform the self‐
immolations into a culturally meaningful or a “good death”. Making use of Lambek’s 
understanding of sacrifice as ‘a kind of beginning’, I have argued that the self‐immolations can 
thus also be understood as an attempt at substantiating a new kind of beginning for the Tibetan 
people, carrying a potential for changing the present political situation in Tibet. The sacrifice of 
the self‐immolators also creates a moral relation between them and the living, the latter forever 
standing in debt to the self‐immolators. Since a sacrifice is a gift that cannot be returned, the 
living have a moral obligation to honor the sacrifice, and consolidate the beginning the self‐
immolators have begun. This is also vital if the self‐immolations are to remain as a “good death”.  
 Further, I have explored how these actions gain political power and become a national 
symbol of resistance in the political projects of CTA and NGOs by looking at commemoration 
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practices for the self‐immolators. I have suggested that the living fulfill their moral obligation 
through commemoration, also carrying the self‐immolations into the future as a “good death”. I 
have argued that through these commemorative practices, the self‐immolators’ legacy is 
honored by highlighting and reproducing Tibetans’ faith in the values and goals for which they 
are believed to have given up their lives, and by awakening exile Tibetans’ social memory and 
infusing their “Tibetan‐ness” with national sentiments. At the same time, these commemorative 
practices are also motivated by the Chinese authorities’ callous handling of dead bodies, and 
their representation of the self‐immolators as ‘criminals’, ‘mentally disturbed’ or ‘terrorists’. The 
commemoration practices challenge the Chinese state narrative by reclaiming the self‐
immolators into exile society as national heroes. These practices, I suggest, can be seen as a way 
of consolidating the beginning, because they contribute in reproducing certain values, 
reinforcing nationalist sentiments in exile, and thus keeping alive the Tibetan freedom struggle, 
which is particularly important in order to keep the community intact in a diasporic setting.   
 However, based on my empirical findings I have also argued that the self‐immolators are 
written in exile society in different ways by CTA and rangzen support groups, highlighting 
different aims or goals. Still, due to the emphasis on unity in exile, in the end the unifying 
narrative of sacrifice and non‐violence triumphs over divergent interpretations. By way of 
conclusion, I have argued that it is necessary to relate the uncontested understanding of the self‐
immolations as a non‐violent sacrifice to the need for unity, which is a central characteristic of 
all nationalist movements. As a result, I suggest that the sacrificial beginning consolidated in 
exile can be seen as a continuity, something a “good death” also secures. Exemplifying a “good 
death”, the self‐immolations secure the continuity of the nationalist project in exile with non‐
violence as its core value.  
 
Concluding thoughts: suggestions for future research  
Something that was confirmed over and over again during my fieldwork was a reluctance to 
speak about sensitive topics. Due to an over‐emphasis on consensus and unity, conflicting or 
unsuitable opinions are glossed over. Another inappropriate subject, besides those mentioned 
already, is to criticize the Dalai Lama. Although some activists have earlier done so, this has not 
been without subsequent sanctions.   
 I remember one particular incident during my fieldwork when I was talking to a SFT 
activist. I told her that one well‐established Tibetan scholar in Dharamsala had encouraged me 
to trace the reason for the self‐immolations to the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. “It is about time 
these Dalai Lama people get a hard time”, he had said. Soon after he said this, I had begun to 
make connections, and as I shared these with the SFT activist, she looked at me, a bit stunned 
and said, “But Harman, you cannot say that loud”, laughing lightly. The reason was that I had 
related the self‐immolations to the Middle Way policy of the Dalai Lama, adopted one year prior 
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to the Nobel Peace Prize, and implied that the Middle Way was the indirect cause of these 
desperate protests. This connection was not entirely my own, but had been expressed to me by a 
few rangzen supporters who, while some uttered it directly, others did so more subtly. A 
possible topic for future research, and more extensive fieldwork than mine, would be to look 
more deeply into the creation of consensus in exile, and in what ways it is produced and 
maintained. Another related but not sufficiently studied topic is the exercise of social control in 
exile, especially at a time when conflicts arise in more explicit ways, and how they are kept from 
openly erupting. As the Dalai Lama grows old, it would also be interesting to look at possible 
directions in which the exile movement could evolve, and in what ways unity and continuity 
could be secured after the passing of the Dalai Lama.  
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Self-immolations after December 16, 2014 (not included in the map):  
141 Tsepey, F, 19, 22 Dec 2014. Ngaba, Amdo (Sichuan). 
142 Kalsang Yeshe, M, late 20s or 30s, Monk, 23 Dec 2014. Tawu, Kham (Sichuan). 
143 Norchuk, F, late 40s, 5 Mar 2015. Ngaba, Amdo (Sichuan). 
145 Yeshi Kandro, F, 40s, Nun, 8 Apr 2015. Kardze, Kham (Sichuan). 
146 Neykyab, M, 40s or 50s, 16 Apr 2015. Ngaba, Amdo (Sichuan). 
147 Tenzin Gyatso, M, early 30s, 20 May 2015. Tawu, Kham (Sichuan).  
148 Sangye Tso, F, 36, 27 May 2015. Kanlho, Amdo (Gansu). 
149 Sonam Tobgyal, M, late 20s, Monk, 9 Jul 2015. Kyegudo, Amdo (Qinghai).  
 
The map has been put together by Christophe Besuchet and is taken from: 
http://www.rangzen.net/downloads/Map_TsampaRevolution_20141216_EN_XXL.jpg 
(acc.10.08.2015). 
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Figure 22: Prayer flags in the korlam.                        
                                                                 Look into the deep blue sky above 
      my lama has returned 
      into the tent with white rock steps 
      look, my Tibetan brothers and sisters 
      look at the peak of that snow mountain 
      the white snow lion has returned 
      look, my Tibetan brothers and sisters 
      look at the fortress in the forest 
      look at the beauty of the turquoise plain 
      my tigress has come back.  
 
Some of the last words of nun Sangay Dolma,  
self‐immolated on November 25, 2012.  
